Unit History of the
87th Chemical Mortar Battalion
22 May 1943 to 6 November 1945
Abbreviations and their meanings for casualties:
KIA - Killed In Action
MIA - Missing In Action
DOW - Died Of Wounds
DOI - Died Of Injuries
LWA - Lightly Wounded in Action
LIA - Lightly Injured in Action
SWA - Seriously Wounded in Action
SIA - Seriously Injured in Action
"Wounds" usually meant that they were caused by enemy action.
"Injuries" usually meant that they were caused by accidents, premature explosions of our own mortar shells, etc.
"DOW" and "DOI" meant that death occurred on a date later than the date of the wounds or injuries.
Preparing for combat
May 1943
Across the ocean Assault on the continent
June 1943
July 1943
August 1943
September 1943
October 1943
November 1943
December 1943
January 1944
February 1944
March 1944June 1944
Supported units
July 1944
August 1944
September 1944
October 1944
November 1944
December 1944
January 1945
February 1945
March 1945
April 1945
May 1945
June 1945
July 1945
August 1945
September 1945
October 1945
November 1945
Attachments and campaigns
Preparing for combat
May 1943
22 May 1943, Item 1: 87th Sep Cml Bn, Mtz, activated at Cp Rucker, Ala., pursuant to authority contained in letter, AG 322.095-7, HQ 2nd Army, Memphis, Tenn., 14 May 1943, subject: Letter Orders No. A-256 (Activation of the 87th Cml. Bn.), with a strength of 6 officers and 1 enlisted man, obtained by transfer from other organizations.
23 May 1943, Item 2: Strength increased to 8 officers and 72 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
24 May 1943, Item 3: Strength increased to 11 officers and 101 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
25 May 1943, Item 4: Strength increased to 13 officers and 104 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Cadre training began.
26 May 1943, Item 5: Strength increased to 112 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
27 May 1943, Item 6: Strength increased to 118 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
28 May 1943, Item 7: Strength increased to 127 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
30 May 1943, Item 8: Strength increased to 146 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
31 May 1943, Item 9: Strength increased to 16 officers, obtained by transfer.
June 1943
2 June 1943, Item 10: Strength increased to 157 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Road march to Claybank Creek and return. Distance 5 miles.
3 June 1943, Item 11: Strength increased to 17 officers, decreased to 150 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
4 June 1943, Item 12: Strength increased to 18 officers and 158 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
6 June 1943, Item 13: Strength increased to 165 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
7 June 1943, Item 14: Strength increased to 20 officers and 168 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
8 June 1943, Item 15: Strength increased to 166 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
9 June 1943, Item 16: Strength increased to 167 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Road march to New Enterprise Highway and return. Distance 10 miles.
10 June 1943, Item 17: Strength increased to 178 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
11 June 1943, Item 18: Strength increased to 22 officers and 184 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
12 June 1943, Item 19: Strength increased to 24 officers and 189 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
14 June 1943, Item 20: Strength increased to 33 officers and 190 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 June 1943, Item 21: Road march to Lake Tholocco and return. Distance 12 miles.
17 June 1943, Item 22: Strength increased to 210 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. One enlisted man, S/Sgt Philip Francis, 34142121, died as a result of sunstroke.
19 June 1943, Item 23: Strength increased to 37 officers and 214 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 June 1943, Item 24: Strength increased to 38 officers, obtained by transfer.
21 June 1943, Item 25. Strength increased to 222 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
22 June 1943, Item 26: Strength increased to 223 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
23 June 1943, Item 27: Strength increased to 226 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
24 June 1943, Item 28: Road march to Lake Tholocco. Distance 6 miles.
25 June 1943, Item 29: Strength increased to 274 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
July 1943
1 July 1943, Item 30: Road march and cross-country hike to Lake Tholocco. Distance 6 miles.
2 July 1943, Item 31: Strength increased to 39 officers, obtained by transfer.
5 July 1943, Item 32: Strength increased to 275 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
6 July 1943, Item 33: Road march to Lake Tholocco. Distance 10 miles.
8 July 1943, Item 34: Strength increased to 40 officers, obtained by transfer.
10 July 1943, Item 35: Strength decreased to 38 officers, obtained by transfer.
13 July 1943, Item 36: Battalion personnel present subjected to overhead machine gun fire.
14 July 1943, Item 37: Strength increased to 39 officers and 277 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Road march toward New Enterprise Highway. Distance 13 miles.
15 July 1943, Item 38: Strength decreased to 276 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 July 1943, Item 39: Strength increased to 277 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
17 July 1943, Item 40: Strength decreased to 276 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 July 1943, Item 41: Road march to Lake Tholocco and return. Distance 15 miles.
21 July 1943, Item 42: Strength decreased to 275 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
23 July 1943, Item 43: Strength increased to 323 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
24 July 1943, Item 44: Strength increased to 324 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Entire battalion present fired Course B for record using Springfield .30 Cal. Model 1903 Rifles.
26 July 1943, Item 45: Strength increased to 325 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
27 July 1943, Item 46: Strength decreased to 320 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
31 July 1943, Item 47: Strength decreased to 297 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
August 1943
1 August 1943, Item 48: Pre-MTP instituted.
2 August 1943, Item 49: Strength decreased to 291 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
4 August 1943, Item 50: Strength decreased to 290 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
6 August 1943, Item 51: Strength increased to 40 officers, obtained by transfer.
9 August 1943, Item 52: Strength increased to 562 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. The 87th Cml. Bn, Mtz. relieved from assignment from 2nd Army and assigned to III Corps.
10 August 1943, Item 53: Strength decreased to 559 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
11 August 1943, Item 54: Strength decreased to 558 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 August 1943, Item 55: 82 EM fired Course C with M1903 rifles, 252 recruits fired familiarization course with M1903 rifles.
18 August 1943, Item 56: Strength decreased to 557 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 August 1943, Item 57: Strength increased to 657 enlisted men and decreased to 39 officers, obtained by transfer.
21 August 1943, Item 58: Strength decreased to 655 enlisted men and 37 officers, obtained by transfer.
22 August 1943, Item 59: Strength increased to 755 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
23 August 1943, Item 60: Strength increased to 38 officers, obtained by transfer.
24 August 1943, Item 61: Four Chemical Companies made road march to Lake Tholocco. Distance marched 6 miles.
25 August 1943, Item 62: Strength decreased to 754 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
27 August 1943, Item 63: Strength increased to 777 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
28 August 1943, Item 64: Strength decreased to 774 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
29 August 1943, Item 65: Strength increased to 893 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
30 August 1943, Item 66: MTP instituted.
September 1943
2 September 1943, Item 67: Strength increased to 39 officers, obtained by transfer.
3 September 1943, Item 68: Strength increased to 905 enlisted men and decreased to 38 officers, obtained by transfer.
4 September 1943, Item 69: Strength decreased to 898 enlisted men and increased to 1 Warrant Officer, obtained by transfer.
5 September 1943, Item 70: Strength decreased to 897 enlisted men and 35 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, obtained by transfer.
6 September 1943, Item 71: Strength decreased to 894 enlisted men and increased to 36 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, obtained by transfer.
7 September 1943, Item 72: Strength decreased to 893 enlisted men and 35 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, obtained by transfer.
9 September 1943, Item 73: Strength decreased to 883 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
10 September 1943, Item 74: Strength decreased to 853 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
11 September 1943, Item 75: Strength increased to 859 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
13 September 1943, Item 76: Strength decreased to 34 officers, obtained by transfer.
14 September 1943, Item 77: Strength decreased to 856 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
15 September 1943, Item 78: Strength decreased to 853 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 September 1943, Item 79: Strength decreased to 852 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 September 1943, Item 80: Strength increased to 886 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
22 September 1943, Item 81: Strength decreased to 885 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
23 September 1943, Item 82: Strength decreased to 884 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
24 September 1943, Item 83: Strength increased to 885 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
25 September 1943, Item 84: Strength decreased to 883 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Administration records inspected by IGD, III Corps. Battalion stood Command Inspection by Battalion Commander.
26 September 1943, Item 85: Strength increased to 2 Warrant officers, obtained by appointment.
28 September 1943, Item 86: Strength decreased to 880 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
29 September 1943, Item 87: Strength increased to 886 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
30 September 1943, Item 88: Strength decreased to 883 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
October 1943
1 October 1943, Item 89: Strength decreased to 882 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
1 October 1943, Item 90: Battalion stood Command Inspection, CG, III Corps.
2 October 1943, Item 91: Battalion witnessed 4.2" Chemical Mortar Shoot, Artillery Range, Camp Rucker, Alabama.
4 October 1943, Item 92: Strength increased to 35 officers, decreased to 880 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
5 October 1943, Item 93: Strength increased to 36 officers, obtained by transfer.
6 October 1943, Item 94: Captain Stone, Ass't Chemical Officer, Second Army on tour of inspection; strength decreased to 879 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
8 October 1943, Item 95: Strength decreased to 877 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
9 October 1943, Item 96: Strength increased to 37 officers, obtained by transfer.
10 October 1943,Item 97: Strength increased to 38 officers, decreased to 876 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
11 October 1943, Item 98: Battalion reorganized under T/O 3-25 dated 7 September 1943. Strength increased to 40 officers, decreased to 874 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
12 October 1943, Item 99: Battalion moved by motor to bivouac 14 miles NW of Camp Rucker, Alabama at 0700 to conduct MTP in field. Strength increased to 41 officers, obtained by transfer.
13 October 1943, Item 100: Strength increased to 42 officers, decreased to 861 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
14 October 1943, Item 101: Strength decreased to 850 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
15 October 1943, Item 102: Battalion moved from bivouac 14 miles NW of Camp Rucker, Alabama, to Camp Rucker by motor 1500.
16 October 1943, Item 103: Strength decreased to 41 officers, 842 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
17 October 1943, Item 104: Strength decreased to 40 officers, obtained by transfer.
18 October 1943, Item 105: Strength decreased to 840 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
19 October 1943, Item 106: Strength decreased to 795 enlisted men, obtained, by transfer.
20 October 1943, Item 107: MTP training, Camp Rucker, Alabama, strength increased to 820 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
21 October 1943, Item 108: Major Batte promoted to Lt. Colonel effective 18 October 1943. Colonel Bonner, 2nd Army Chemical Officer on tour of inspection, 21-24 October, inclusive. Strength decreased to 819 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
24 October 1943, Item 109: Lt. Colonel Batte from duty to temporary duty, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. Major Slovak assumed command.
25 October 1943, Item 110: Strength decreased to 816 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
28 October 1943, Item 111: Strength increased to 41 officers, decreased to 813 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
29 October 1943, Item 112: Weapons inspected by 2nd Army Inspection Team.
30 October 1943, Item 113: Motors inspected by 2nd Army Inspection Team, strength decreased to 811 enlisted men1 obtained by transfer.
31 October 1943, Item 114: MTP training, Camp Rucker, Alabama, strength decreased to 810 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
November 1943
1 November 1943, Item 115: Strength decreased to 758 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
2 November 1943, Item 116: Lt. Colonel Batte resumed command. Strength decreased to 757 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
3 November 1943, Item 117: Strength decreased to 756 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
4 November 1943, Item 118: Strength decreased to 755 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
5 November 1943, Item 119: Strength decreased to 40 officers, 616 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
7 November 1943, Item 120: Strength increased to 617 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
8 November 1943, Item 121: Strength decreased to 39 officers, obtained by transfer.
9 November 1943, Item 122: Battalion moved by motor to bivouac 14 miles NW of Camp Rucker, Alabama, to conduct MTP training in the field. Strength increased to 40 officers, obtained by transfer.
10 November 1943, Item 123: MTP training 1-10 November 1943.
11 November 1943, Item 124: Battalion moved by motor to bivouac 5 miles NW of Camp Rucker, Alabama, at 0300. Colonel Wanamaker, III Corps Chemical Officer and Captain Luedke, Ass't Chemical Officer, on tour of inspection. Strength decreased to 39 officers, obtained by transfer.
12 November 1943, Item 125: Battalion moved from bivouac 5 miles NW of Camp Rucker, Alabama, to camp. Strength increased to 41 officers, obtained by transfer.
14 November 1943, Item 126: Strength increased to 42 officers, obtained by transfer.
15 November 1943, Item 127: Strength increased to 47 officers, obtained by transfer.
18 November 1943, Item 128: Strength increased to 48 officers, obtained by transfer.
19 November 1943, Item 129: Strength decreased to 617 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 November 1943, Item 130: MTP training, Camp Rucker, Alabama, 11-20 November, 1943.
22 November 1943, Item 131: Colonel Rankine, Army Ground Forces Chemical Officer, on tour of inspection. Motors and arms inspection by 2nd Army inspection team.
24 November 1943, Item 132: Battalion completed transition firing, rifle caliber .30, M1903.
25 November 1943, Item 133: Strength decreased to 47 officers, obtained by transfer.
27 November 1943, Item 134: Colonel Bonner, 2nd Army Chemical Officer, inspected and observed Battalion in training. Strength decreased to 616 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
28 November 1943, Item 135: Strength decreased to 614 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
29 November 1943, Item 136: Strength decreased to 613 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
30 November 1943, Item 137: MTP training, Camp Rucker, Alabama, 21-30 November, 1943.
December 1943
2 December 1943, Item 138: Strength decreased to 611 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
4 December 1943, Item 139: Strength decreased to 46 officers, obtained by transfer.
6 December 1943, Item 140: Colonel St. John, Office Chief Chemical Warfare Service on tour of inspection and observation of battalion.
9 December 1943, Item 141: Motors inspected by inspector, 2nd Army. Strength decreased to 45 officers, obtained by transfer. Increased to 46 officers.
10 December 1943, Item 142: MTP training, Camp Rucker, Alabama, 1-10 Dec 43. Strength decreased to 610 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
11 December 1943, Item 143: Strength decreased to 605 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
13 December 1943, Item 144: Battalion started on MTP test given by III Corps.
14 December 1943, Item 145: Battalion completed test given by III Corps.
15 December 1943, Item 146: Annual inspection by Inspector General started. Strength decreased to 45 officers, obtained by transfer.
16 December 1943, Item 147: Annual inspection by Inspector General completed. All units satisfactory with the exception of Company B which was rated EXCELLENT.
20 December 1943, Item 148: MTP training and test, Camp Rucker, Alabama, 10-11 Dec 43; UTP Camp Rucker, Alabama, 15-20 Dec 43.
22 December 1943, Item 149: Strength decreased to 608 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
27 December 1943, Item 150: Strength increased to 46 officers, obtained by transfer.
31 December 1943, Item 151: MTP continued, Camp Rucker, Alabama, 21-31 Dec 431.
January 1944
1 January 1944, Item 1: Strength decreased to 45 officers, 607 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
2 January 1944, Item 2: Colonel Orsonger, III Corps G-4, on tour of inspection.
10 January 1944, Item 3: Strength increased to 46 officers, obtained by transfer. UTP continued.
11 January 1944, Item 4: Strength decreased to 45 officers, obtained by transfer.
12 January 1944, Item 5: Strength decreased to 44 officers, obtained by transfer.
13 January 1944, Item 6: 87th Chemical Battalion, Mtz, relieved from assignment to III Corps and assigned to IX Corps. Strength decreased to 43 officers, obtained by transfer.
15 January 1944, Item 7: Strength decreased to 604 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 January 1944, Item 8: Maneuver umpire detail, 2 officers and 49 enlisted men departed at 0800 for Camp Forrest, Tennessee, by Government Motor Transportation.
17 January 1944, Item 9: Strength decreased to 602 enlisted men obtained by transfer.
20 January 1944, Item 10: Battalion moved by motor to a point 15 miles NW of Camp Rucker, Alabama, to bivouac for platoon combat firing. UTP continued, Camp Rucker, Alabama. Strength decreased to 601 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
21 January 1944, Item 11: Battalion moved by motor to Camp Rucker, Alabama at 1800.
23 January 1944, Item 12: Battalion completed infiltration course.
24 January 1944, Item 13: Major Keuron, IX Corps Chemical Officer, on tour of inspection.
26 January 1944, Item 14: Strength decreased to 600 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
27 January 1944, Item 15: Strength increased to 601 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
29 January 1944, Item 16: Strength increased to 602 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
31 January 1944, Item 17: Battalion departed from Camp Rucker, Alabama, enroute to the Tennessee Maneuver Area at 0600. Arrived at Fort McClellan, Alabama, at 1700. Movement was by motor. 11-30 January 44, UTP continued. Preparation undergone for movement to Maneuver #5, Tennessee Maneuver Area.
February 1944
1 February 1944, Item 18: Departed from Fort McClellan, Alabama at 0700. Arrived Huntsville Arsenal, Alabama at 1500, movement by motor.
2 February 1944, Item 19: Departed from Huntsville Arsenal, Alabama at 0700. Arrived at Camp Forrest, Tennessee at 1430. Strength increased to 603 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
3 February 1944, Item 20: Battalion relieved from assignment to IX Corps and assigned to Second Army; further attached to 11th Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army, Camp Forrest, Tennessee.
5 February 1944, Item 21: Strength decreased to 602 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
6 February 1944, Item 22: All personnel of the Battalion fired transition course with carbine, M1.
9 February 1944, Item 23: Strength decreased to 601 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
10 February 1944, Item 24: Battalion completed combat firing. Strength decreased to 600 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
11 February 1944, Item 25: Strength increased to 625 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
12 February 1944, Item 26: Battalion completed Air-Ground Liaison Test given by 11th Detachment, Special Troops. Results-excellent.
13 February 1944, Item 27: Approximately 450 officers and enlisted men departed on leave for furlough for eight days.
15 February 1944, Item 28: Strength decreased to 624 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 February 1944, Item 29: Lt. Col. Batte from duty to leave. Major Slovak assumed command. Strength increased to 634 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
18 February 1944, Item 30: Strength decreased to 633 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 February 1944, Item 31: Period 11-20 February 1944, special training continued. Strength decreased to 632 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
21 February 1944, Item 32: Strength decreased to 631 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
23 February 1944, Item 33: Lt. Col. Batte from leave to duty and resumed command.
25 February 1944, Item 34: Strength decreased to 624 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
29 February 1944, Item 35: Special training continued.
March 1944
1 March 1944, Item 36: Strength decreased to 625 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
2 March 1944, Item 37: Strength decreased to 624 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
4 March 1944, Item 38: Strength decreased to 618 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
5 March 1944, Item 39: Strength decreased to 41 officers, obtained by transfer.
6 March 1944, Item 40: Strength decreased to 40 officers, 616 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
7 March 1944, Item 41: Battalion inspected by Second Army Inspector General.
9 March 1944, Item 42: Battalion observed by AGF Inspector, Brigadier General Donavon. Battalion completed night infiltration course.
10 March 1944, Item 43: Special training continued at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.
11 March 1944, Item 44: Strength decreased to 601 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
16 March 1944, Item 45: Strength decreased to 596 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
18 March 1944, Item 46: Strength decreased to 589 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
20 March 1944, Item 47: Special training continued at Camp Forrest, Tennessee. Battalion restricted to area at approximately 1500 hours prior to movement to staging area. Strength decreased to 582 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
23 March 1944, Item 48: Battalion departed from Camp Forrest, Tennessee for permanent change of station, via rail, to Camp Shanks, New York. Accommodations excellent on train.
25 March 1944, Item 49: Battalion arrived at Camp Shanks, New York. Medical Detachment, Company C and Company D arrived at 0630. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Company A and Company B arrived at 1235.
27 March 1944, Item 50: Strength increased to 586 enlisted men, obtained by transfer. Bn cleared at Camp Shanks, and 50% of personnel allowed 12 hour pass to N.Y.
28 March 1944, Item 51: Battalion restricted to area at approximately 0800 prior to departing from Camp Shanks, New York for New York P. O. E.
30 March 1944, Item 52: Medical Detachment, Company C and Company D departed Camp Shanks, New York via rail for permanent change of station to NYPE at 1500. Embarked upon HMT Queen Elizabeth. Strength decreased to 584 enlisted men obtained by transfer of two AWOL's.
31 March 1944, Item 53: Headquarters Detachment, Company A and Company B departed from Camp Shanks, New York for permanent change of station to NYPE by rail at 0445. Embarked HMT Queen Elizabeth. Vessel left New York Harbor for European Theater of Operations at approximately 1300. Accommodations aboard ship proved excellent. Strength decreased to 582 enlisted men, obtained by transfer of two AWOL's.
Across the ocean
April 1944
6 April 1944, Item 54: Vessel sighted land this date. Steamed up Firth of Clyde and anchored off Geenock, Scotland. Trip had been pleasant, seas calm, weather clear, morale excellent. Strength decreased to 581 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
7 April 1944, Item 55: Headquarters Detachment, Medical Detachment and Company A debarked from HMT Queen Elizabeth at 0800, enroute to Tiverton in Devon County, England via rail. Battalion assigned to First United States Army, attached to VII Corps and further attached to 4th Infantry Division. Strength decreased to 579 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
8 April 1944, Item 56: Headquarters Detachment, Medical Detachment and Company A arrived at Tiverton, Devon County, England at 0900. Company B, Company C and Company D debarked HMT Queen Elizabeth 1030 enroute to Tiverton, Devon. The advance detail of two officers and one enlisted man which had left the unit 1 March 1944 were rejoined.
9 April 1944, Item 57: Company B, Company C and Company D arrived at Tiverton, Devon County, England at 1000.
22 April 1944, Item 58: Company D at reduced strength departed Tiverton, Devon by motor for combined training in water and land operation.
23 April 1944, Item 59: Companies A, B and C, at reduced strength departed Tiverton, Devon for combined operations and training. Arrived at marshalling area by motor.
24 April 1944, Item 60: Strength increased to 580 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
24 April 1944, Item 61: Personnel participating in problem left marshaling area and boarded troop transports.
27 April 1944, Item 62: Units left troop transports via small landing craft and landed on beach at Slapton Sands; with complete equipment, moved to support of 8th and 22nd Infantry Regiments, 4th Division. Strength increased to 581 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
28 April 1944, Item 63: Battalion moved in support of Infantry and set up mortars in alternate positions. Moved toward completion of maneuver.
29 April 1944, Item 64: Company D, at reduced strength returned to Tiverton, Devon.
30 April 1944, Item 65: Companies A, B and C, at reduced strength returned to Tiverton, Devon from combined training in water and land operations.
May 1944
1 May 1944, Item 66: Battalion authorized change in equipment per instructions of First United States Army. Shall receive 90 light cargo carriers, M-29, in place of a similar amount of 1/4-ton trucks, which are to be turned in.
2 May 1944, Item 67: Battalion alerted for departure.
8 May 1944, Item 68: Strength decreased to 580 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
9 May 1944, Item 69: Last of cargo carriers received and jeeps turned in.
11 May 1944, Item 70: Strength decreased to 579 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
15 May 1944, Item 71: Companies A, B, C & D, at reduced strength departed from Tiverton for marshaling areas via motor for combined operations with other arms.
16 May 1944, Item 72: Battalion Commander plus portion of staff left Tiverton for marshaling area for combined operations with other arms; strength decreased to 577 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
18 May 1944, Item 73: Strength increased to 579 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
25 May 1944, Item 74: Strength decreased to 578 enlisted men, obtained by transfer.
31 May 1944, Item 75: 113th Chemical Processing Company (strength 5 officers, 120 enlisted men) arrived Tiverton on detached service from home station, Bristol for training purposes.
June 1944
1 June 1944, Item 76: Orders placing 113th Chemical Processing Company on detached service with 87th Chemical Battalion, Mtz., amended to attach unit instead. Strength increased to 42 officers, 699 enlisted men.
2-4 June 1944, Item 77: Assault group of Battalion embarked on board ships prior to sailing for French coast.
4-5 June 1944, Item 78: Combined naval and land forces underway across English Channel for assault on France.
Assault on the continent
D-Day on Utah Beach
After approximately seven weeks of intensive preparations following arrival in the United Kingdom, the 87th Chemical Battalion moved to marshalling areas to begin operation NEPTUNE. 440 officers and men and 67 vehicles comprised the assault wave. The remainder of the Battalion, known as the residue, were left in bivouac at Tiverton and were to follow on D plus 8. After approximately 10 days in the marshaling area, the assault echelons of Companies A, B and D loaded onto their respective types of transportation at Torquay; Battalion Headquarters loaded at Dartmouth; and Company C loaded at Plymouth. This was the last that the Battalion Commander saw of any of the companies until after the landing on Utah Beach.
At 1800, 3 June 1944, the Battalion Commander's party, which was on the same boat with the Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Regimental landing team, weighed anchor and stood out to sea. After the breakwater had been crossed, Colonel Van Fleet announced that D-Day would be Monday, June 5, H-Hour 0650. During the night bad weather set in; D-Day and H-Hour were postponed for 25 hours. The approximately 62 hours spent on this LCT in the English Channel was a rather miserable, never-to-be-forgotten experience. Salt spray fell across the craft at all times and the decks had from one-half to an inch of water washing about at all times. The majority of the occupants were seasick and conditions were crowded. In spite of this, spirits were good and morale excellent in anticipation of the momentous occasion. The huge invasion fleet was a very inspiring sight.
The coast of France was approached on the morning of 6 June. there was a great roar and rumble in the distance and the huge flashes were observed every few seconds. The Battalion Commander's party transferred to an LCVP along with the Regimental Landing Team party at about 17,000 yards from shore and touched down on the coast of France at H plus 50. Companies A, B, C and D likewise transferred from ships to LCVP's at approximately 17,000 yards from shore and proceeded to a landing.
The entire battalion had been attached to the 4th Infantry Division and sub-attached to the 8th Infantry RLT. The following attachments were made within the 8th Infantry RLT:
Company A to the 1st Battalion Company B to the 2nd Battalion Company C to the 3rd Battalion Company D to the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, which was also attached to the 8th Infantry RLT 6 June 1944, Item 79 (D-Day) (H-Hour - 0630): Company A and Company B landed at H plus 50 and set up on the beach ready to deliver fire on call from its forward observers who had landed with the leading infantry waves at H-Hour. Company A fired 20 rounds and Company B fired 80 rounds. After approximately 40 minutes, both companies moved inland in order to keep up with the advance of the battalions which they were supporting.
Companies C and D landed at H plus 90 and set up on the beach, ready to deliver fire on call from its forward observers who had landed with the leading waves of the supported infantry units at H plus 50. Company C fired 10 rounds and Company D fired 30 rounds before displacing forward with their supported units. Battalion Headquarters operated with Headquarters 8th Infantry RLT.
It is interesting to note that the first time this battalion had ever fired over the heads of its own troops was on the battlefield and against an armed enemy. This battalion was the sole "artillery" support for the 4th Division for approximately 6 hours. At all times the mortar companies kept pace with the advance of the supported infantry and were always in position, ready to fire when called upon by the forward observers. The infantry was amazed at the rapidity and accuracy with which our mortars replied. Enemy strong points, machine gun emplacements, pill boxes, and even concrete emplacements were brought under fire during the initial hours of the assault.
In the landing, two mortars and two vehicles were lost as a result of the sinking of LCVP's. No personnel were lost at sea, however, one man killed and that by a direct hit into a foxhole, this, despite rather severe enemy shelling of the beach.
Bn CP moved inland from Utah Beach via Ste Marie-Du-Mcnt, closing in vicinity of Les Forge, CR (363932) at 062000 June.
Strength decreased to 41 officers and 695 enlisted men. Casualties:
0-1535529, Shouse, Harold W., 2nd Lt, KIA, Co C
33655680, Smith, Frederick R., PFC, KIA, Co C
35644934, Richey, Herman L., Pvt, SWA, Co A
13081250, Montgomery, James, Cpl, LWA, Co D
51549262, Trent, William T., Cpl, LWA, Co A Beyond the beach
7 June 1944, Item 80 (D plus 1): Co A, Co B and Co C continued to support the battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment in their advance towards Ste. Mere Eglise. Company D continued to support the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Infantry north along the beach towards Quineville. Approximately 1500 rounds were fired by the battalion during the 24-hour period on strong points and personnel. By this time the supported infantry had begun to appreciate the terrific firepower which the mortar companies could deliver. Bn CP closed I mile NE of Ste. Mere Eglise (351967) at 071900.
First build-up left Tiverton, Devon at 0700 for marshalling area. Arrived Falmouth, Cornwall at 1800. Build-up of Co A, Co B and Co C embarked ship. HQ Det and Co D returned to marshalling area to spend the night.
Strength decreased to 692 enlisted men. Casualties:
32277928, Walker, Robert C., 1st Sgt, KIA, Co D
32925289, Plubell, Francis L., Pvt, IMA, Co D-Med
31366954, Stubb, Frank R., Jr., Cpl, LWA Co D 8 June 1944, Item 81 (D plus 2): Company A was detached from the 8th Infantry Regiment and attached to the 12th Infantry at 0630 to support the attack of this regiment north towards Montebourg. This placed at least one mortar company with each combat team of the 4th Infantry Division. On two occasions, counterattacks were stopped by intense barrages delivered by this company and a number of rounds were placed on enemy positions. Company B and Company C remained attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment and moved north with the 1st and 2nd Battalions, respectively, towards Montebourg. While displacing forward to a new position, just north of Ste. Mere Eglise, Company B came under very heavy shell fire at 1020. This shellfire hit the road without prior registration. Lieutenant Taylor and four men were seriously wounded. Two mortars and two M-29 Cargo Carriers were put out of action. Company B was reorganized by the Battalion Commander who came upon the scene approximately one hour and a half later, into one platoon of six mortars and led forward into action. Ammunition and equipment was salvaged from the shelled vehicles and fired several hours later by which time this company had worked its mortars up close to two casemented positions believed to contain 88mm guns, fired upon and silenced them. Company D fired approximately 800 rounds in support of operations of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Regiment in its advance north along the beach. Well-prepared enemy positions were encountered and both HE and WP were used with great effect.
Bn CP closed I mile NW of FRESVILLE (318007) at 082330. Remainder of first build-up embarked ship at 1300. Second build-up departed from Tiverton, Devon by motor convoy at 1730 for Plymouth marshaling area.
Strength decreased to 39 officers and 681 enlisted men. Casualties:
33698853, St. Clair, William E. Jr., Cpl, SWA, Co C
34826500, Fowler, Thomas J., Pvt, DOW, HQ Det
31386119, Ventriglia, Pasquale, PFC, SWA, Co C
0-1038499, Taylor, Ray O., 1st Lt, SWA, Co B
31379140, O'Connell, Harold F., T/5, LWA, Co A
36685248, Miller, Adolph, Pvt, LWA, Co B
51567268, Berry, Frederick W., Pvt, LWA, Co B
31556992, Fordell, Edward E., Pvt, LWA, Co B
33246909, Albright, John, Sgt, LWA, Co B
31588273, Bernatowicz, Bonificious J., Cpl, LWA, Co B
0-1555562, Cable, William H., 2nd Lt, LWA, Co A 9 June 1944, Item 82 (D plus 3): At 0600, Company B was detached from 8th Inf, 4th Div and transferred across the VII Corps front and attached to the 101st A/B Division to provide supporting fire for the bridging of the Douve River and the resulting attack on Carentan. Company A fired approximately 800 rounds in support of operations of the 12th Inf Regt. Company C continued to support the 8th Inf Regt in the attack on the ridge line southwest of Montebourg. Two hundred rounds were fired in two hours. 0n three occasions, barrages were laid down against enemy counterattacks.
Company D continued to support the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Inf Regt and fired approximately 900 rounds. Progress over this well-defended terrain was very difficult and slow. During the night an ammunition truck containing approximately 100 rounds of HE was destroyed by enemy shellfire while parked in a bivouac position of the 2nd Battalion.
No change in location of CP. Second build-up arrived Plympton, Devon at 0230.
10 June 1944, Item 83 (D plus 4): Company A attached to the 12th Inf Regt. Company C, attached to the 8th Inf Regt, and Company D, attached to the 22nd Inf Regt, continued to support advance of the 4th Inf Div to the west and east of Monteb0urg. Approximately 1,500 rounds were fired against enemy counterattacks and enemy positions.
Company B fired approximately 400 rounds of WP to assist the crossing of the Douve River of the 101st A/B Division. This screen was highly effective and successful.At approximately 0130, Captain Henry S. Williams, Commander of Company D was killed when an enemy anti-personnel airplane bomb landed approximately one foot from him while he was going from the 1st platoon to the 2nd platoon in order to inspect positions.
Bn Cp closed 1.5 miles SW of Montebourg (308054) 101200. Second build-up departed the marshalling area at Plymouth at 1700 and boarded the Liberty ship SS John Henry.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 678 enlisted men. Casualties:
0-1035102, Williams, Henry S., Captain, KIA, Co D
37666640, McQuiston, Warren K., T/5, KIA, Co D
0-1038499, Taylor, Ray 0., 1st Lt, DOW, Co B
6994339, Atkinson, Walter G. Jr., S/Sgt, SWA, Co D
31579568, Gentile, Alfred Jr., Cpl, LWA, Co D 11 June 1944, Item 84 (D plus 5): Company A continued to fire numerous missions in support of the advance of the 12th Inf Regt northward in the vicinity of Ozeville. Company C, because of losses in equipment and vehicles from enemy action, was reorganized by the Bn Commander into one platoon of five mortars and at 1100 was detached from the 8th Inf Regt and attached to the 101st A/B Div.
Company B was attached to the 101st A/B Div at the same time and these two companies materially assisted in the rapidity with which the city of Carentan capitulated. The companies fired both HE and WP. The employment of WP had a huge psychological effect on the defenders and is officially credited by the Division G-3 with having been a contributing factor in the sudden capitulation of the defending forces. Not until approximately 20 rounds were fired into the city did the Germans surrender.
Company D was detached from the 22nd Inf Regt and attached to the 8th Inf Regt and took up positions just south of Montebourg.
Bn CP closed 1 mile NW of Fresville (318007) 112300. First build-up landed in France and remained in vicinity of Utah Beach overnight. Second build-up departed from Plymouth, England enroute to France.
Strength decreased to 57 officers and 673 enlisted men. Casualties:
35698892, Wilkevich, Joseph R., Cpl, KIA, Co A
56215916, Simon, Leonard E., T/4, SWA, Co C
35751804, Redman, Joseph A., Cpl, SWA, Co A
51367006, Morison, Robert L., T/5, DOW, Co C
56580752, Sobole, Arthur W., Cpl, LWA, Co C
0-1058420, Leah, Lawrence D., 1st Lt, LWA, Co A 12 June 1944, Item 85 (D plus 6): Company A, detached from 12th Inf Regt and attached to the 22nd Inf Regt, moved to that sector in the morning. Companies B and C were detached from the 101st A/B and attached to the 12th and 22nd Inf Regts, respectively of the 4th Inf Div.
Company B was very effective in providing supporting fire for the 8th Inf Regt in operations west of Montebourg. On two occasions enemy counter attacks were stopped cold by the accurate adjustment of mortar fire upon the advancing forces.
Bn CP closed 5 miles NE of Ste. Mere Eglise (542013) 120900. Battalion residue began to arrive during the late afternoon from the United Kingdom, bringing with them much needed personnel and vehicles. Casualties:
6949768, Czerwinski, John, 1st Sgt, KIA, Co C
31388958, Abdallah, George, T/5, LWA, Co D
31579332, Faber, Harry W. Sgt, LWA, Co A 13 June 1944, Item 86 (D plus 7): Companies A and C fired approximately 800 rounds each in support of operations of the 22nd Inf Regt. Company B fired approximately 500 rounds in support of the 12th Inf Regt.
Company D fired approximately 1400 rounds of WP and HE in 90 minutes on the city of Montebourg from 2100 to 2230 to support operations of the 8th Inf Regt. The city was fired and completely gutted with resulting great damage. Reconnaissance parties the following morning found only gutted buildings and isolated points of resistance.
No change in location of Bn CP. Battalion second build-up arrived in France; debarked at Utah Beach and proceeded to Ste. Mere Eglise to bivouac area.
Strength decreased to 670 enlisted men. Casualties:
36215916, Simon, Leanord E., T/4, DOW, Co C
33054784, Ermillio, Frank, Pvt, SWA, Co A
31388992, Sheehan, Leonard J., T/5, SWA, Co A 14 June 1944, Item 87 (D plus 8): Companies A and C continued support operations of the 22nd Inf Regt. These companies occupied very favorable positions from which supporting fires were delivered for the attack of this regiment on the ridge line west of Quineville, approximately 400 rounds being fired. All during the day interdictory fire was placed on cross roads in the rear of the enemy positions.
Company B fired prearranged concentrations on cross roads and likely concentration areas in support of the 12th Inf Regt. This Company was attached to the artillery which was supporting the regiment and all such fire was coordinated thru the so-called "Artillery Groupment". This type of set-up works rather successfully in a defensive situation or stationary situation. However, it is not recommended for offensive situations where a close-in, direct support for the infantry is needed and usually on a moment's notice.
Company D fired 1640 rounds during the 24-hour period in support of operations of the 8th Regt on strong points and enemy positions surrounding Montebourg. Harassing and interdictory fire computed from map was also placed on positions in the rear of the enemy lines.
No change in location of Bn CP. Strength increased to 682 enlisted men.
15 June 1944, Item 88 (D plus 9): Companies A and C fired approximately 700 rounds in support of operations of the 22nd Inf Regt operating on the Division's left flank. Company C was subjected to heavy counter battery at 0900. However, there were no casualties. Company B continued to fire missions on call in support of the 12th Inf Regt. All requests for fire were cleared thru the artillery group supporting the regiment.
Company D continued to support operations of the 8th Inf Regt against Montebourg by firing 5000 rounds on enemy positions to the flank and outskirts of the city. HE and WP were also placed on the high ground west of the city which the Germans were using for observation purposes. A new battalion record of 5,582 rounds was fired in a 24-hour period.
At 2100 the battalion was detached from the 4th Inf Div. The battalion, less Co B was attached to the 9th Inf Division at 2100 in order to provide the now much desired mortar support for this division's attack west from Ste. Mere Eglise in order to cut the neck of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Company B was attached to the 82nd A/B Division and moved out at approximately 1400.
16 June 1944, Item 89 (D plus 10): The Battalion, less Company B, was attached to the 9th Inf Div as of 2100 15 June, and further attached to the 39th Inf Regt. Positions are five miles southwest of Ste Mere Eglise. Companies are ready to fire on call.
Company B was attached to the 82nd Air Borne Division as of 2100 15 June. Position is two miles east of St Saveur le Vicomte. Personnel are very tired as a result of ten straight days and nights of almost continuous firing. Morale, however, is still very high.
At 1640 Company A was placed in support of the 2nd Battalion, 39th Inf Regt moved from a bivouac area, approximately six miles to a gun position, established the necessary liaison, dispatched forward observers, and opened fire on an enemy mortar emplacement at 1810. Enemy installations were silenced. The company then proceeded to shell La Calais.
At 1640, Co C and Co D were attached to the 1st Bn of the 39th Inf Regt, and moved forward into position ready to place fire on call. The Battalion received a number of replacements, 3 officers and 97 enlisted men.
Strength increased to 40 officers and 779 enlisted men. Casualties:
33698565, Soltesz, Joseph A., Cpl, LIA, Co C 17 June 1944, Item 90 (D plus 11): The Battalion, less Co B, remained in support of the 39th Inf Regt of the 9th Inf Division and continued the advance to the north and west from Courbesville. At dawn, approximately 600 rounds were fired on Orglandes, an enemy strong point which had held up the advance for six or seven hours. The position was completely, neutralized and all opposition silenced.
At 1400, the Battalion, less Co B, displaced forward in order to continue to be in position to provide close support to the forward units. At 2100, Co A fired five rounds of WP for purposes of adjustment on a suspected enemy strong-point north of Golleville. Six enemy vehicles and four automatic weapons were observed to immediately abandon the area. A short while later, Co A, in support of the 2nd Battalion, fired 100 rounds on an enemy mortar emplacement and on observed hostile personnel.
Co. B, attached to the 82nd Air Borne Division, fired a concentration of HE and WP on St Saveur le Vicomte in advance of our troops entrance into the town. A short while later, Captain Marshall, Commanding Officer of B Company, obtained a direct hit on a M-6 tank with HE at 3000 yards. All during the night, harassing and interdictory fire were placed on the area to the south and west of the town.
General Order #26, Headquarters, First United States Army, this date, cites the 87th Chemical Battalion, Mtz. for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action in the initial assault on the northern coast of Normandy, France, 6 June 1944.
18 June 1944, Item 91 (D plus 12): In order to effect mortar support to the rapid advance of the 39th Infantry Regt across the Cherbourg Peninsula, Co. A was attached directly to the 3rd Battalion in the vicinity of Blandamour, Co. C was attached directly to the 2nd Battalion in the vicinity of Valdecie, Co. D was attached directly to the lst Battalion in the vicinity of St Jacques de Nehan. Battalion headquarters (forward) remained with the 39th Inf Regt CP near St Jacques de Nehan. All companies displaced forward well early in the morning.
Co. B continued to fire support of the 82nd Air Borne Division. An entire German infantry company was brought under heavy HE fire and completely routed; 47 were killed.
At 1500, orders were received from Headquarters VII Corps to the effect that present attachments to the 9th Infantry Division and 82 Air Borne Division were terminated, and that Battalion Headquarters was to proceed to the 313th and 315th Infantry Regiments, respectively, of the 79th Inf Div, and Companies C and D attached to the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments, 4th Inf Div. These companies immediately executed march order, and were in position with their new attachments, six or seven miles distant, ready to fire at 2000.
19 June 1944, Item 92 (D plus 13): At approximately 0300, Company C fired a concentration of HE and WP on targets by map coordinates in preparation for an attack by the 8th Infantry Regiment. Excellent results were obtained from this harassing and interdictory fire. This mission was fired on a very dark night and, while moving and adjusting base plates in order to fire on the various prearranged positions, one mortar worked back under a tree and a round of HE hit an overhanging limb and exploded, seriously injuring one officer and six enlisted men.
Co A and Co B, operating with the 79th Division, fired one mission apiece during the rapid advance of this division northward. Each company displaced forward from four to five times during the day.
Co D, in support of the 12th Infantry Regt, 4th Infantry Div, displaced forward three times during the day in order to be in position to provide the necessary close support for the rapid advance of this Regiment northward to the high ground east of Valognes.
Co C occupied a position directly west of Montebourg and fired between four and five hundred rounds of interdictory and harassing fire on prearranged targets in support of the 8th Infantry Regt. This fire was noted by the forward observers to be very effective. At approximately 1300, as the second platoon was executing march order to displace forward, a terrific explosion on an ammunition truck, cause unknown and undetermined, resulted in twelve men being killed and twenty-four wounded. The explosion was tremendous, and hurled parts of the truck motor and the machine gun mount ring a distance of 500 yards. The entire company was within a radius of less than 100 yards of the explosion and everyone was severly shocked and dazed. The battalion commander, who was at the 79th Division operating with the two companies attached to that Division, was notified and arrived upon the scene approximately at 1630 to find the company sitting in foxholes at the gun position in a dazed and partially disorganized condition. Wreckage, mortar shells and bodies were scattered over the landscape. It is not known what caused the explosion or how many shells exploded sympathetically. However, it was observed that a large part of the shell, both HE and WP, remained unexploded even though some were severely dented and flattened. Meanwhile, the company commander had proceeded to the rear in an attempt to locate the Bn commander. After a hasty estimate of the situation, the Bn commander called the remaining officers and men of the company together, apprised them of the situation, reoriented them, reimbued them with the determined fighting spirit of this Battalion and instilled in them a desire and determination to remain in action and go forward, continuing to support the 8th Infantry Regt instead of, as they first desired, going to the rear to reorganize.
The battalion commander led the first platoon forward in reconnaissance of a new position, re-established liaison with the Infantry regimental commander and saw that this platoon was set up and ready to fire. The men moved out in high spirits and a grim determination to redeem the loss of their fellow soldiers. The vicinity of the area from which the Company moved and the new area selected were subjected to occasional enemy artillery and sniper fire. As a matter of fact, none of the gun positions occupied by the four companies have been out of range of enemy artillery and occasional small arms and sniper fire since D-Day.
The remaining twelve to fifteen men of the first platoon were ordered by the battalion commander to collect their material and vehicles and proceed with same to the Bn rear echelon. This was promptly executed in good order. This platoon was reorganized that same evening with new replacements and will again be in the front lines within twelve hours. All in all, the officers and men of this Company exhibited amazing recuperative and come-back ability and it is believed they are better and more determined soldiers as a result of having as quickly recovered from the above experience.
At 2100, Co B was transferred from attachment to the 315th Infantry Regt and attached to the 314th Inf Regt of the 79th Division and the 315th was falling back in reserve.
Strength decreased to 40 officers and 767 enlisted men. Casualties:
33698906, Edmiston, William R., Pvt, KIA, Co C
33655657, Grizzle, Raymond O., Pvt, KIA, Co C
36685239, Tomsovic, Charles J., Pvt, KIA, Co C
34625674, Eckhoff, Kenneth A., PFC, KIA, Co C
31278325, Olubowicz, Steven, Tec 4, KIA, Co C
34583070, Gaston, Joseph M. Jr., Pvt, KIA, Co C
33682976, Misinay, Michael, Cpl, KIA, Co C
6964741, Cape, Willie L., Sgt, KIA, Co C
33764991, Cence, William A., Pvt, KIA, Co C
31379193, Mannix, Gordon C., PFC, KIA, Co C
33698936, Martin, George J., Jr., Pvt, KIA, Co C
36762331, Dunn, Ray A., Cpl, SWA, Co C
31003185, Stasinipulos, Charles M., Sgt, SWA, Co C
31336855, Vallera, Robert V., PFC, SWA, Co C
33647127, Vermillion, Jay L., Sgt, SWA, Co C
0-519927, Edwards, Charles V. III, 2nd Lt, SWA, Co C
31588967, Psoinos, James N., Pvt, SWA, Co C
32872689, LaMarca, Fred, Cpl, SWA, Co C
33698919, McCullough, Franklin, Pvt, SWA, Co C
31374033, Maynard, Roland J., PFC, LWA, Co C
33731995, Ellison, Albert L., PFC, LWA, Co C
31366534, Hamond, Stanley W., Pvt, LWA, Co C
38530535, Jones, Pershing A., Pvt, LWA, Co C
35340446, Savage, William J., Sgt, LWA, Co C
31366936, Shepardson, Raymond H., PFC, LWA, Co C
31162055, Simon, Gorham G., Sgt, LWA, Co C
36682094, Girton, Francis J. L., Pvt, LWA, Co C
13154101, Pompei, Romeo F., Sgt, LWA, Co C
31388949, Hildreth, William H., Pvt, LWA, Co C
33266381, Heinricher, Joseph A., S/Sgt, LWA, Co C
13996398, Wootten, Samuel J., Cpl, KIA, HQ Det
33655528, Powers, Hudson 0., Pvt, LWA, Co C
31336871, Burke, Edward W. Jr., Pvt, LWA, Co C
33732064, Byrns, Herbert F. Jr., Pvt, LWA, Co C 20 June 1944, Item 93 (D plus 14): Companies A and B, operating with the 313th and 314th Infantry Regts., respectively of the 79th Inf. Div. kept pace with the rapid advance northward towards Cherbourg, displacing forward four times during the day. At 1700 Co A placed counter-battery fire on two gun positions, identified as containing 88mm guns, and silenced them.
Company C and Company D kept pace with the rapid advance northward towards Cherbourg with the 8th and 12th Inf Regts, respectively, of the 4th Inf. Div. Each Company displaced forward four times during the day, however, they were not called upon to fire.
The reorganization of the second platoon of Company C completed this date and the men were anxious to return to the front.
21 June 1944, Item 94 (D plus 15): Co. A, operating with the 313th Inf Regt and Co B, operating with the 314th Inf Regt., of the 79th Division, moved forward in the closing arc on Cherbourg. The companies were called upon to fire only two missions each in view of the rapid retirement of the enemy behind prepared defenses. During the afternoon, Lt. Murray, forward observer of B Co. patiently watched the Germans establish and meticulously camouflage a large ammunition dump. When they had completed their work, he opened up on this dump with HE and completely destroyed it. Fires and explosions lasted for several hours.
Co C kept pace with the rapid advance of the 4th Division northwards towards Cherbourg and fired between six and eight hundred rounds of interdictory and harassing fire. Col Van Vleit, the regimental commander, credits this interdictory and harassing fire with being greatly responsible for the advance of his regiment through the enemy infested country.
Co D was transferred from attachment to the 12th Inf Regt. and attached to the 22nd Inf Regt. and supported the advance of this regiment towards the air field and surrounding strong points northeast of Cherbourg. Approximately 600 rounds of ammunition were fired.
Strength of organization decreased to 40 officers and 766 enlisted men. Casualties:
11012296, Smarth, William A., Sgt, KIA, Co D 22 June 1944, Item 95 (D plus 16): The Bn Rear Echelon displaced forward approximately 15 miles into position three miles west of Valognes. This places the rear echelon approximately five miles from the front lines. At the present time the Bn Forward Echelon is also operating from this area as it is only one mile west of VII Corps Headquarters. There was no change in the attachments of the companies.
Co A and Co B fired approximately 500 rounds in support of the 79th Div. in the attack of that Division upon the enemy's defenses south of Cherbourg. In view of the ample supply of ammunition which these companies had on hand at the gun positions, they provided the greater part of the artillery support for their respective infantry regiments. Each company is being employed exactly as though it were a component part of the divisional field artillery.
Co. C was shelled from 0800 to 1200 and three men from the second platoon were wounded and evacuated. This company continued its scheduled interdictory fire, however, by jumping out of foxholes, firing several rounds and then ducking back into the foxholes. Fortunately, two out of every five 88mm shells were duds and this probably saved many lives as several duds landed squarely in the mortar positions.
Co D was shelled heavily during the morning. During this shelling, the company continued to fire their priority mission which was being adjusted by forward observers against a concrete enemy strong point, which was captured.
Strength decreased to 40 officers and 764 enlisted men. Casualties;
51357176, Barker, George R., PFC, SWA, Co C
51557169, Lombardi, Vincent M., Pvt, LWA, Co C
52937197, Spanagel, Jack A., Pvt, LWA, Co C
31278129, Kriss, Joseph S., Tec5, LWA, Co C A very thorough investigation is being conducted by the Battalion CO into what appears to be an excessive bending of elevating screws and other parts of the mortars. It has been found in every case that the mortars have been properly set up and emplaced and have been properly employed. All positions have been in good, firm soil and there is no criticism of the technique of mortar emplacement or service of the mortars. Thus far, 186 elevating screws have been re-straightened by ordnance shops. This, of course, includes screws which have been straightened several times. Since D-Day the mortars have been firing almost continuously and in many cases, the base plates have had to be moved and reset four or five times in one emplacement in order to place fire in the desired sector to meet enemy counter attacks or to bring fire on a suddenly discovered strong point. A 360 degree mortar is sorely needed as this would eliminate having to reset the mortar a great number of times and would thus ensure a good substantial emplacement, there by eliminating a great deal of strain on the elevating screws.
23 June 1944, Item 96 (D Plus 17): Company A Displaced forward twice during the day in order to continue support of the 313th Inf Regt in its advance on the high ground just south of Cherbourg. Approximately 150 rounds were fired, mainly on pill boxes. This company was shelled intermittently all day and night. Enemy artillery shellfire at night was especially heavy and one casualty resulted.
Co B displaced forward twice to continue supporting fire for the 314th Inf Regt in its advance to the high ground just north of Cherbourg. Approximately 300 rounds of HE and 109 rounds of WP were fired during the day directly on the enemy front lines, mainly on spots containing automatic weapons. It was found especially effective to drive the German from his hiding place with HE and then shower him with WP as he was running across open country. An Ammunition dump was fired and exploded. During the afternoon, WP and HE fire was placed on a small village and completely gutted it. Several machine gun nests were definitely destroyed. Lt Murray was called upon by the regimental commander to adjust fire for the light artillery battalion. Hence, this man was adjusting for the two platoons of 4.2" chemical mortars and a battalion of field artillery with one SCR Radio. All missions were fired smoothly and efficiently.
Co C continued to fire prearranged harassing and interdictory missions to cover the advance of the 8th Infantry Regt northwards towards Cherbourg. At 1500, approximately 900 rounds were fired to cover an attack by the 3rd Bn. This was a rolling barrage which advanced in 50 yard bounds approximately 100 yards in front of the assault waves; HE and WP were fired alternately. General Roosevelt, who observed this barrage, telephoned his congratulations back to the guns with the statement that it was one of the best and most effective rolling barrages in front of assaulting infantry he had ever seen. This company displaced forward three times during the day. The enemy placed a heavy concentration of six inch shells into a position which Co C had just vacated approximately one hour earlier.
Co D advanced northwards with the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Infantry Regt. and fired approximately 200 rounds on concrete enemy strong points. During the night, while this company was placing a heavy barrage against counter-attacking enemy forces, an urgent call was received by the company from the infantry for reinforcements. Twenty men went forward and engaged in the fire fight, aiding in repulsing the enemy attack. Thus, this company was instrumental both with mortar fire and with small arms in repulsing a counter attack. Approximately 100 rounds of interdictory fire were placed on prearranged targets. More and more each day, the infantry regimental commanders, in conjunction with division artillery are employing the 4.2" chemical mortars for interdictory and harassing fire on cross roads, likely troop concentration areas, and on defiles. This is considered an excellent use of this weapon and ammunition when priority missions are not being fired and prisoners state that such fire is amazingly effective both from the damage done and psychological effect.
Casualties:
31316041, Cusano, Pasquale A., T/5, LWA, Co D
31337176, Barker, George R., PFC, DOW, Co C 24 June 1944, Item 97 (D plus 18): Co A displaced forward three times and emplaced in defilade on the high ground overlooking Cherbourg, ready to throw thousands of rounds of HE and WP into the city in the event that the capitulation Was not imminent. During this advance, approximately 100 rounds of ammunition were placed on la Glacerie. One man was wounded during the day as a result of enemy counter-battery fire.
Co B situated itself just west of the Co A position, and poised ready to support the advance of the 314th Infantry Regt into the city of Cherbourg. At approximately 1700, 88mm guns began shelling the vicinity of the regimental CP. Two mortars from each platoon moved forward on carts, as shellfire prohibited vehicular traffic on the road, into position approximately 1200 yards from 4 enemy pieces. The 4.2's opened up on the 88's position with HE and were quickly picked up by enemy observers. Innumerable shells were placed about the mortar position, however, could not get into the emplacement because of defilade. After about ten minutes of fierce dueling, all fire from the 88mm position ceased and the 4.2's were officially credited with knocking out two of them and silencing the others.
Both General Wyche, Commanding General of the 79th Infantry Division, and Colonel Thomas, Chief of Staff for this division expressed high regard and appreciation for the support rendered them by Companies A and B during the advance of the division on Cherbourg. Colonel Thomas stated that the presence of those two companies had materially affected the success and progress of the advance, especially when on several occasions the 4.2's were the only available artillery support because of their rapidity of getting into positions and the always availability of ammunition at the gun positions. The forward observers have done a superior job and time and time again have rallied shaken and demoralized troops around them and led them forward, at the same time observing fire and adjusting it for the guns behind them. Lieutenants Murray and Byers have done a superior job and have lived day and night in the front lines or with the outposts in order to accomplish their tasks. Never a day passes that the forward observers are not forced to take part in a fire fight.
Co C fired 1500 rounds in support of the advance of the lst Battalion of the 8th Inf Regt. This Company fired on an area containing guns identified as 88's and kept them silenced throughout the advance of the infantry. At 1500 approximately 300 rounds were fired in a very few minutes to break up a determined enemy counter-attack. It is interesting to note that 4.2" chemical mortars and infantry fire alone successfully repulse counter-attacks before Division artillery is able to range in and begin firing. The infantry Battalion commander reports that if the mortars had not been present, his position would have been over-run. This company displaced forward three times during the day. At approximately 1600, a 3/4 ton weapons carrier, while employing wire, hit a mine and was totally destroyed.
Co D fired 735 rounds between midnight and 0600 on two well prepared enemy strong points containing concrete emplacements and well constructed perimeter guns in support of the advance of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment to cut the road leading east out of Cherbourg. Both the infantry Battalion commander and the artillery forward observer reported that this fire was far more effective than artillery fire which had earlier been placed on this position. At 0600 the infantry attacked and overran the position. At 0800, between 40 and 50 enemy mounted troops were observed moving northwards on a road. Twelve well-placed rounds of HE killed 20 and completely routed the rest. Since the 22nd Infantry Regt had not reached its objective, Co D was transferred at 1950 from attachment to this unit and to the 12th Inf Regt in order to provide support for an advance to a position north and east of Cherbourg.
There has never been any rest for the 4.2" chemical mortar company for, when the infantry to which it is attached gains its objective, the heavy mortar company is transferred to another unit which jumps several hours later. The wear and tear on our men and material is terrific. However, at the present time, the men are standing up better than the material and equipment.
All companies are experiencing difficulty with the M-29 Cargo Carriers. It has proven itself unsatisfactory and is not recommended for use in a mortar battalion. Not only spare parts are unavailable, but they continue to throw tracks and simply cannot be used on narrow trails or roads, especially if there are any ruts. Then, too, the slightest bit of artillery or rifle fire knocks them out and 90 percent of the time sets them afire. The 1/4 ton trucks will stand far more punishment than the cargo carriers.
Strength decreased to 39 officers and 747 enlisted men. Casualties:
36685245, Ford, Howard, T/4, LWA, Co C
12008970, Conway, John D., T/5, LWA, Co A
36762785, Forkash, David, Pvt, LWA, Co B 25 June 1944, Item 98 (D plus 19): Co A, now in position on the high ground overlooking Cherbourg stood ready to fire on call. Very little firing was done for the fighting had progressed to a point where it became infantry against infantry and hand to hand combat. Artillery at this stage would most probably do as much damage to friend as foe.
Co B occupied a position on the high ground overlooking Cherbourg. A smoke screen, interpaced with HE was fired to cover the advance of the 314th Infantry Regiment into the center approaches of the town. This screen was observed to be very effective both for screening purposes and casualty effect.
Co C displaced forward twice during the day and evening found them in position approximately 2000 yards south of the leading waves of the 8th Infantry, which had reached its objective. There was very little firing by this company during the day as no prepared strong points were encountered. In the infantry's advance to its objective in the past several days, very few Germans have been found in the open as all have retired behind well prepared concrete positions. It is just a question of capture or killing all or none in a position.
Co D displaced forward to a position east of Hau St Jean and fired approximately 50 rounds to silence two enemy machine guns. After being in this position for approximately an hour, several of the men decided to investigate a stone house approximately 300 yards away from the position. Our own infantry had advanced through this position 24 hours previously and it was supposedly clear. Nevertheless, many enemy underground positions and strong points have unintentionally been by-passed and much sniping and harassing of our troops has resulted therefrom. Lt. Duffy led a patrol towards the house and was suddenly met with a burst of automatic weapons fire and hand grenades. The house was quickly surrounded and after a brisk exchange of rifle fire, five Germans were killed and 14 captured. The house was found to contain a very elaborate radio set-up and was being used by the Germans as an OP and spy headquarters on our movements into positions.
Strength decreased to 39 officers and 746 enlisted men. Casualties:
32909831, Paton, Harold C., Pvt, LWA, Co D
36066328, Little, DeVern C., Pvt, LWA, Co D 26 June 1944, Item 99 (D plus 20): Co A detached from 313th Inf Regt., 79th Div and attached to the First Bn, 47 Inf Regt, 9th Div effective 26-1130. The move to new positions, approximately 8 miles distant, was effected in four hours.
Co B, while operating in support of the 314th Inf Regt in mopping up operations on the approach to Cherbourg, fired 43 rounds of HE on a 40mm gun position which was firing point blank at assaulting troops. The gun position was destroyed and personnel killed. Quite an elaborate operational method was employed to adjust fire on this well concealed and located 40mm gun. An infantry lieutenant, who was pinned down a short distance from the gun, adjusted our mortar fire by yelling adjustments back to the infantry regimental commander who in turn yelled them back to Captain Marshall, who was operating an SCR 300, and in turn radioed to the gun position. In spite of this rather roundabout method, fire for effect was begun with the fourth round.
Co C remained attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment, which occupied its objective. Early in the morning, 20 rounds of HE were fired on an ammunition dump and destroyed it. One displacement forward was made during the day.
Co D was detached from the 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Inf Div. and attached to the 22nd Inf Regt of the same division at 0800 since the 12th had reached objective and 22nd given the mission of cleaning up the tip of the peninsula to the north and east of Cherbourg. 24 rounds of HE were fired on a huge concrete emplacement, the fire from which was pinning down our infantry. Our HE shells caused practically no damage to the concrete emplacement, yet immediately upon completion of the firings, 30 men came out of the position and surrendered. It is interesting to note that apparently concussion alone forced the surrender.
Casualties:
32354025, Nigro, James W., Pvt, LWA, HQ Det 27 June 1944, Item 100 (D plus 21): Co A continued in support of the 1st Bn, 47th Infantry Regt, 9th Inf Div, in mopping up operations in the area northwest of Cherbourg. Little resistance was encountered and only one mission of approximately 20 rounds was fired. This mission was fired by forward observers on two automatic weapons emplacements. Two displacements were made during the day. While unloading ammunition from a truck, a round of ammunition suddenly exploded and wounded six men, all of whom were evacuated. This round was boxed but our examination of the fuse following the explosion showed the pin still properly placed therein. The other round of WP in the box did not explode and was fired a short while later. Cause of the explosion is as yet unknown and undetermined.
Co B was relieved from attachment to the 314th Regt, 79th Inf Div and attached to the 60th Regt, 9th Inf Div, 27-1000; movement of approximately ten miles was completed and company set up, ready to fire in its new position at 1400. No missions were fired during the day as the 60th Regt was preparing for an advance into the area northwest of Cherbourg on the following day.
Co C continued to support the 22nd Regt, 4th Inf Div in mopping up operations in the area northeast of Cherbourg. Two missions of approximately 20 rounds were fired during the day on strong points and a sniper was killed close to one of the gun positions.
The last organized resistance in Cherbourg came to an end at approximately 2130 this date when the troops in the arsenal surrendered. Organized resistance in the area northeast of Cherbourg, which is being mopped up by the 22nd Regt, officially came to an end at 2400 this date. However, small isolated positions and sniper fire continued.
The Battalion Commander contacted. G-3 of Corps in an effort to bring Co C and Co D back under direct battalion control but Corps wished to keep these two companies in position for several more days in order to guard against any sudden flare-up of resistance. Meanwhile, during what might be considered a temporary lull in operations, every effort is being made to effect complete maintenance on all mortars and vehicles and other equipment. No springs are available for replacement and every mortar in the battalion need replacement of these springs.
The Battalion Commander was informed by General Roosevelt of the 4th Inf Division that the two huge forts just north of the airfield in the 22nd Regt's sector showed no signs of surrender this afternoon until Co D began firing white phosphorus into the area. The white flag was seen to appear immediately and, after capture, the Germans freely admitted that the use of WP was the deciding factor in their surrender.
The Battalion was commended this date for the work of Co B while attached to the 314th Inf Regt, 79th Inf Div.
Strengthof Battalion decreased to 39 officers and 740 enlisted men. Casualties:
31366973, Heron, Lawernce J., Cpl, SWA, Co A
31379399, Valette, Michael A., Pvt, LWA, Co A
33514970, Williamson, Robert L., Pvt, LWA, Co A
31367303, Almeida, Arther, Pvt, LWA, Co A
31379360, Bartosiewicz, Edmond S., Cpl, LWA, Co A
31366564, Madeiros, James N., Cpl, LWA, Co A 28 June 1944, Item 101 (D plus 22): Co A, operating in support of pending advance of the 47th Regt, 9th Inf Div to clear the Cap de la Hague Area northwest of Cherbourg, displaced forward to gun positions at 1700 and is standing by ready for the attack. Co B operating in support of 60th Regt, 9th Div. to clear the Cap de la Hague area northwest of Cherbourg, displaced forward to its gun positions at approximately 1800 and awaited the attack. The plan of the regimental commander was to withhold fire of these two companies until 0600 the following day in order that surprise may be effected.
Co B commander was ordered by the infantry Bn Commander to maintain contact at his CP. This necessitated Bn Commander having to order the Bn Liaison officer (G-2) from Division Headquarters to the 60th Regimental CP the detailing of the Bn G-3 from duty at the Bn CP to Liaison officer with the 9th Inf Div.
Co C and Co D had been standing by in a tactical bivouac since 27-2400 as all organized resistance in the area northeast of Cherbourg ceased at that time. Battalion Commander has made repeated efforts to effect the return of these companies to his control. However, Corps G-3 advised that this could not be done without the direct, personal approval of the Corps Commander. This authority was finally obtained at 2245 and these two companies were ordered to return to the Bn Rear Echelon for a much needed overhauling and maintenance of equipment and a personal clean-up job.
Strength decreased to 39 officers and 739 enlisted men.
29 June 1944, Item 102 (D plus 23): Co A displaced forward twice in support of the 47th Regt, 9th Inf Div. Progress in cleaning up the Cap de la Hague area has been made slow and difficult by numerous Teller and S-mines and accurate artillery fire. Approximately 100 rounds of HE were fired during the day on strong points.
Co B displaced forward in support of operations of the 60th Regt, 9th Inf Div. Eighty rounds of HE were fired at 0600 on prearranged targets, namely, strong points. At approximately 1000, two enlisted men in the forward observer party were hit and seriously wounded by enemy shellfire. At approximately 1700 while firing a mission on an enemy strong point, an enemy artillery shell landed directly in the gun position of the first platoon and killed three men, wounding six others. Only one radio was put out of action by this shellfire and the platoon continued to fire all four mortars in its mission in spite of the sudden loss of nine men. Nine replacements and a new radio were immediately displaced forward from the Bn rear area and the platoon was at full strength again by 2100. Intermittent artillery fire continued to fall in the vicinity of all the positions occupied throughout the day.
Co C and Co D returned to Bn control at 0900. Arrangements have been made to use power-driven apparatuses for showers and the day was spent in cleaning and overhauling both men and equipment.
Colonel Couglin, Chemical Officer, 1st Army, visited the Bn area with his staff.
The battalion was commended this date for the work of Co A while attached to the 47th Inf Regt, 9th. Inf Div.
Strength decreased to 39 officers and 734 enlisted men. Casualties:
36682189, Hild, Arthur J., Pvt, KIA, Co B
31389062, Ohlson, Lief O., Cpl, KIA, Co B
31379323, Doyle, Edward F., Pvt, DOW, CoB
31337171, Bakis, Joseph A., Pvt, SWA, Co B
32939114, Dayton, Hyman B., Cpl, SWA, Co B
32880832, Shapiro, Irving, PFC, SWA, Co B
33730054, Bailey, Edward E., PFC, LWA, Co B
31299503, Binns, Joseph H., Sgt, LWA, Co B
31374023, Martel, Lionel F., Pvt, LWA, Co B
37663620, Olsen, Norman L., Pvt, LWA, Co B
33440454, Shapiro, Harry, Pvt, LWA, Co B 30 June 1944, Item 103 (D plus 24): Co A fired approximately 500 rounds in support of the 47th Inf Regt, 9th Inf Div. in its advance to the tip of the peninsula northwest of Cherbourg. All rounds were fired on well-placed and well-concealed enemy strong points and effective fire was observed. Three forward displacements were made during the 24-hour period.
Co B fired approximately 250 rounds in support of the advance of the 60th Regt, 9th Inf Div. towards the tip of the peninsula northwest of Cherbourg. Two forward displacements were made during the day. Operations and progress in this area have been extremely difficult because of numberless, well-placed enemy strong points and defensive positions as well as hundreds of Teller and S-mines. Our mortars have been found to be very effective.
Co C and Co D are in bivouac under battalion control and spent the entire day in maintenance of equipment and clothing. Time. was also found for much needed haircuts, baths and shaves.
Strength decreased to 39 officers and 731 enlisted men.
July 1944
1 July 1944, Item 104 (D plus 25): Co A and Co B went into tactical bivouac at 0800. At 1200 these companies were permitted by Corps G-3 to return to the battalion area for bivouac. However, they remain attached to the 9th Inf Div. Companies arrived at approximately 1600 in battalion area for hot showers from power driven apparatuses which were awaiting them.
There was no change in the status of Company C and Company D. Battalion Commander issued warning order and a reconnaissance was conducted for movement to a new area on the morning of 2 July in the vicinity of Bloiseville.
This brought to an end 25 consecutive days of continuous fighting for units of this battalion. Approximately 32,000 rounds of ammunition were fired. There were six Officer casualties and 88 enlisted men casualties. The battalion is making plans to again be actively engaged in operations with 48 hours. During the campaign for Cherbourg, an amazing job has been done by the rear echelon in the maintenance and repair of radios, mortars and vehicles and the replacement of ammunition. Without the establishment of a rear echelon as now existing the battalion could not have functioned with any such degree of efficiency as it has performed.
It has just been brought to light that on at least three occasions during the recent campaign, our forward observers, operating alongside field artillery forward observers, used the artillery liaison plane to adjust mortar fire. On several other occasions our forward observers adjusted artillery fire and artillery observers adjusted mortar fire. There has been splendid harmony and cooperation between all arms in the employment of the 4.2" mortars.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 727 enlisted men.
2 July 1944, Item 105 (D plus 26): The 87th Chemical Battalion, with all companies under battalion control for the first time since H-Hour, D-Day, moved from tactical bivouac vicinity west of Valognes, approximately 18 miles south to tactical bivouac just west of Bloiseville; entire movement complete in three hours. This movement in preparation for advance of VII Corps units inland from recently captured peninsula.
3 July 1944, Item 106 (D plus 27): Orders received attaching Co A to 330th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, and Co C to the 351st Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division. Necessary liaison was effected by the battalion commander and company officers concerned during the morning. Companies A and C moved into respective gun positions at about 1900. The areas in which the companies established forward CP's and gun positions were very crowded and is an ideal set-up for enemy harassing and counter-battery firing.
Company B and Company D were attached to the 8th and 12th Regiments, respectively, of the 4th Infantry Division. The necessary liaison was effected by the battalion commander during the afternoon.
Lt. Col. Hamilton, Commanding Officer, 86th Chemical Battalion, Mtz, VIII Corps, visited the battalion area with the Battalion Commander.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 718 enlisted men.
4 July 1944, Item 107 (D plus 28): Company A, attached to the 330th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, fired approximately 200 rounds at 0445 to support the opening attack of the 2nd Battalion. At approximately 0630, three enemy shells landed in the gun position of the second platoon; one shell killed four men and wounded three others. At 0930, all members of the forward observer party, second platoon, Composed of Lt. Ansley and two enlisted men, were seriously wounded by enemy shellfire. This party was operating with front line infantry units. Missions were fired throughout the day on called fire from forward observers and a total of 1500 rounds were fired by this company during the day. At approximately 1800, Lt. Gump forward observer for the first platoon, was killed by enemy shellfire and the two men with him were seriously wounded. This party was also operating with front line infantry units. At approximately 1500, a forward observer party composed of Lt. Branson and two men were ambushed by a German patrol and were brought under severe grenade and rifle fire. The two men were wounded but Lt. Branson escaped unscathed. This forward observer party was ambushed because the infantry unit with which they were operating fell back without so advising Lt. Branson, thus leaving him and his party completely exposed and unprotected. This same thing also happened to the two other forward observer parties.
Company C, acting in support of the second and third battalions of the 331st Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, fired approximately 400 rounds of observed fire during the day on enemy strong points and automatic weapons. One radio at the gun position was knocked out by shellfire. There were no casualties in this company during the day. There was no change in the status of Co B from previous data. Co D moved into bivouac area in vicinity of the 12th Regiment, 4th Division, in preparation to support the advance of this regiment when it moves south.
Strength decreased to 36 officers and 706 enlisted men. Casualties:
0-1037021, Gump, Arthur L., 1st Lt, KIA, Co A
32928438, Kolman, Leslie S., Pvt, KIA, Co A
31367171, Rubenstein, David H., Cpl, KIA, Co A
12140465, Thomas, David, S/Sgt, KIA, Co A
33576084, Volcjak, Carl C., Sgt, KIA, Co A
0-1035639, Snsley, Oscar L., 2nd Lt, LWA, Co A
34611741, Collins, William S., Tec 5, DOW, Co A
31219150, Velente, Joseph J., PFC, LWA, Co A
31366981, Fertitta, Arthur J., Sgt, LWA, Co A
32986142, Delbene, Philip J., Pvt, LWA, Co A
33278403, Nusser, Robert K., Tec 5, LWA, Co A
33682444, Shaffer, Edward A., Cpl, LWA, Co A 5 July 1944, Item 108 (D plus 29): Company detached from the 530th Inf Regt was attached to the 329th Inf Regt of the 83rd Division; further attached in support of the advance by the 3rd Battalion. Approximately 300 rounds were fired in support of this Battalion although forward observers were operating with the Battalion Commander throughout the day.
Company B proceeded to a rendezvous area with the 8th Infantry Regt of the 4th Infantry Division, and prepared to support the attack by this regiment the following day.Company C fired approximately 100 rounds in support of the operations of the 331st Regt, 83rd Infantry Division. Forward observers were operating with the Infantry Battalion Commander. Company D was in bivouac under control of the 12th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, and ready to move south with this regiment on call.
Strength increased to 708 enlisted men. Casualties:
42036995, Shannahan, William E., Pvt, KIA, Co A
31349270, Fiske, Stephen F., Cpl, KIA, Co A
31366865, Kaiser, Joseph G., PFC, LWA, Co D
33681643, Barker, Robert L., Pvt, LIA, Co C 6 July 1944, Item 109 (D plus 30): Company A; during the entire morning and most of the afternoon, the SCR 300 radios operating between the company forward CF and the gun positions to our forward observers with the 2nd and 3rd Bns of the 329th Inf Regt, 83rd Div were the sole means of communication between the regimental CP and the above mentioned battalions. Messages were brought by courier from the regimental CP to either the Company CP or the gun position and were in turn transmitted to our forward observers who gave same to the supported battalion commander and then sent back his answer. Since the radios were occupied in this manner, no rounds were fired until approximately 1800 when about 200 were fired to halt an enemy counter-attack.
Company B, operating in support of the 8th Inf Regt, 4th Inf Div, moved to a firing position near La Granvallarie and emplaced guns in preparation to fire on prearranged targets at 0300 the following day.
Company C, detached from the 331st Regt was attached to the 330th Infantry Regt, 83rd Inf Div at 1200. No rounds were fired during the day, for during the greater part of the time, radios were occupied in the transmittal of messages from regimental CP to front line positions.
Company D, operating in support of the 12th Regiment, 4th Inf Div, moved south with this unit when it relieved the 331st Regiment of the 83rd Division. Guns were emplaced ready to fire on call.
Strength increased to 709 enlisted men, 38 officers.
One Officer and 3 enlisted men today were awarded the Bronze Star Medal per Sec II, General Order 32, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division, APO #4, U.S. Army. The recipients of this award were:
1st Lt Charles B. Griffis, 0-1035476
S/Sgt Julian 0.Brunt, 34005567
S/Sgt David Thomas, 12140465 (deceased) (revoked per 6041, 4th Div)
Cpl Lloyd L. Kruse, 42021343 Attached hereto-congratulatory message through command channels from the Secretary of War to members of the First United States Army.
Attached hereto letter of commendation from the Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, to all personnel of this Battalion.
7 July 1944, Item 110 (D plus 51): Company A, operating in support of the 329th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, fired 150 rounds of observed fire on personnel and hedgerow defenses. One forward displacement was made during the day.
Company B, operating in support of the 8th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, fired approximately 80 rounds of WP at 0300 on the boundaries of an area thru Which our troops were to advance; in other words, a path was marked by firing WP shell on the flanks and then lifting our fire again. The objective was also marked every five minutes with a WP shell. During the morning, approximately 50 rounds of observed fire were placed on hedgerow defenses.
Company C fired approximately 600 rounds of HE in support of the 330th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division. This regiment advanced on a 500 yard front and the route of advance was divided into 100 yard phase lines. Fire was placed for four minutes on each successive phase line and the infantry literally walked up to their objectives. This is the first sizeable advance made by any infantry unit in several days through this difficult and strongly fortified terrain. At 1530, this company was detached from the 330th Regiment and attached to the 351st Regiment as the 330th was relieved by the 331st. It is the same old story; the infantry units are relieved in order to rest and reorganize, but the 4.2 mortar units are continually in the line, firing day and night. An over-strength is an absolute necessity if this is to be kept up day in and day out. At approximately 1750, the radio operator at the forward observer party, operating with front line infantry, was hit in the arm by rifle fire and evacuated.
Company D fired approximately 370 rounds on personnel and hedgerow defenses in support of the advance of the 12th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division. Approximately half of this amount was fired during the hours of darkness. At 2400, Company D was detached from the 12th Infantry and attached to the 22nd Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, and the 22nd relieved the 12th.
An incident which might be considered by a very few to be tragic occurred near the rear echelon. A cow stepped on a land mine and was instantly killed. Fortunately a qualified meat cutter was close by. The first steaks that we have had since leaving the United Kingdom were very delicious. Some of the officers and men are considering adding land mines to their basic loads.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 708 enlisted men. Casualties:
33514995, Hafer, Cameron H., Pvt, LWA, Co B
33644928, Swart, John F. Jr, Sgt, LWA, Co C 8 July 1944, Item 111 (D plus 32): Company A, firing in support of the 329th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, placed an approximately 20 rounds of WP on a crossroads at 0300. All computation was from maps and fire was requested by regimental headquarters.
Company B fired a smoke screen in support of the 8th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, along a 3000 yard front and maintained same from 0900 to 1130; 1116 rounds of WP were used. The screening and casualty effect of the WP was very effective and when our troops arrived at the screened area, the enemy had evacuated.
Company C fired approximately 25 rounds on an enemy strong point in support of operations of the 331st Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division. No other firing missions were called for during the day by the infantry battalion or regimental commanders.
Company D fired approximately 15 rounds on an enemy strong point in support of operations of the 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division. Two direct hits (one HE, one WP) were observed on the turret of a captured M-4 American tank which was being used by the enemy as a pillbox. Neither of the hits had any effect on the tank as the machine guns remained in action.
Morale of unit remains high, general health good.
Included in this history, G0 #4, Headquarters, 87th Chemical Battalion, Motorized, this date, awarding the Purple Heart to members of this organization.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 707 enlisted men.
Casualties:
31367007, Wallace, Arnold W., Sgt, LWA, Co A 9 July 1944, Item 112 (D plus 33): Company A, detached from 329th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division and attached to 330th Regiment, 83rd Division, While engaged in a night firing problem of approximately 80 rounds, the enemy replied with terrific counter-battery fire on and in the vicinity of the gun positions. The mission was completed by the men jumping out of slit trenches, firing the mortars and then taking cover again. By so doing, Jerry was not able to ascertain just when he had registered on the gun position. Effective at 2400, this company was detached from 330th Regiment and attached to the 351st Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division.
During the day Company B fired approximately 600 rounds of observed fire on hedgerow defenses and well prepared defensive positions and was very instrumental in assisting the advance of the 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, approximately 2000 meters. There was counter-battery in the vicinity of the position day and night but no casualties were suffered.
Company C, operating in support of the 331st Regiment, 83rd Division, fired approximately 522 rounds of observed fire on successive 100 yard phase lines and walked the second and third battalions right up to their objectives, thus proving again that when the infantry closely follows mortar and artillery barrages, ground can be gained with the loss of a very few men as well as the expenditure of a very small amount of small arms ammunition. During the afternoon an enemy ammunition dump was hit and blown up; the resulting fire and explosions lasted for approximately 2 hours. Effective at 2400, Company C was detached from the 331st Regiment and attached to the 329th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division.
Company D, operating in support of the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, fired approximately 400 rounds of observed fire on well-prepared hedgerow defenses. This company was subject to terrific enemy counter-battery during the night at all positions which they occupied during the day. However, due to well-prepared slit trenches and the defiladed positions occupied by the guns, there were no casualties. Jerry opened up immediately with counter-battery each time this company fired its two prescribed night missions.
Orders were received this date from FUSA to the effect that expenditures of 4.2" mortar ammunition is restricted to one-third unit of fire per day, cumulative until further notice; unit of fire, 60 rounds per gun. This data was immediately disseminated by the Battalion Commander to the Commanding General, 4th and 83rd Infantry Divisions and copies sent to regimental commanders with whom our companies are currently operating. All officers of this battalion were likewise informed and duly instructed that under no circumstances was this restricted expenditure to be exceeded unless they were directly ordered to do so by the infantry regimental commanders whom they were supporting, who then would have to bear the responsibility. Orders concerning the above restrictions were also disseminated by HQ, VII Corps to the above divisions. Protests against this restriction have been received from all sides and it is hoped that it will soon be lifted. Mortar fire had been found to be the most effective method of dealing with well prepared hedgerow defenses found in this well defended sector through which the Corps is now advancing.
Strength increased to 38 officers and 715 enlisted men. Casualties: None
10 July 1944, Item 113 (D plus 34): Company A, detached from the 331st Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, effective 0300 and attached to 330th Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, for the purpose of firing a smoke mission on Tribehou and Les Aubris. After much negotiating and phone calling by the Battalion Commander with Corps G-3, Division G-3 and FUSA G-3, permission was obtained to draw from ASF 101 700 rounds of FS over and above the restricted allowance for this mission. After the issue was obtained between 0100 and 0300, Captain Stiefel moved his guns forward to the very front lines of our own troops in order to be within, range to fire the smoke mission. Between 400 and 450 rounds were fired from 0800 to 0830 on a 2,000 yard front. Screen was observed to completely cover the desired area. After firing mission, the company moved back to its normal position of approximately 600 yards to the rear of the front lines. From 1000 to 1030 this company fired another screen on approximately a 1500 yard front. The target was an area just east of Auxais per Division order. Approximately 100 rounds were employed. After a careful reconnaissance, the writer is not able to ascertain what, if anything, was accomplished by the above two screens other than the expenditure of much needed ammunition. Not a single infantryman of either of the regimental front lines was observed to move forward under the protection of these two screens and no forward movement beyond the front lines took place until approximately 1200. If the firing of these screens Was to be a feint, Jerry was evidently not fooled or knocked off balance because he was not observed to fire into the smoke screen or to dispose his troops any differently because of the two screens. Approximately 14 rounds of HE were fired by the forward observer on a strong point at 1500.
Company B fired approximately 100 rounds of HE at various times throughout the day in support of the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division.
Company C, operating in support of the 329th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, fired approximately 170 rounds of observed fire on well emplaced enemy hedgerow defensive positions. One forward displacement was made during the day. Company D made one forward displacement while operating in support of the 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division. Approximately 150 rounds were fired on enemy hedgerow defenses.
The ammunition expenditure restriction of one-third unit of fire per day is seriously curtailing the employment of the companies and the fact that they are limited to the expenditure of 240 rounds per day, cumulative, seriously limits their value as a supporting unit.
A reconnaissance was made to select an advance bivouac area and at 1830, the forward echelon of the battalion displaced forward to a bivouac approximately three miles south of Carentan and approximately three miles from the front lines. The entire battalion rear echelon will move into this position the following morning.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 714 enlisted men. Casualties:
31270162, Joseph, Tofie E., Pvt, LWA, Co D 11 July 1944, Item 114 (D plus 35): Company A, detached from 330th Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, and attached to 351st Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, fired approximately 80 rounds during the day on hedgerow defenses.
Company B fired approximately 97 rounds during the day on hedgerow defenses in support of the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division. One man was killed by an enemy mortar shell which fell into the field adjoining the gun position.
Company C fired approximately 100 rounds in support of the 329th Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, on hedgerow defenses. The company made one forward displacement during the day.
Company D fired approximately 400 rounds in support of the 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, at approximately 1500. One man was killed and one wounded as a result of enemy artillery fire falling into the gun positions. It is believed that the enemy was firing at five tanks which moved into the adjoining field. On numerous occasions, especially within the past two weeks, the presence of and movement of tanks in the vicinity of our gun positions has resulted in a large volume of fire being placed thereon.
Two men departed from the battalion bivouac area at approximately 1750 to deliver the daily ration returns. While passing through Carentan a few minutes later, two enemy shells landed in the very center of the town square and one landed within five feet of the 1/4 ton truck transporting the men. The truck continued in motion for approximately 100 yards. The driver was burned to a crisp and the other occupant was seriously injured.
The restriction of fire of one-third unit of fire per day, cumulative, has seriously affected the employment and efficiency of the companies. In several regiments an effort is being made to build up an accumulated supply in order that a company can take a worthwhile part in an offense for at least one day. A limit of 240 rounds per day per company is not worth risking the life of a forward observer to expend. All companies are operating largely in a defensive role and expending their limited supply of ammunition mainly for specifically located strong points or holding same in reserve for a possible counter-attack. Each Company is now operating one six-gun platoon and the personnel of the remaining two guns have been brought back to the battalion rear echelon for a rest. The six gun platoon is more than ample for all requirements under present conditions and circumstances.
One Officer today was awarded the Bronze Star Medal per par II, Co #35, HQ 4th Infantry Division. General order attached as a component part of this history. The recipient of the award was Lt Col James H. Batte, 0-23401.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 711 enlisted men. Casualties:
33268978, Bernardo, Anthony J., Sgt, KIA, Co B
31367042, Sullivan, James J. Jr., PFC, KIA Co D
31302338, Parent, Homer L., Pvt, SWA, Co D
38343214, Scott, Orville F., T/5, KIA, HQ Det
32545453, Byrne, Harold A., T/5, SWA, HQ Det 12 July 1944, Item 115 (D plus 36): Company A, operating in support of the 330th Infantry, 83rd Infantry Division, fired approximately 200 rounds of observed fire on machine gun emplacements and hedgerow defenses. At approximately 1600, 30 rounds of observed fire were placed on two Mark IV enemy tanks which caused them to move out of their well-concealed positions. Then, their route of flight was interdicted and they were forced to flee into the sector occupied by the 331st Infantry Regiment and they were knocked out by bazookas.
Company B, although attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, fired approximately 200 rounds on call missions of the 22nd Infantry Regiment which was on the left flank of the 8th Infantry.
Company C, operating in support of the 329th Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, fired 150 rounds of HE on a tank park and was officially credited with knocking out two Mark IV tanks and the routing of the other tanks that were in the park. An additional 60 rounds were fired during the day on machine gun emplacements and hedgerow defenses.
Company D, Operating in support of the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, fired four rounds during the day for registration purposes. Lt. Hinkle, the forward observer, was wounded by rifle fire while operating with front line infantry units. The company was detached from the 22nd Infantry and attached to the 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, effective 2100 in order to support the attack of the 12th Infantry on the following day as this regiment is relieving the 22nd Regiment.
Prisoners of war interrogated by the 4th Division report that their front lines suffer most casualties, in order of their destructiveness, from mortar fire, artillery, dive-bombers, and level bombers. This is quite a tribute to the effectiveness of our mortar fire.
Strength increased to 39 officers and decreased to 709 enlisted men. Casualties:
35215977, Meehling, Denver E., PFC, SWA, Co D
0-1301825, Hinkle, John M., 1st Lt, LWA, Co D
31379264, Leslie, John G., PFC, LWA, Co D 13 July 1944, Item 116 (D plus 37): Company A; while operating as forward observer with the 3rd Battalion, 331st Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division, Lt Bonafin was killed at approximately i8oo. Lt Bonafin had observed and fired between 350 and 400 rounds during the day to assist the advance of this battalion and finally, what appeared to be a breakthrough was achieved. Lt Bonafin warned the infantry battalion commander that, to him, it appeared to be a mousetrap and to exercise caution in following through. This advice was disregarded and a short while later the entire infantry battalion was mouse-trapped by four Mark VI tanks and almost wiped out. Lt Bonafin was killed by machine gun bullets from one of the tanks. At the gun position, one barrel was damaged by enemy shellfire but no casualties were sustained.
Company B continued to support the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division. Three hundred and sixty eight rounds were fired on three phase lines and materially assisted the advance of this regiment to its objectives. Five rounds of enemy shellfire fell into the gun position at 1700. The now-trained ears of the men heard the shells coming, the men ducked into foxholes and no one was injured; there was no damage to material.
Company C, operating in support of the 329th Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division fired 374 rounds on enemy strong points and hedgerow defenses. A number of small smoke screens resulted from HE and WP being placed on these defenses and was instrumental in assisting the advance of this regiment. One forward displacement was made during the day.
Company D, operating in support of the 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, fired 85 rounds on strong points and hedgerow defenses.
It is not possible to express in words the praise and credit due to the forward observers operating with this battalion. Scarcely a day passes that someone, if not all of the forward observers party are either wounded or killed. Yet, all officers of this battalion operate as forward observers and there are always volunteers among the men to carry the SCR 300 radio or to provide security, thus making up a three-man forward observer party. These men go out without hesitation or a backward glance to operate with the front line infantry, handicapped in their movements by the carrying of a radio and the transmission of messages in order to observe and provide the much-needed support from the mortars. They are even more exposed and handicapped in their operations and maneuvers than the attacking infantry elements with whom they are operating. They are entitled to every possible praise and consideration.
Quoted herewith is a paragraph from the IPW Report, dated 12 July 1944. HQ 4th Infantry Division which is an extract from a captured document of the 77th German Infantry Division:
"Experience has proved that CP locations are safer in houses than on rocky ground. This is true because of the fact that enemy (American) mortar ammunition has a highly sensitive fuse and explodes without causing much damage to roof."
Strength decreased to 35 officers and 708 enlisted men. Casualties:
0-524080, Bonafin, Eugenio L., 1st Lt, KIA, Co A
33655541, Eagle, John R., PFC, LWA, Co A 14 July 1944, Item 117 (D p1us 38): There was a lull and general inactivity along the VII Corps front. The only firing by units of this battalion during the day was by Company A, which fired 60 rounds on two tanks, causing them to evacuate a prepared favorable position which they occupied.
All companies went into position from six to eight hundred yards to the rear of the front lines ready to fire on call. All positions were subjected to intermittent harassing shellfire by enemy artillery. Throughout the day there were no casualties to personnel. However, a one-quarter ton trailer in A Company was hit and destroyed along with eleven empty gasoline cans.
The area of the battalion rear echelon was subjected to very heavy enemy shellfire during the night from what appears to be 155 or 240 millimeter guns. This shellfire lasted for approximately three hours. There were no casualties to men or equipment despite the fact that a number of shells landed in fields adjoining those occupied by men and equipment.
At approximately 2100 two enemy planes flew over the battalion rear echelon and strafed the vicinity. There were no casualties. One plane was observed to be shot down.
Strength of organization decreased to 38 officers and 706 enlisted men.
15 July 1944, Item 118 (D plus 39): Company A fired approximately 20 rounds on hedgerow defenses in support of the 331st Infantry Regiment, 83rd Division, to assist this regiment to reach its limited objective.
Company B fired a five-hour smoke screen on a 2,000 yard front using 1060 rounds of WP and also fired 20 rounds of HE to assist the attack of the 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division, and seize an objective they had been attempting to gain for three days. Upon reaching the objective, a large number of wounded and dead Germans were observed to have been seriously burned.
Companies C and D were not called upon to fire any missions during the day by the units they were supporting.
Six infantry officers, all experienced 81mm mortar men, were assigned to this battalion, this date. These infantry officers with mortar experience were obtained from a replacement depot since no CWS men with mortar experience or training are available in this theater for assignment as replacements. If the three CWS officer replacements recently assigned to this battalion are a criterion, then this is just as well.
Companies A, B, and C were detached from assignments and returned to control of the chemical battalion Commander for movement to a new bivouac area the next day. Shortly after arrival in the battalion bivouac area (approximately 2130) the detachment of companies A and C from the 83rd Division was cancelled by the Corps Commander and these companies ordered to return immediately to the 331st Infantry, 83rd Division, to render support for an attack which was to take place the next morning. These companies immediately returned to the front and by 2245 all RSCP and necessary liaison had been completed.
Strength decreased to 38 officers and 704 enlisted men.
16 July 1944, Item 119 (D plus 40): Company A fired approximately 200 rounds in support of the 2nd Battalion, 331st Infantry, 83rd Division. This fire was placed on several enemy strong points.
Company C fired approximately 60 rounds while in general support of the attack of the 331st Infantry. The two companies were detached from the 83rd Infantry Division at 1430 and proceeded to the battalion bivouac area.
The battalion less the actively engaged firing echelons of Companies A and C, moved to a new bivouac area approximately six miles east and south of Carentan. This movement of approximately 11 miles was completed by 0900. At sundown the battalion had been joined by the firing echelons of Companies A and C, marking the second time since D-Day that the battalion had been together once again as a unit for a very short period of time before beginning the next operation. Arrangements were made for both Protestants and Catholics to attend religious services at 2130. This is the first opportunity that some of the men have had to attend religious services since before departure from the United Kingdom.
GO #40, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, this date, awards the Bronze Star Medal to the following enlisted men of this organization for service during the current campaign:
Sergeant Hiram P. Inman, 33698821, Co C
Corporal Howard E. Deabondorfer, 33764418, Co C
Corporal Ralph G. Portis, 36762769, Co C
Technician Fifth Grade John F. Swart, Jr., 33644928, Co C
Private First Class Francis J. Doran, 33698832, Co C Strength increased to 44 officers and decreased to 702 enlisted men. Casualties:
33698914, Kelley, Harold E., PFC, LWA, Co C 17 July 1944, Item 120 (D plus 41) - 19 July 1944 (D plus 43): The entire battalion remained in bivouac during the above period. The time was utilized for baths furnished by power driven decontaminating vehicles and in maintenance and repairs on vehicles and equipment. All vehicles, weapons and equipment are now in excellent condition. On Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons the bivouac area and vicinity were subject to strafing by enemy planes. There were no casualties. On Wednesday afternoon, 35 M-29 Cargo Carriers were exchanged for 35 1/4-ton trucks. This was a most welcome exchange and the battalion is now left with 49 of the original 99 of these very unsatisfactory and undesirable cargo carriers.
This three-day period was great relief to many tired bodies and jangled nerves and despite the maintenance and repair work accomplished, there has been a general rest for all. With the exception of a few hours here and there, a number of officers and men were back from the front line gun positions for the first time since D-Day.
The morale and health of the battalion are excellent and all are now anxious to begin the next operation.
Orders were received at 2000 attaching Companies A and B to the First Infantry Division and Companies C and D to the 9th Infantry Division. The necessary liaison was effected and it is expected that the combat echelons of these Companies will move out within the next day or two to support operations of the above Divisions.
G0 #41, 4th Div. awards Bronze Star Medal posthumously to S/Sgt David Thomas, 18 July 1944; Order of the Day, Number One, was published this day by the Battalion quoting two commendations received and also voicing the sentiments and regards of our Commanding Officer towards the effort made by this unit.
Strength decreased to 43 officers and 699 enlisted men.
20 July 1944, Item 121 (D plus 44): Orders received this date from Headquarters VII Corps and subsequently by Divisions concerned, made the following attachments; Company A to 16th Regiment, 1st Infantry Division; Company B to 8th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division; (detached from 16th Infantry, 1st Division); Company C to 47th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division; Company D to 60th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division.
The Battalion Commander, the two Liaison officers and the respective Company Commanders effected the necessary liaison and arranged for the companies to proceed to respective regimental areas. Channels for the SCR 300 radios were obtained as well as other necessary arrangements made with message centers, S-4 officers, etc.
An enemy plane flew over the battalion area at 1245. A few minutes later a dogfight took place at approximately 10,000 feet.
A final briefing was held at 1930 by the Company Commanders and Staff officers in preparation for the next operations.
All mortars, vehicles, weapons and equipment are now in excellent condition. The morale and physical condition of officers and men are excellent.
Strength still remains at 43 officers and 699 enlisted men.
21 July 1944, Item 122 (D plus 45): The three battalion liaison officers joined the Division CP's of the 1st, 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions.
Company A moved into position in vicinity of the 16th Regiment, 1st Infantry Division and was ready to support operations of this regiment.
Company B moved to a position in vicinity of 8th Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, ready to support operations of this regiment. This company's position was subject to intermittent harassing fire throughout the day. Shells of approximately 155mm in size were employed by the enemy. A 2 1/2 ton truck was damaged and the tires on three one-quarter ton trucks were damaged. Only one man was slightly wounded.
Company C moved to a position in vicinity of 47th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division and was ready to support operations of this regiment. This company's position was subjected to enemy harassing fire throughout the day. However, there were no casualties.
Company D moved to vicinity of the 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division and was ready to support operations of this regiment. This Company's position was subjected to enemy shellfire, however, there were no casualties. General Eddy, the Commanding General of the 9th Division personally made arrangements for the 60th Regiment to "loan" Company D to the 39th Regiment of the 9th Inf Div. to support that regiment's attack south towards the high ground on the Periers-St Lo road. One platoon supported the 1st Battalion and the other platoon supported the 2nd Battalion. 450 rounds of HE were fire on enemy personnel and on well-constructed hedgerow defenses by the forward observers. The enemy reacted very strongly to this attack and hurled three counter-attacks against our forces in quick succession. The mortars were instrumental in breaking up all three counter-attacks. Co D returned to its original position in the area of the 6oth Infantry Regiment at 2130. No casualties were suffered during the day.
A gas alert was sounded in the battalion rear area at 1930. However, the "gas attack" was later ascertained to be without foundation. All men quickly and properly masked when the alert was sounded.
GO #3, this Headquarters, was published this date awarding the Purple Heart to eight (8) enlisted men. Copy attached.
Strength remained at 43 officers and 699 enlisted men. Casualties:
31278487, Cisero, Carmen V., PFC, LWA, Co B 22 July 1944, Item 123 (D plus 46): There was no change in the status of any unit of this battalion on this date. All units are in the same location and state of readiness as the previous date, and ready to go into action at a moment's notice when ordered by the regimental commander to whom attached. Strength remained at 43 officers and 699 enlisted men.
23 July 1944, Item 124 (D plus 47): All was relatively quiet on the VII Corps front as far as offensive action was concerned. The gun positions occupied by Company B were subjected to harassing fire throughout the day. Shell fragments hit and damaged one M-29 Cargo Carrier which was evacuated. One man was slightly wounded in action but remained on duty.
During the day, Company D fired 22 rounds of harassing fire on an enemy troop concentration areas in conjunction with the artillery supporting the 60th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division.
It was announced that D Company has been officially credited with knocking out two Panther tanks while supporting operations of the 39th Infantry, 9th Division on July 21, 1944. Approximately 50 rounds had been fired into an area believed to contain enemy troops and tanks. When our infantry reached the area several hours later, they found two tanks still burning, their treads knocked off.
A gas alarm was sounded in the vicinity of the battalion rear echelon from 2400 to 0100. The alarm was not passed on by the battalion sentries because they did not smell any gas. The alarm was later found to be false.
Two enemy planes flew over the rear echelon at 2100 and were soon met with a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft fire. A large amount of flak fell into the area. One anti-aircraft shell landed within 30 yards of the Battalion CP and exploded. There were no casualties.
Strength remained at 43 officers and 699 enlisted men.
24 July 1944, Item 125 (D plus 48): Company A remained near the 16th Infantry, 1st Division, and was ready to proceed on call with this regiment to final positions.
Company B continued in support of the 8th Infantry, 4th Division. The positions occupied by both platoons were subjected to harassing and searching fire throughout the day, fire being extremely heavy between the hours of 1300 and 1700. At 1600, an enemy shell landed squarely in the corner of the field occupied by several camouflaged vehicles. One 3/4-ton weapons carrier was partially destroyed. The shell, approximately of 105mm caliber, landed about five feet away from the truck and within ten feet of 30 rounds of WP. The walls of two WP shells and the gasoline tank on the truck were ruptured by the concussion. Prompt action by the men of the platoon prevented a fire. There were no casualties to personnel during the day.
Company C, operating in support of the 47th Infantry, 9th Division, fired 50 rounds throughout the day. The fire, which was tied in with the artillery supporting the Regiment, was mainly harassing and searching in character. The positions of both platoons were subjected to the same type of fire from the enemy all through the day, however, there were no casualties.
Company D, operating in support of the 60th Infantry, 9th Division, fired 160 rounds. The fire was coordinated with the artillery supporting the regiment and consisted mainly of searching and harassing fire, most of which was placed on a very large orchard. A weapons carrier located in a field adjacent to the gun positions was hit by enemy shellfire at 1400 and partially damaged. There were no casualties.
Several enemy planes flew over the rear echelon between 2500 and 2400. An intense anti-aircraft barrage broke out, fragments of which rained down on the area, however, no casualties were suffered.
Strength increased to 43 officers and 700 enlisted men.
25 July 1944, Item 126 (D plus 49): The commanders of Companies B, C, and D were busy during the early part of the morning briefing their men and making sure all were properly dug in to withstand the shock of the aerial assault accompanying H-Hour of long-awaited COBRA.
Company A remained in position with the 16th Infantry 1st Infantry Division.
Company B, operating in support of the 8th Infantry, 4th Division, fired 367 rounds during the day: on prearranged targets at 1100, on an enemy counter-attack at 1430, and at targets of opportunity as designated by the forward observers. A large percentage of the bombs from the approximately 4,ooo planes taking part in the operation fell seven to eight hundred yards to the front of the gun positions. One forward displacement was made during the day. A shell fragment pierced the gasoline tank of a 1/4-ton truck at 2035 while the occupants were on a reconnaissance. One enlisted man was slightly wounded at 2340 when an enemy shell landed squarely in the gun position, but remained on duty. There were no other casualties to personnel or material. At 1445, while the Battalion Commander and the Liaison Officer were at the CP of the 8th Infantry Regiment, an armor-piercing shell entered the building and carried through one of the walls into the next room. Neither of the above was injured; however, 8th Infantry Regimental Headquarters suffered three casualties.
Company C, supporting the 47th Infantry, 9th Division, fired 17 rounds at 0500 on three tanks. Results could not be observed because of darkness. No other fire was called for during the day by either the forward observers of the supported infantry unit. One forward displacement w