The 93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion
in U.S. & Central Europe during World War II
compiled by Joseph Towell, Norfolk, Virginia, 1991-2000


Preface

This history is presented to record the part played by the men of the 93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion toward the victory of the United States in central Europe in World War II. It came about because there was no one advertising a reunion of the unit in any of the veteran or military publications. In trying to locate a reunion, it was discovered that the only unit history available was located in the National Archives and, using this version as a start, the final version was developed. This history was compiled mostly from publications and official documents. It is presented and dedicated to all members and former members.

Contents


Chapter 1
History of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS)

It might be of interest to know something about the Chemical Warfare Service and those who were in charge of it. The wartime chiefs of the Chemical Warfare Service were Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker until April 1941, and Maj. Gen.William N. Porter, May 1941 to November 1945.

About 620 chemical warfare troop units served during the war. Units used in ground operations included chemical mortar battalions, which used the 4.2-inch mortar, chemical smoke generator battalions, chemical service battalions, and the following types of companies: chemical mortar, chemical decontamination, chemical depot, chemical base depot, chemical laboratory, chemical maintenance, chemical processing, and chemical composite (or service).

Units used by air combat forces included the following types of aviation chemical companies: air operations, service, storage, depot, and maintenance. There were three types of chemical platoons planned for use against enemy gas attack, but very few left the United States and all were disbanded by the end of 1942.

Each troop unit was numbered, and each normally underwent a training, organization and staging phase within the continental United States and an operational phase outside the continental U.S. When a unit was being redeployed from the European or Mediterranean Theater to the China-Burma-India or Pacific Theaters, there was a redeployment phase in the continental United States.


Chapter 2
4.2-inch mortar background

The 93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion was equipped with 4.2-inch mortars. What is a 4.2-inch mortar and how did it come about?

The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was a multipurpose weapon employed in close support of ground troops. Its versatility was indicated by its ability to fire toxic agents, smoke, and high explosives. In original tactical concept, it was a basic ground weapon for offensive gas warfare. No other weapon approached the gas-delivering capacity of the 4.2-inch mortar. Eight of them could fire over a ton of toxic agent in the span of two minutes. The smoke mission was also a part of the original tactical concept of mortar employment and was one of the reasons for its success in World War II. But the real key to the popularity of the weapon was its ability to fire high explosive shell, a johnny-come-lately as far as chemical missions were concerned.

The 4.2-inch mortar was the culmination of attempts to improve the 4-inch British Brandt Stokes (SB) mortar. With American-made SB mortars and with shell and propellant purchased from the British after World War I, the CWS sought to obtain increased range, accuracy and mobility. By 1924, experiments under the direction of Capt. Lewis M. McBride (later colonel) produced the rifled 4.2-inch chemical mortar with a range of over 2000 yards, and by the end of World War II this distance had been doubled.

The CWS saw the 4.2-inch mortar as a weapon which possessed mobility and flexibility, which could go in and out of action quickly, and which was capable of delivering massed fire in an unusually short time. Calculation of firing data was simple, and the communications system was efficient and rapid. Its high angle of fire enabled it to reach targets in defiladed positions, inaccessible to most types of artillery. The short minimum range of the mortar and its mobility enabled it to give support to infantry units. The low silhouette of this easily concealed weapon offered a difficult target to the enemy.

If the high explosive mission had not been authorized, activity of chemical mortar units in a non-gas war probably would have been confined to screening operations. While the CWS saw the chief function of the mortar as firing gas shells, it did not overlook the possibility of using the weapon to fire high explosives. As early as 1934 these shells were fired in experiments.

After the outbreak of World War II, the infantry's need for a good medium-range close support weapon became evident, and General Porter and his staff took vigorous steps to get the HE shell standardized and to make firing of such a shell a major mission of chemical mortar battalions.

On March 19, 1943 the War Department authorized the use of HE by the 4.2-inch mortar and directed that necessary amendments be made in the tactical doctrine.

In “World War II Was A Chemical War” (Army & Navy Journal, vol LXXXIII, Major General William N. Porter, USA, wrote: “Another surprise weapon was the 4.2-inch chemical mortar. Affectionately dubbed the ‘goon gun’ by chemical mortar battalions which used it, this light rifled mortar gave invaluable support to assault troops.”

This mortar was so successful on land that it was subsequently mounted on boats to cover beach assaults in the Pacific. Ready for use at the time of the Japanese surrender was a recoilless mortar, half the weight of the other, which was capable of direct and deflected fire and the shock of the recoil was taken up by gases from the explosive charge escaping through the rear.

General Somervell hailed the 4.2-inch mortar as an outstanding CWS war contribution, while General Marshall credited the mortar, the incendiary bomb and the flamethrower with materially helping the offensive. The CWS had produced some 10,000,000 shells for the chemical mortar by the time the war closed.


Chapter 3
4.2-inch mortar units

What was the status of 4.2-inch mortar units and how did they develop?

In mid-1941 there was only a handful of mortar units, consisting of regiments, separate battalions, and companies. The 1st and 2nd Chemical Regiments had only one active company between them; the two separate battalions, also the 1st and 2nd, each had an active company. Completing the roster were two separate chemical companies, one of which was to be lost on Bataan and the other to be inactivated shortly after the United States entered the war. This unimpressive list, with its regiments, battalions, and companies, indicated some indecision about the size of the basic type of weapons unit. Indeed, the brigade also had its supporters. By 1941 it had been pretty well decided that the basic unit of the mortar organization would be the battalion, composed of organic companies. The exception was the several separate mortar companies which saw action in the Pacific fighting.

As of January 1942 there were two chemical mortar battalions, the 2nd and 3rd, on active duty. Four more, the 81st, 82nd, 83rd, and 84th were activated by mid-year. During the ten-month interval from June 1942 until May 1943 the number of mortar battalions remained at six. As all of the six existing battalions were committed for the month of March and May 1943, the CWS urgently recommended that 19 additional battalions be activated by the end of 1943, six of them at once to replace a like number being sent overseas. Soon after the final decision to commit four battalions for operations in Sicily, the War Department authorized the activation of four additional battalions, the 86th, 87th, and 88th in May and the 85th in June.

Upon entry in combat each of the mortar battalions was composed of 1,010 men: 36 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 973 enlisted men, 32 distributed among a headquarters, a headquarters company, a medical detachment, and four weapons companies. Each company had 2 platoons, each platoon had two sections, and each section had 3 squads. On the basis of one mortar per squad, the battalion complement of mortars was 48. Transportation of the battalion consisted of 88 2½-ton trucks and 36 vehicles of varying smaller sizes. Chemical mortar carts were present in case of rough terrain. Side arms for the battalion included 820 .45-caliber automatics.

General Shadle, chief chemical officer, NATOUSA, put his finger on one of the main shortcomings revealed by this first test of combat when he said there was nothing seriously wrong with the 4.2-inch mortar or the chemical battalion except transportation. The principal means of motor transport in the mortar battalion was the 2½-ton truck, often too big and too conspicuous to operate adequately in positions as near the front as the 4.2-inch mortars were emplaced. The ¼-ton truck and trailer seemed more appropriate, and at times infantry commanders gave up some of their own jeeps in order to ensure chemical mortar support.

The mortar battalion tables of organization and equipment published shortly after the Sicilian campaign provided for ¼-ton trucks and trailers as the basic means of transportation. The other serious difficulty encountered in the first combat employment of the mortar was that of its range. The introduction of the M5AI propellant in January 1943 increased the range of the mortar from 2,400 yards to 3,200 yards. The M6 propellant, standardized in March 1943, raised the maximum range to 4,500 yards although the item was not in production in time for use in Sicily. Meanwhile, in July 1943, the Office of the Chief, CWS (OCCWS) froze the range of the 4.2-inch mortar at 3,200 yards, despite repeated requests from North Africa for increased range. At the end of the hostilities in Sicily a conference of Seventh Army CWS officers agreed that a range of 4,500 was required, an opinion which was reflected in the other important reports of the Sicilian Campaign. These recommendations, combined with an urgent request from theater headquarters for a chemical mortar range of at least 4,500 yards led the OCCWS to reverse its decision.


Chapter 4
Mortar battalions and training

The strength of the CWS at the end of April 1942 was 1,832 officers and 12,068 enlisted men. Four chemical mortar battalions were in training and by the end of June two more were to be mobilized. The air and ground chemical troop basis as of 25 May 1942 called for 4,970 officers and 47,192 enlisted men. It contemplated the mobilization of 105 ground service units and 105 air chemical units. The Army Supply Program called for the activation of twenty-two more chemical mortar battalions in 1943 and 1944.

The policy on chemical mortar battalions as worked out in the spring of 1942 made Army Ground Forces (AGF) responsible for the activation and unit training of these organizations; the officers, unit cadres, and filler and loss replacements were to be trained and supplied by the CWS.

Officer requirements for these battalions and for the chemical units in prospect for ground and air forces necessitated immediate enlargement of the modest CWS Officer Candidate School that began operations in January 1942.

Troop requirements for nearly thirty-five thousand filler and loss replacements during the remainder of the calendar year forced radical changes in the approach to both individual and unit training. A new and vitalized chemical training program for the Army at large coupled with War Department insistence on more realistic chemical situations in ground force maneuvers combined to give the CWS greatly enlarged training responsibilities.

Training procedures

The decision of the War Department to mobilize a substantial number of chemical organizations during 1942 presented the immediate problem of providing suitable cadres around which these new units could be built. The limited number of existing chemical companies excluded the possibility of obtaining the necessary cadres from parent organizations. It therefore became necessary to fill cadre positions with replacement trainees.

A special cadre training company was established at the Edgewood Arsenal Replacement Training Center (RTC) in June 1942.

The cadre training company at Edgewood Arsenal followed the general pattern of the RTC specialists schools; at the end of the period of basic military training, selected men were transferred to the cadre company where for the remainder of the RTC course they received specialized instruction according to the needs of organizations requiring cadre complements.

This procedure was amplified after transfer of the RTC to Camp Siebert, where only men who had completed the entire course of replacement training were selected for additional instruction as cadre men. Selection was made by a board of three officers and was based on demonstrated qualities of leadership, excellent character rating, and an Army General Classification Test rating of ninety or higher. Throughout 1943, when the group of cadre trainees was usually in excess of one hundred, this training was accomplished in four weeks of additional instruction.

An important use of cadre men was in connection with the activation of the chemical mortar battalions authorized under the 1942 Troop Basis. Although responsibility for unit training of these battalions was delegated by the War Department to the AGF, the CWS was deeply interested in the training of weapons units and accordingly coordinated the early cadre training program quite closely with the AGF schedule for the activation of chemical battalions. The needs of the mortar battalions received careful consideration, both in the selection of cadre men and in the attention given to their training. When these cadres left Camp Siebert, they carried with them charts and other training aids to assist in the work of instructing the newly activated weapons units.

Training of mortar battalions

The two battalions which the chief of staff first authorized for activation in September 1941 were not actually mobilized until January 1942. By that time, the activation of four more battalions had been authorized. Two of the additional battalions were mobilized in April and two in June 1942. These six battalions were created for the primary purpose of providing the U.S. Army with the means of retaliating with gas in ground operations. Since they represented an important feature of the War Department's program for improving readiness for gas warfare, the CWS felt considerable responsibility for their technical competence. The battalions fired smoke, yet this mission alone could not justify their existence. Their employment in firing high explosive shell had been proposed by CWS but was not at this time (spring of 1942) authorized by the general staff. The original proposal of General Porter that chemical battalions be activated at the rate of one per infantry division was rejected in favor of the plan for mobilizing units on the basis of “special projects.” This was taken to mean, in effect, that when gas warfare began or appeared to be imminent, additional battalions provided for under the 1942 Troop Basis would be activated.

The battalions activated or expanded in the winter or early spring of 1942 received their initial cadres from existing chemical units. On 1 January, Company C of the 2nd Chemical Regiment at Fort Benning, Ga., was inactivated and its personnel were transferred to the newly activated 3rd Separate Chemical Battalion (Motorized). Two weeks later Headquarters Company and Company A of the 2nd Battalion moved from their station at Edgewood to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but the 2nd Battalion did not reach full strength until companies B, C, and D were activated in April.7 Additional personnel for these battalions came from the infantry, the coast artillery, the medical department and the CWS Replacement Training Center. Officers and enlisted men in both battalions were of high caliber and, spurred on by the memory of the recent Pearl Harbor attack, they were anxious to do a particularly good job.

Each battalion had some officers who understood infantry tactics, a requirement in the training of the units for infantry support.

As provided in the mobilization regulations, the battalions carried out basic and unit training concurrently. The health and endurance of the individual soldier were emphasized; he was taught to use his weapons and to care for himself in the field. Stress was placed on duty, honorable conduct, and uncomplaining obedience. These remained the essentials of mobilization training during the war.

The tactical training of the early battalions was handicapped by a shortage of mortars and ammunition, a deficiency that was not overcome until 1943.

Although the principal mission of the battalions was the firing of toxics and smoke, the 2nd also fired some five hundred rounds of high explosives before going overseas. Another handicap in the initial period of training was the lack of a specific training program for chemical battalions. This situation was rectified somewhat in May 1942 with the publication of a program for the mobilization training of battalions, but it was not until January 1944 that the War Department published a Unit Training Program for chemical battalions.

In July 1942, both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, having been trained up to company level, were directed to participate in Army maneuvers. The 2nd was ordered to the Carolina maneuver area and the 3rd, which had been transferred from Fort Benning to Fort Bliss, Texas, in April, was ordered to the Louisiana maneuver area. From November 1942 to March 1943, companies of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were rotated for amphibious training at Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, under the Chemical Warfare Amphibious Project, the object of which was the training of companies in the use of smoke in landing operations, a technique which these units never used in combat. Before being sent overseas the 2nd Battalion was attached to the 45th Infantry Division for training at Camp Picket, Va. This was one of the very few instances in World War II where a chemical mortar battalion actually went through a period of training in the zone of interior with a division.

Cadres from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, together with some 800 men from the RTC at Edgewood who had been given special mortar training over a period of four to six weeks, were detailed as cadres for the 81st, 83rd, and 84th Battalions when they were activated in the spring of 1942. The 81st and the 82nd were both activated on 25 April 1942 at Fort D. A. Russell and Bliss, Texas, respectively. The 83rd was activated 19 June 1942 at Camp Gordon, Georgia, and the 84th on 5 June at Camp Rucker, Alabama. These battalions like the 2nd and 3rd before them, were handicapped by a shortage of mortars, ammunition, training literature and training aids. Until mortars were received at the beginning of 1943, emphasis was placed on physical conditioning of the men, identification of chemical agents, and small arms training. In March 1943, the 82nd was ordered to the Louisiana maneuver area, and in the following month the 81st was directed to participate in the same maneuvers. This was the last occasion during the war when chemical mortar battalions took part in Army maneuvers, so important for the training of combat units.

Despite the handicaps which the 81st, 82nd, 83rd, and 84th Battalions faced, their training seems to have been quite satisfactory as far as it went. Raw recruits were trained to be good soldiers through long and tedious hours of work and instruction. Ambitious enlisted men were offered opportunites for promotion or attendence at OCS.

While the principal mission of the mortar battalions was the dispersion of toxic agents and smoke, the CWS was of the opinion that the battalions could be profitably used to fire high explosives in support of the infantry.

The CWS had little difficulty in securing approval for establishing a military requirement for the 4.2-inch high explosive shell; on 10 April 1942 the Chief, CWS, submitted a request to the commanding general, Army Service Forces (ASF), which was approved on 26 April 1942. Convincing the AGF of the potentialities of the mortar for firing HE was a much more prolonged task.

In February 1943 the Chief, CWS, arranged for a conference among representatives of the ASF, the AGF, and the CWS, to discuss the feasibility of having a War Department directive issued authorizing chemical troops to fire high explosives.

Suggestions emanating from this meeting led to the War Department action on 26 April 1943 authorizing the firing of high explosives by chemical troops.

The official change in mission to include the firing of high explosive shell had a marked effect on the training of mortar battalions. From the spring of 1943 on, training was concentrated more on that aspect of the mission than on the dispersion of toxics and smoke. From May 1943 till 1945, twenty-two additional chemical battalions were activated by the AGF and trained in various camps throughout the United States. Of these twenty-two, the first four, the 85th, 86th, 87th, and 88th, all activated in May and June 1943, drained the entire Regular establishment of available battalion commanders. Thereafter battalion commanders came primarily from the ranks of reserve officers called to active duty.

Although the chemical mortar battalions were activated by the AGF and remained under its jurisdiction, the CWS, as indicated above, retained a considerable interest in them. The CWS supplied most of their officers and cadres, procured their mortars and ammunition, and was responsible for the technical aspects of their training. The chemical mortar battalions were accepted in the theaters as stemming from the CWS, even though their early growth was nurtured by the AGF.

The CWS, moreover, had a considerable role in the writing of the tables of organization and mobilization training programs for mortar battalions.

With the appearance of the mobilization training program for unit training of chemical battalions in January 1944, the platoon, company and battalion phases of training were spelled out much more precisely than heretofore. During the platoon and company phases of training, which were to run for five and four weeks respectively, each unit was to be developed into a fighting team capable of operating with other units in various types of battle missions. In these phases, troops were to be psychologically prepared for the shock of battle by being subjected to overhead fire, fire past their flanks, tank attacks against entrenchments of their own construction, and realistic, simulated attacks from the air. During the battalion phase of training, which was scheduled for three weeks, each unit was to be taught to perform its tactical and technical functions in the battalion through movements, maneuvers, and exercises in simulated combat situations. All three training phases called for additional instruction in basic and general subjects, such as military intelligence, security, and physical and mental conditioning.

These schedules were not simple elaborations of the training programs, but included, in addition to the requirements of the War Departent, certain aspects of training which the commanding officers felt should be stressed. In a way these schedules and the training carried out under them reflected the personalities of the individual battalion commanders. If the commander was gifted with imagination, training would tend to be realistic and consideration would be given in such activities as firing the mortar and marches to actual tactical situations. The military background of the commanding officer also tended to influence training. If, as sometimes happened, the commanding officer had an artillery background, the firing of the mortar would be approached from the artillery point of view.

The training of CWS officers for duty with chemical battalions was, on the whole, never as well integrated as, for example, the pre-activation training of artillery officers scheduled for assignment to field artillery battalions.

This same lack of integration is evident in connection with the unit training of chemical battalions. The AGF did not have available firing areas where toxic agents could be released, and arrangements were never worked out for the battalions to fire gas munitions at CWS proving grounds; the training of these units in gas warfare was therfore theoretical at best. At the same time their training in close support of the infantry with HE was never altogether satisfactory because their mobilization training was entirely unrelated to that of the organizations they eventually supported in battle. When the activation of the initial series of six chemical battalions was begun in 1942, a third of the Army's wartime divisions already were mobilized, and the division mobilization program was virtually completed by the time activation of chemical battalions was resumed in 1943. Most of the battalions thus missed out on the splendid teamwork development of non-divisional units which climaxed AGF training in the United States. In many, if not a majority of cases, the battalions first encountered the units they were to support only after their arrival in the theaters of operation, so that lessons that should had been learned in maneuvers had to be mastered in combat.

Officer candidates

The primary objective of the CWS Officer Candidate School was, from the start, the production of combat rather than staff officers. A steady demand for lieutenants to serve with chemical mortar battalions quickly absorbed many graduates of the second to eleventh classes. Once the first phase of battalion mobilization was completed, increasing numbers of graduates went to chemical service-type companies. The stress on qualifications for combat leadership persisted into 1943 when mobilization of additional chemical mortar battalions was begun. The requirements of the Army Air Forces (AAF) for junior CWS officers were running so heavy in the last half of 1942 that special emphasis was placed on training in aviation subjects for the sixth to thirteenth classes. However, the long-range mission of the OCS course was “to train officer candidates in the basic military subjects which will qualify them as combat platoon officers.”

93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion training

1. Cadre training: During the period 24 March to 22 May 1944, a cadre training program was in effect. The primary purpose was to prepare the men for the forthcoming basic training period in their new role as instructors and leaders. A portion of time was spent in reviewing basic and specialized subjects. Each cadre member conducted practice classes.

2. Basic training: A week's delay was authorized after cadre training to await final shipment of trainees. The basic training program was inaugurated on 22 May 1944. Due to previous training which all men had received, the basic period was cut to eleven weeks. To determine whether or not the battalion had satisfactorily completed basic training. IX Corps conducted a test covering all subjects. The battalion received a satisfactory grade for the period, and basic training ended on 5 August 1944.

3. Unit training: This period contained very little formal instruction. It consisted of a series of field problems and combined operations, involving firing problems, motor marches and tactics as follows:

a. 7-12 August 1944: Individual field operations, Conecuh National Forest, Alabama.

b. 18-23 August 1944: Individual field operations and field firing, Fort Benning, Georgia.

c. 28 Aug-9 Sept 1944: Combined training, firing with infantry battalions, and IX Corps tests.

d. 4-15 October 1944: Advanced chemical training, smoke screen with HC pots, contamination and decontamination of H, firing CNB shells in a battalion shoot, and a six day field maneuver. Place: Camp Sibert, Alabama.

e. Throughout the period of unit training, IX Corps conducted the following tests:

(1) 29-30 August 1944: Air-ground test. A combined operation with engineer units, involving stream crossing. Grade: Satisfactory.

(2) 5 September 1944: Physical fitness test. Company A was picked to represent the battalion, and successfully completed the test. Grade: Satisfactory.

(3) 12 September 1944: MOS test. Given to a cross-section of specialists. Grade: Satisfactory.

(4) 13-14 September 1944: Basic medical test. This test was held for the entire battalion. Grade: Satisfactory.

(5) 15-16 September 1944: Combat intelligence test. This test was given to a selected group of officers and enlisted men. Grade: Satisfactory.

4. The third period of training was a carry-over of the second, or unit training period, with emphasis being placed on firing tactics. Several battalion field problems were held, and emphasis was placed on realism. Situations were given for all problems. Battalion headquarters sections were given their share in the activities by setting up forward command posts and issuing orders covering the operations. This third and final training period was terminated on 31 December 1944. In the period 15 through 29 November 1944, the battalion took part in infantry battalion combat firing tests with the 65th Infantry Division. On 14, 15, 16 and 23 November, the battalion received its own combat firing tests by the Second Army. Grade: Satisfactory.

5. Qualification in arms: This phase of training received great emphasis. The battalion set up its own standards, and made them high. Each man was to qualify with both the M-1 rifle and the carbine cal. 30, regardless of which he was armed with and regardless of how many times he had to re-fire the course. As a result, 100% qualification was obtained in both weapons.

6. Familiarization firing: Each man fired familiarization courses with rocket launchers, grenade launchers, and cal. 50 machine guns on both ground and anti-aircraft targets. Each man threw live fragmentation grenades.


Chapter 5
Getting chemical mortar battalions for the ETO

Mortar battalions were needed in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), but getting chemical mortar battalions for the that theater proved to be a complicated and difficult problem. Colonel Rowan, chief chemical officer in the theater, had recommended a total of 24 battalions for the theater troop list, a figure based upon the formula of 2 battalions per corps (18) and 2 additional battalions per army (6). His commander approved this recommendation, including the figure in the overall troop list which was forwarded to Washington early in 1943.

The War Department took no action on the troop basis recommended by the theater commander. In November 1943 it sent an officer to England to inform the theater commander on War Department troop basis policy-the establishment of an over-all theater personnel ceiling within which the theater commander could set up his own troop basis. The officer produced a list of those units which were immediately available, those which were in training, and those which were scheduled for activation. He stated that the theater commander could take his pick, staying, of course, within his over-all ceiling. Because the list admittedly had no relation to the one submitted by the ETO, a situation which negated a large amount of detailed planning, the War Department agreed to activate and train units not on the list, with the understanding that this would take additional time. Unfortunately, there were only seven chemical mortar battalions on the list.

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the U.S. army group in the theater, received the job of determining the final troop list. Rowan pointed out to General Bradley that the seven chemical mortar battalions bore no numerical relation to the number of armies and corps on the list, that they could not be distributed equitably, and that they were far too few to achieve their full potential. Rowan then asked Bradley for the twenty-four mortar battalions of the original troop list. Bradley replied that he would like to have more mortar units but, because the troop ceiling had just about been reached, adding them would mean giving up other units that were equally valuable. This he was reluctant to do.

At the time of these negotiations the only mortar battalion located in the ETO was the 81st. Four others were then in the MTO (Mediterranean Theater of Operations): the 2nd, 3rd, 83rd and 84th. Those and 13 more joined the 81st in the ETO before the fighting was over. Those 13 were the 86th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 99th and 100th.

A change in the table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for the mortar battalion promised an unexpected source of men. Under the existing table, the authorized strength was 1,010; a revised table of September 1943 reduced this number to 622. Colonel Rowan was informed that the battalions in the United States were organized under the old table. Taking into consideration the battalions then existing and those which could be formed from the men made excess by reorganization under the new table, Colonel Rowan came up with a total of eleven potentially available battalions. If General Bradley asked for but one battalion in addition to the War Department troop list, there would be enough to equal just half of the original request, or one per corps and army. General Bradley acceded, requesting twelve mortar battalions for the theater troop list.

Although it began auspiciously, the plan for capitalizing on battalion reorganization as a source for new units soon turned sour. The theater received permission in December to activate a mortar battalion in England manned in large part by the men freed in the reorganization of the 81st Battalion. But Rowan learned to his dismay that the battalions in the United States earmarked for his theater had already been reorganized under the new TO&E, thus cutting off an important supply of personnel.

A personnel problem of a different sort had existed even before the battalions entered combat. The revised TO&E of September 1943, it will be recalled, reduced the battalion strength from 1,010 to 622. Battalion commanders were of the opinion that this number was below that required to man, supply, and provide communications for the forty-eight mortars within the unit. Although there was disagreement as to the composition of an appropriate TO&E, all of the commanders considered the 6-man squad too small to keep a mortar in action. A popular remedy was to withdraw several mortars and reinforce the remaining squads with the men thus freed. Lt. Col. Ronald LeV. Martin took more drastic action with the 92nd Battalion. He received permission to eliminate one of the four companies of his unit, thus anticipating the revised TO&E which was to become effective in the fall of 1944.

Another difficulty which emerged in Normandy involved the tactical employment of chemical mortar units, or more precisely, the matter of mortar battalion control. The resulting controversy provoked two schools of thought, one holding that mortar units should be directly responsible to the infantry which they supported, the other maintaining that they should operate under artillery control.

One of the main benefits of the artillery control system was the efficiency with which the battalion could operate as a unit. In defensive situations, mortar fire could be readily massed and the unit's fire could be effectively integrated with that of the artillery.

Most of those concerned, the CWS and otherwise, favored the close infantry support method. This fact was confirmed in a CWS theater of operations letter which stated that although applicable artillery techniques and practices should be used, the normal role of the chemical battalion “should be considered as part of the infantry team... furnishing close support with a heavy and powerful mortar.” During December the mortar battalions began to reorganize under new tables of organization and equipment Dated 29 September, the revised TO&E converted the battalion to a triangular organization by eliminating Company D.This change had long been advocated by CWS officers, although there had been a recent move to retain the fourth company as a replacement and training unit. The designation of the three companies was changed from “weapons” to “mortar.” Each had three platoons of 4 mortars, or a total of 36 for a battalion; the previous organization provided for 4 companies, each with 2 platoons of 6 mortars, or a total of 48.

Battalion commanders had long complained of insufficient men; now, despite the reduction in the number of weapons, battalion strength rose from 622 to 672. What formerly had been the headquarters detachment with 63 men was changed to a headquarters company with 155. The inclusion of nine 2½-ton trucks in the new TO&E provided a slight increase in the amount of organic transportation.


Chapter 6
General

The 93rd Chemical Battalion (Motorized) was activated on 24 March 1944 in Camp Rucker, Alabama, per Letter Order Number A 3-23, Headquarters Second Army, Memphis 15, Tennessee, dated 15 March 1944. It was organized under T/O 3-25, dated 7 September 1943. The battalion strength was set at 39 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 582 enlisted men. Cadre was furnished by the CWS Replacement Training Center. The officers and enlisted men of the cadre were assigned to companies per Special Orders 1, 2, 3, Headquarters, 93rd Chemical Battalion (Motorized), dated 24, 25, and 26 March 1944 respectively.

The following named officers were announced as the battalion staff on General Order Number 1, Headquarters, 93rd Chemical Battalion (Motorized), dated 24 March 1944:

On 4 July 1944, at Camp Rucker, Alabama, Lt Col Jacquard H. Rothschild, 0018077, assumed command of the battalion. On 6 August 1944, Captain Marshall S. Marshall, 0-436613, was assigned to Headquarters and announced as battalion executive officer. He was promoted to the rank of major per Par 1, SO #136, Headquarters, Ninth U.S. Army, dated 16 May 1945.


Chapter 7
93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion strength

After activation in March 1944, the morning report showed a total strength of 38 officers and 80 enlisted men. During the month of April 1944, 16 men were received from Hq, 5th Det Sp Trs, 2nd Army, Camp Rucker, Alabama, and 75 men were received from Hq, 100th Div, Camp Rucker, Alabama. This brought the total strength on the morning report at the end of April 1944 to 47 officers and 179 enlisted men.

During May 1944, the battalion received an additional 46 men from Hq, 66th Div, Camp Rucker, Alabama; 106 from Barrage Balloon Tng Ctr, Camp Tyson, Tenn; 160 from AAATC Cp Davis, NC; and 105 from AAATC Hq, Camp Haan, Califrnia. The morning report strength as of 31 May 1944 was 49 officcrs and 644 enlisted men.

The morning report showed a decrease during June, July and August 1944; and, as of August 31, 1944, strength was 44 officers, 1 WO, and 539 enlisted men.

In Sept 1944, 53 men were received from ASF Replacement Depot, Camp Reynolds, Penna, and 45 were received from Hq 5th Det Sp Trs, 2nd Army, Camp Rucker, Alabama. The morning report showed 41 officers, 1 WO, and 628 enlisted men as of 30 Sept 1944.

After receiving 12 men from Hq ASF Replacement Depot, Camp Beale, California, and the decrease during the month of Oct 1944, the morning report strength was 42 officers, 1 WO, and 615 enlisted men as of October 31, 1944.

After the addition of 26 men received from Hq 24th Det Sp Trs, 2nd Army, Camp Shelby, Miss., during Nov 1944, and decreases during the month, the morning report stood at 43 officers, 1 WO, and 636 enlisted men on 30 November 1944.

48 men were received from Hq AGF Repl Depot, Ft George G. Meade, so that by 31 December 1944 the morning report strength reflected 42 officers, 1 WO, and 656 enlisted men.

In the months of Jan, Feb, Mar and Apr 1945, the officer strength was 38 or 40, the WO remained stable, and enlisted men reached a low of 623 and a high total of 656. May and June 1945 resulted in an increase for both months and, at the end of June 1945, strength stood at 38 officers, 1 WO, and 650 enlisted men.

Strength remained fairly stable until Sept 1945 when a net increase in officer influx resulted in a total of 40 officers, with the WO no longer on hand, and a net decrease of 81 enlisted men brought the EM total down to 574 at the end of September 1945.

No change was reflected for October 1945.


Chapter 8
93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion stations

Activated Camp Rucker, AL 24 Mar 44
Assigned to IX CORPS, Ft McPherson, GA
Camp Rucker, AL, 24 Mar 44 to 19 Aug 44
Fort Benning, GA, 19 Aug 44 to 25 Aug 44
Camp Rucker, AL, 25 Aug 44 to 3 Oct 44
Temporary change of station
Departed Camp Rucker, AL, Oct 3, 1944
Arrived bivouac area, Camp Siebert, AL Talledga National Forest, 4 Oct 44
Camp Siebert, AL, 4 Oct 44 to 16 Oct 44
Attached to 65th Infantry Division, Camp Shelby, MS, 16 Oct to 6 Nov 44
Combined training and reinforcing fires during infantry battalion field exercise and infantry battalion combat firing tests
Permanent change of atation
Departed bivouac area, Camp Siebert, AL Oct 16, 1944
Motor convoyed to Camp Shelby, MS; arrived 18 Oct 44
Camp Shelby, MS, 17 Oct 44 to 9 Jan 45
Assigned 9-10 Nov midnight to 24th Det Sp Trs, Second Army, Camp Shelby, MS
Reorganized and redesignated as 93rd Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
38 officers, 1 warrant officer, 633 EM as of 17 Nov 1944
Assigned midnight 30 Nov, reattached to 14th Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army, Camp Shelby, MS
Permanent change of station
Departed Camp Shelby, MS, 9 Jan 1945
Arrived Camp Miles Standish, MA, 11 Jan 1945
Para 10 SO 3, 14th Hq Sp Trs, 2nd Army, Camp Shelby, MS
Shipment Order 9011-A EDCMR, 17 Jan 1945
Camp Miles Standish, MA, 16 Jan to 20 Jan 45
Camp Lucky Strike, France, 30 Jan 45 to 27 Mar 45
Field operations in France and Germany
Camp Lucky Strike, France, 18 Jun 45 to 23 Jun 45
Relieved assignment Third U.S. Army, 12th Army Gp, assigned Normany Base Sec 28 Jun 1945
Camp Miles Standish, MA, 4 Jul 45 to 5 July 45
Fort Bragg, NC, 6 Jul 45 to 20 Oct 45
27th Detachment, Special Troops, Second Army, Ft Bragg, NC
Deactivated 93rd Oct 20, 1945


Chapter 9
93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion campaigns

On January 9, 1945, at 1000 hours the 93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion boarded a troop train at Camp Shelby, Miss, and headed north to Camp Miles Standish, near Boston, Massachusetts. En route the train made a stop in Bristol, Virginia. At the stop sandwiches and drinks were furnished by the local ladies. The battalion arrived at Camp Miles Standish, Mass, on 11 January 1945.

While waiting to embark overseas, men of the 93rd spent time sightseeing in Boston. At the service club in Boston, one of the men met the movie star that he had a crush on from afar, Diana Lynn, and she gave him an autographed picture of herself.

The 93rd Cml Mortar Bn left Camp Miles Standish, Massachusetts, on 18 January 1945 at 0745 upon call from the Boston port commander. The battalion left Boston harbor on the 18 January 1945 at approximately 1745 on board the Santa Maria with the strains of “Don't Fence Me In” being played. The English battleship Rodney stayed along side the starboard bow. DE boats protected the outer edges of the convoy. En route to Le Havre, France, the convoy was attacked by German U boats. The sound of depth charges could be heard as they exploded under water.

The North Atlantic Ocean is rough in January. 75 foot waves were plentiful. The propeller of the ship ahead of the Santa Maria came out of the water as the waves rose and fell. The rapid rise and fall had a roller coaster effect, and the yawing and pitching had a serious effect on the stomachs of some of the troops. There were quite a few trips to the rails and some men spent part of the trip in their bunks.

The 93rd arrived at Le Harve, France, ETO, at 1100 hours on 29 January 1945. The battalion departed for Camp Lucky Strike, Camp Barville, France, standing up in 40 by 8 trucks, and arrived there after a very cold trip at 0155 hours, 30 January 1945. The 93rd left Camp Lucky Strike on 4 February 1945 on VOCO (verbal order of the commanding officer). This VOCO was later confirmed by Letter Orders 2-32, Hq, District A, Normandy Base Section, Communication Zone, ETO, dated 7 February 1945.

Hq & Hq Company was stationed at Crasville la Rocquefort, France. Company A was stationed at Le Chateau, France, Company B at Thiedvilla, France, and Company C at Rainfrevilla, France. A liason officer was maintained for the battalion at Camp Lucky Strike, France.

While here, the 93rd CMB was attached to the Fifteenth Army. The 93rd received its orders to move up to Germany and, with its new motorized equipment started out on the long drive from Rouen. On 28 March 1945, the battalion was transferred by VOCO to Laufenselden, Germany. No enemy resistance was encountered.

After the 93rd entered Germany at Trier, some members had their first church service on Easter Sunday. April 1st, in a Protestant church because all the churches around their Chateau in France were Catholic. The men carried
their carbines in church.

The 93rd CMB crossed the Rhine River at the Saint Goar crossing on a pontoon bridge. While the battalion waited its turn to cross, some of the members watched some boats traveling on the river trying to dock on the other side. The current was so swift that the boats had to head upstream from where they wanted to land and drift over to the final spot. There was some confusion after reaching the other side of the bridge on which way to go, left or right, because another outfit was alternating its vehicles with the 93rd. A truck from the other outfit went first, then one of
the 93rd jeeps, then another of the other units trucks and so on. Upon reaching the other side, the other unit's trucks were to go to the right and the 93rd jeeps to the left. Needless to say, due to some misunderstanding a few jeeps went right and until it was realized that the rest of the convoy was not ahead. There was a sigh of relief when, after turning back and after passing some distance past the bridge landing, the rest of the unit had pulled over and was waiting for the strays to show up. Once intact the movement continued.

On 3 April 1945, the 93rd was transferred by VOCO to Neukirchen, Germany. No enemy resistance was encountered. Hostilities officially ended in the European Theater at 0001, 9 May 1945.

Hq & Hq Company departed from Saalfeld, Germany (J5633), at 1725, 15 May 1945, and arrived at Weimar, Germany (J5271), at 1845, 15 May 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was clear, roads were excellent and morale was high.

The battalion departed Weimar, Germany, at 1200 hours on 15 June 1945, destination Camp Lucky Strike, France. The first day's travel of approximately 240 miles placed the battalion in Kirchberg, Germany. Here the battalion bivouacked on a small German military reservation.

Leaving the next morning, June 16th, the battalion crossed the Rhine and going through Luxembourg moved into France. Another bivouac in Soissons, France, a distance of about 250 miles from Kirchberg. Members of other mortar battalions were met here.

Departing Soissons, France, at 0500 the next day, June 17th, the battalion arrived at Camp Lucky Strike, France, a total travel distance from Weimar, Germany, of approximately 755 miles. The stay at Camp Lucky Strike lasted about a week and, at 1500, 24 June 1945, the battalion boarded the Bienville, a small troop transport. Berthed directly in front of the Bienville was the Santa Maria, the ship that had brought the battalion over from the United States. The Beinville sailed at 2100 on 25 June 1945 for the United States.

A July 4th welcome home greeted the battalion as the Beinville moved toward its berth in the harbor at Boston. The battalion disembarked at 1800, boarded a train and arrived back at Camp Miles Standish, its original point of departure through Boston some several months before.

Divided into groups, the men were given their furlough orders and, late on July 5 and 6, the men were on their way to their furlough destinations.

Their furloughs over, the me reassembled at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, before redeployment duty against Japan. On August 17, the men were relieved to find their orders had been cancelled following the surrender of Japan in the preceding week. The battalion was deactivated on October 20, 1945. The men were discharged or reassigned to another military unit.


Chapter 10
93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion battles

The 93rd Cml Mort Bn joined VIII Corps in action at Emmelshausen on 29 March 1945. The first company was committed on 3 April 1945. The companies of the battalion were attached to various divisions of the Corps and fought with them until relieved on 20 April 1945. The entire action was characterized by light resistance and lack of great need for the heavy support of which mortars are capable. 1148 rounds (579 HE and 570 WP) were fired by the battalion.

Battalion Headquarters. During the entire action, battalion headquarters stayed in the vicinity of VIII Corps headquarters. Telephone communication with Corps was nearly continuous and liaison was maintained with the Corps chemical officer. Battalion headquarters retained close administrative control with the companies. Regular scheduled visits to the companies by the commanding officer, executive officer and staff officers kept battalion headquarters appraised of the administrative and tactical situation of the mortar companies.

Headquarters Company. The company remained with battalion headquarters at all times. The ammunition sections maintained a battalion ammunition dump of approximately 6000 rounds and moved it forward each time the company moved. They also kept the mortar companies supplied with ample ammunition during the entire period. The supply sections hauled all classes of supplies from the Army dumps to the mortar companies.

Company A. The company was attached to the 65th Infantry Division by operation order of VIII Corps dated 3 April 1945. On that date the company departed the battalion assembly area, vicinity Neukirchen, and reported to an assembly area in the 65th Infantry Division zone at Sontra. On the following day the company was attached to the 259th Infantry Regiment and the platoons further attached to the three battalions of the regiment. On the initial movement into positions, the company was strafed by approximately 50 ME 109 planes. No casualties resulted and the platoons were emplaced in defensive positions in support of the regiment in the vicinity of Mulverstedt.

The company remained attached to the 259th Infantry Regiment until 13 April when it reverted to control of the 65th Infantry Division. At that time the division was placed in corps reserve and the company moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Friedrichroda. The company was relieved from attachment to the 65th Infantry Division on 16 April and reverted to battalion control.

On 18th April, Company A was attached to the 76th Infantry Division at Limbach and further attached to the 385th Infantry Regiment. Late on 18 April the entire company supported the 385th in an attack on Chemnitz. The company fired into the town scoring hits on factories in the town and starting fires. 111 rounds of HE and 6 rounds of WP were expended during this operation. On 20 April the company again reverted to battalion control and saw no further action during the period. The company lost two men missing in action.

Company B. The company was attached to the 89th Infantry Division by VIII Corps operation order on 3 April. The entire company was attached to the 353rd Infantry Regiment and moved forward in the attack on Eisenach. After Eisenach had been captured, the company moved to support the attack on Rohla on 7 April. Very effective fire was placed on the town that day and the town was taken. 98 rounds of HE and 96 rounds of WP were expended in this action, and the gun positions were attacked both by small arms fire and by five Nazi planes, type not identified.

On 9 April, the company was attached to the 355th Infantry Regiment and moved into firing positions in the vicinity of Mohlberg. On 10 April, the company was attached to the 354th Infantry Regiment and fired WP on two enemy 88 guns. The guns were silenced. On 11 April, the company was attached to the 3rd Battalion of the 354th Infantry Regiment and fired in support of the attack on Hill 518 near Gossel. The mortar position received 88mm fire and the company fired seven concentrations to silence the 88's. The company then moved forward in the attack to the vicinity of Wullersleben. While moving into position, the 1st platoon received 88mm fire which killed one officer (the platoon commanding officer) and one enlisted man, and wounded two enlisted men.

On 11 April, the company fired a smoke screen and two HE concentrations in support of the 3rd Battalion 354th Infantry, expending 357 rounds of WP and 96 rounds of HE. One enlisted man was wounded by sniper fire while in an OP in a church steeple in Wullerleben during this firing. On 14 April the company was again attached to the 353rd Infantry Regiment, with the first and second platoons in direct support of the third battalion, and the third platoon in direct support of the second battalion. Movement at this time was very rapid and no fire was called for.

On 16 April, the company was attached to the 355th Infantry Regiment and further attached to the first battalion. On 17 April, the second platoon fired a number of concentrations on enemy troops and automatic weapons positions. 89 rounds of HE and 2 rounds of WP were expended in these missions. The company remained attached to the 355th Infantry and moved forward during the rapid advance until it was relieved from the 89th Infantry Division on 20 April. The company had two men killed in action and three wounded in action during this period.

Company C. The company was attached to the 87th Infantry Division on 8 April. On 11 April, the company was attached to the 347th Infantry Regiment and moved from a battalion assembly area to the vicinity of Ober Porlitz to support the infantry regiment. The company advanced rapidly with the regiment, prepared to support it at any time.

Positions were occupied to fire on Saalfeld on 13 April but the town capitulated before the fire was requested. The company continued to advance rapidly with the infantry and supported an attack on Schleiz with fire. On 16 April, the platoons were placed in support of the three battalions of the regiment and became part of the battalion combat teams then set up within the regiment. On that day, the third platoon fired on Theoma, destroying buildings and starting fires.

On 18 April, the third platoon moved out to a position along the restraining line with two platoons of infantry to destroy enemy positions east of Theuma. Thirty-three rounds of WP and fourteen rounds of HE were fired during the mission, demolishing the enemy positions. The platoons then returned to their former positions. On 19 April, the second platoon fired in support of a limited attack in the vicinity of Stockigt on houses from which enemy fire had been received. The mission was accomplished. On 20 April, the company was relieved from attached to the 87th Infantry Division and reverted to battalion control.

Hq & Hq Company

Departed Neukirchen, Germany (W1353), by motor convoy at 1200 on 5 April 1945 and arrived at Hersfeld, Germany (H3954) at 1330 on 5 April 1945. Weather was cloudy with occasional light rain. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Hersfeld, Germany (H3954), at 0930 by motor convoy on 9 April 1945 and arrived at Eisenach, Germany (H8167), at 1330 on 9 April 1945. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Eisenach, Germany (H8167), at 0800 on 12 April by motor convoy and arrived Wolfis, Germany (J144500), at 1030 on 12 April 1945. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. The advance party was fired upon by two enemy snipers but the main body met no enemy resistance.

Departed Wolfis, Germany (J144500), at 1430 on 14 April and arrived at Pfanzwirbach, Germany (J532436), at 1700, 14 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed from Pfanzwirbach, Germany (J532436) at 1045 on 16 April 1945 and arrived at Auma, Germany (J9441) at 1305 on 16 April. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Auma, Germany (J9441), at 0910 on 19 April 1945 and arrived at Reichenbach, Germany (K225343), at 1130 on 19 April. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was rainy. Roads were fair. Morale was good. No enemy resistance was encountered.
Departed Reichenbach, Germany (K225343), at 1545 on 20 April 1945 and arrived at Suhl, Germany (J0927), at 2315, 20 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was good. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Suhl, Germany (J0927), at 1100 on 24 April 1945 and arrived at Saalfeld, Germany (J5633), at 1400 on 24 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was good. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Company A

Departed Neukirchen, Germany (WH-1353), at 1800 on 4 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Sontra, Germany (H5477), at 0835, on 5 April 1945. Weather was cloudy with light rain. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Attached to 65th Infantry Division by VOCO on 4 April 1945.

Departed Sontra, Germany (H5477), at 0930 on 5 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Mulverstedt, Germany (H9484), at 1530, 5 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Mulverstedt, Germany (H9484), at 1930 on 7 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Mazza, Germany (H8283), at 0200 on 8 April 1945. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Mazza, Germany (H8283), at 0700 on 8 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Dippach, Germany (H6260), at 1145, on 8 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Dippach, Germany (H6260), at 1430 on 11 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Friedrichroda, Germany (H9856), at 1900, on 11 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Friedrichroda, Germany (H9856), at 0800 on 14 April 1945 and arrived at Dannheim, Germany (J5849), at 1030 on 14 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was rainy. Roads were fair. Morale was good. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Dannheim, Germany (J5849), at 1700 on 17 April 1945 and arrived at Auma, Germany (J9441), at 1700 on 17 April 1945. Weather was clear. Roads were excellent. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Auma, Germany (J9441), at 1330 on 17 April 1945 and arrived at Limbach, Germany (K545625), at 1900 on 17 April 1945. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance encountered. Relieved from attachment to 65th Infantry Division, and attached to 76th Infantry Division.

On 19 April 1945, company participated in attack on Chemnitz with elements of the 385th Infantry. Effective fire was delivered throughout most of the day. Company suffered no casualties.

Departed Limbach, Germany (K545625), at 0930 on 20 April 1945 and arrived at Suhl, Germany (J0927), at 2330 on 20 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Suhl, Germany (J0927), at 1030 on 28 April 1945 and arrived at Schleusingen, Germany (J135165), at 1200 on 28 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was clear. Roads were excellent. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Company B

Departed Neukirchen, Germany (WH-1353), at 1700 on 4 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Hersfeld, Germany (H3954), at 2000, on 4 April 1945. Weather was cloudy with an occasional light rain. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Attached to 89th Infantry Division by VOCO on 4 April 1945.

Departed Hersfeld, Germany (H3954), at 0815 on 5 April 1945 and arrived at Bosserode, Germany (H5864), at 1100, 5 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy. Weather was cloudy with frequent light rain. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Bosserode, Germany (H5864), at 1330 on 6 April 1945 and arrived at Herda, Germany (R6664), at 1900 on 6 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Herda, Germany (R6664), at 1230 on 7 April 1945 and arrived at Ruhla, Germany (H8558), at 1900 on 7 April 1945. Travel was by motor convoy.Weather was rainy. Roads were fair. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Ruhla, Germany (H8558), at 1700 on 8 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Friedrichroda, Germany (H9856), at 0100, on 9 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Friedrichroda, Germany (H9856), at 1915 on 9 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Muhlberg at 2330 on 9 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Muhlberg at 0015 on 11 April 1945 and arrived at Wullersleben, Germany (J345515), at 1400 on 11 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. Engaged in the battle at Hill 518, near Gossel, Germany (J209498). No casulties. Engaged in battle near Wullersleben, Germany (J345515), at approximately 1400, on 11 April 1945. Encountered fire from German 88. Enemy gun silenced by mortar fire from Company B mortars. One officer and one enlisted man killed, and three more enlisted men wounded.

On 11 April, the company fired a smoke screen and two HE concentrations in support of the 3rd battalion, 354th Infantry, expending 357 rounds of WP and 96 rounds of HE. One enlisted man was wounded by sniper fire while in an OP in a church steeple in WULLERLEBEN during this firing.

On 14 April, the company was again attached to the 353d Infantry Regiment with the first and second platoons in direct support of the 3rd battalion, and the third platoon in direct support of the 2nd battalion. Movement at this time was very rapid and no fire was called for.

On 16 April, the company was attached to the 355th Infantry Regiment and further attached to the 1st battalion. On 17 April, the second platoon fired a number of concentrations on enemy troops and automatic weapons positions. 89 rounds of HE and 2 rounds of WP were expended in these missions.

Remained attached to the 355th Infantry and moved forward during the rapid advance until it was relieved from the 89th Infantry Division on 20 April.

The company had two men killed in action and three wounded in action during this period.

Company C

Departed Neukirchen, Germany (WH1353), by motor convoy at 0700 on 7 April 1945 and arrived at Reichenbach, Germany (N9343), at1100 on 7 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance encountered.

Attached to 87th Infantry Division by VOCO on 7 April 1945.

Departed Reichenbach, Germany (H9343), at 0600 on 11 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Oberporlitz, Germany (J2538), at 1700, on 11 April 1945. Weather was cloudy. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Departed Oberporlitz, Germany (J2538), at 1745 on 12 April 1945 by motor convoy and arrived at Milbitz, Germany (J4038), at 1845 on 12 April 1945. Weather was clear. Roads were good. Morale was high. No enemy resistance was encountered.

Positions were occupied to fire on Saalfeld on 13 April but the town capitulated before the fire was requested. The company continued to advance rapidly with the infantry and supported an attack on Schleiz with fire.
 
On 16 April, the platoons were placed in support of the three battalions of the regiment and became part of the battalion combat teams then set up within the regiment.

On 16 April, the 3rd platoon fired on Theoma, destroying buildings and starting fires.

On 18 April, the 3rd platoon moved out to a position along the restraining line with two platoons of infantry to destroy enemy positions east of Theuma. Thirty-three rounds of WP and fourteen rounds of HE were fired during the mission, demolishing the enemy positions. The platoons then returned to their former positions.

On 19 April, the 2nd platoon fired in support of a limited attack in the vicinity of Stockigt on houses from which enemy fire had been received. The mission was accomplished.

On 20 April, the company was relieved from attachment to the 87th Infantry Division and reverted to battalion control.


Chapter 11
The Final Drive

By the end of January 1945, the Allies had regained the ground lost during the enemy's Ardennes offensive. In February, the 12th Army Group prepared for attack along the Roer and Sauer Rivers, an attack whose impetus would carry to the Rhine. This latter obstacle, the last great defensive barrier for the enemy, was surmounted in March. After that, victory was but a matter of time.

Much of the fighting of February and March involved river crossings. The Roer, the Erft, the Sauer, the Moselle, the Rhine – these were the largest rivers which blocked the American forces in their drive to the east. The chemical mortar battalions, by both smoke and high explosive missions, provided valuable support in this series of important operations.

One of the most spectacular smoke operations in Europe involving chemical mortar battalions was staged in the Third Army sector during the XII Corps attack across the Sauer and Our Rivers. This attack, which began on 7 February 1945, was supported by the 91st Chemical Mortar Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy W. Muth. The 91st Battalion was committed to action in December 1944, a month which marked the beginning of a steady influx of new mortar battalions. By the end of the war the 12th Army Group had a total of twelve, the number previously decided upon for the European theater.

In addition to those units already mentioned, the following chemical mortar battalions saw action with the 12th Army Group: the 89th, commanded by Lt. Col. Donald E. Yanka; the 90th, Lt. Col. Edgar V. H. Bell; the 93rd, Lt. Col. Jacquard Rothschild; the 94th, Lt. Col. Benjamin D. Williams, Jr.; the 95th, Lt. Col. Earl L. Shepherd; the 96th, Lt. Col. Farleigh E. Smith; and the 97th, Lt. Col. Edwin S. S. Hays, Jr. The 6th Army had four battalions.

The period of the Ardennes counter-offensive saw the start of a series of mortar shell malfunctions which were to plague the battalions for most of the winter of 1944-1945. These malfunctions were of two types: barrel bursts, in which the round exploded within the barrel; and muzzle bursts, in which the round prematurely exploded after leaving the barrel but still within the vicinity of the mortar emplacement.

Another factor was the emplacement of weapons in soft ground, a situation which plagued the 86th Battalion in September and October. In some cases the mortar crews of the 86th, after firing only two or three rounds, had to dig through mud to the base plate and haul it out with a jeep. A similar problem was the presence of hard shale rock in the soft clay which provided uneven support for the base plate and produced a shearing effect. The 81st Battalion particularly experienced this difficulty.


Chapter 12
Twelfth Army Group

The Headquarters of the Twelfth Army Group was established in London on July 14, 1944, and was given operational control of the United States First and Third Armies on August 1. Its commanding general was Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, who was also commanding general of the United States Army Group. This Army Group had been established on October 19, 1943, to plan United States participation in the forthcoming operation, and although its staff was largely transferred to the Twelfth Army Group in July 1944, it continued to exist on paper as a deception device until activation on October 18, 1944. The Twelfth Army Group, known also as Central Group of Armies, was under operational control of General Montgomery of the Twenty-First Army Group from August 1 to September, and under the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, thereafter. On September 5, 1944, the United States Ninth Army was assigned to the Twelfth Army Group. For a short time in late 1944 and early 1945, the First and Ninth Armies were detached for duty with the Twenty-First Army Group.

In the midst of the Ardennes counteroffensive, the United States Ninth Army was assigned to the Twelfth Army Group. It remained with the Group until the end of the combat period. At the time of the surrender of the German forces in May 1945, the four armies of the Twelfth Group First, Third, Ninth and Fifteenth were disposed on a continuous front running over 550 miles across Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Twelfth Army Group headquarters was entirely American in composition. It was organized in 5 general staff sections, and in 19 special staff sections, one of which was a section for psychological warfare. From mid-August 1944 until mid-May 1945, the headquarters operated on the continent in three areas: The Tactical Headquarters, which was the usual command post group; the Main Headquarters, which contained most of the general staff and special staff sections; and the Rear Headquarters, for supply and maintenance. After the surrender, the staff sections were concentrated in the Main Headquarters, from which they exercised operational control of the Armies until the Group was disbanded on August 1, 1945.


Chapter 13
Third Army

The 93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion was assigned to the Third Army. That Army, which originated in the United States before the war, served as one of the major ground combat commands in Europe from March 1944, when its headquarters and troops arrived in England, until after the end of the war in 1945. Commanded by Lt. Gen. George Patton, Jr., the Third Army joined in the combat in Normandy in July, 1944, took Brittany in August, fought the Battle of Moselle in September, conducted the Metz offensive in October and November, and took part in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 and January 1945. In March 1945, it crossed the Rhine and, in April, it drove through Bavaria and pursued the enemy across the Altuhl, Danube, and Isar Rivers. By May, it had captured Linz in Austria. After the German surrender, the Third Army became an occupation force and, in March 1947, it was disbanded in Europe and reestablished in the continental United States with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

Forcing the Rhine - Frankfurt on Main - Across the Mulde
22 March-21 April 1945

It had long been expected that the Rhine River would form a barrier which might delay forces of Third US Army for a considerable time, and that high casualties could be expected when the initial crossing in the Army zone was made.

Because of the tactical surprise achieved, the initial crossing deserves to be considered one of the most important tactical river crossings during Third US Army operations. The ease which the crossing was made and the rapid expansion of the bridgehead came as a surprise to the world. The crossing was made even before all territory west of the Rhine had been completely mopped up and within 2 days large forces of the XII Corps were well east of the River.

This first assault crossing of any Allied Army across the Rhine River occurred on the night 22-23 March when elements of the 5th Infantry Division, supported by some amphibious tanks of the 748th Tank Battalion crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim. This was strictly an assault crossing made with assault boats, contrasted to the earlier crossing at Remagen where First US Army forces seized the large Ludendorf Bridge intact. By noon of 23 March the entire 5th Infantry Division had crossed, and then the 90th Infantry Division plus one complete combat command of 4th Armored Division crossed. Within 36 hours of this initial crossing, a tread way bridge and a ponton bridge had been completed.

The 26th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division came to XII Corps control on 23 March and both prepared to cross the Rhine River. By 24 March, both of these divisions had crossed into the bridgehead area. The 4th Armored Division had passed through the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, and had driven 20 miles inland. Darmstadt was by-passed by the 4th Armored Division which drove close to Aschaffenburg on the Main River. Meanwhile the 5th Infantry Division drove up the south bank of the Main River while the 90th Infantry Division, attacked and cleared the important city of Darmstadt.

By 26 March all units of the XII Corps were well beyond the Rhine River. On this day the 6th Armored Division captured a damaged bridge across the Main River, pushing armored infantry elements across into the great industrial city of Frankfurt. Quickly, 5th Infantry Division elements followed, attacking into the heart of the city. Aschaffenburg was bypassed by the 4th Armored which had a bridgehead near the city across the Main River. The 26th Infantry Division was following behind the 4th Armored Division while the 90th Infantry Division swung north from captured Darmstadt to reach the Main River east of Frankfurt. Fighting continued inside Frankfurt where the 5th Infantry Division gradually reduced heavy resistance until 29 March when the city was cleared.

In accordance with a new inter-corps boundary there was a general reshuffling of Third US Army units on 28 March to provide the most effective fighting strengths for the various corps. The 5th Infantry Division and 6th Armored Division were passed to XX Corps control while the 11th Armored Division came to XII Corps from XX Corps and the 71st Infantry Division passed to XII Corps control from Seventh US Army.

The 4th Armored Division was ordered to halt its progress on 29 March to allow the following 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions to close up. Then, during the last two days of the month, it was given the go-ahead signal and drove quickly northeast 75 miles from Frankfurt to Hersfeld which it cleared on 31 March. Another drive was opened on 29 March by the 11th Armored Division in a zone just south of that of the 4th Armored Division, with the manufacturing city of Fulda being taken on 31 March.

At the end of March the supporting 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions were following 11th Armored Division and 4th Armored Division respectively, mopping up enemy which had been by-passed by the speeding armor, and the newly assigned 71st Infantry Division was assembled southeast of Frankfurt, prepared to join in the corps attack.

The VIII Corps assumed command of the 89th Infantry Division on 23 March at which time it had the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions. All were prepared to attack across the Rhine. The first VIII Corps crossing occurred near Boppard on 24 March when the 87th Infantry Division crossed in assault boats and rapidly set up a bridgehead 1 mile in depth. Another bridgehead at St Goar was secured the following day by the 89th Infantry Division. Fire support was furnished both divisions by the 76th Infantry Division which remained on the west bank of the River. Generally, resistance was stiffer than it had been in XII Corps zone, but at no time was the issue of success in doubt. The corps was ordered on 26 March to gain and Maintain contact with a planned bridgehead of the XX Corps at Mainz, and to continue its attack to the east. Steady advances were made by the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions until 27 March when the 76th Infantry Division crossed the Rhine. All three divisions then advanced to the east until 30 March when they reached the eastern limits of their zone. Inter-corps boundaries that were set up on 28 March assigned the VIII Corps the northern part of Army zone between XX Corps on the south and First US Army on the north, this zone, however, ended about 20 miles east of the Rhine, and accordingly VIII Corps was pinched out from further advance. At the end of the month all elements of the Corps were clearing their zone of remaining bypassed enemy troops.

Most XX Corps units were south of the Third - Seventh US Army boundary that was designated on 22 March. These units, however, continued to function south of the boundary for the next two days, at which time they headed north to take over the northern part of Army zone. On 26 March when XX Corps was ordered to seize and secure a bridgehead across the Rhine River in the vicinity of Mainz, and to continue its attack to the east, it consisted of the 65th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions, and the 11th Armored Division. On the night 27 - 28 March the 80th Infantry Division crossed the Rhine and Main Rivers in the vicinity of Mainz.

On 28 March XX Corps passed the 11th Armored Division to XII Corps, and received from XII Corps the 5th Infantry Division and 6th Armored Division, both of which were near Frankfurt. The 5th Infantry Division was fighting inside the city against decreasing resistance from air raid wardens, firemen, police and a few troops, while the 6th Armored Division started a drive to the northeast. Simultaneously, contact was made near Wiesbaden by the 80th Infantry Division with the 9th Armored Division (First US Army) which had driven south, and, Wiesbaden completely outflanked, fell to the 80th Infantry Division. Frankfurt, important manufacturing city with a pre-war population of 553,464 was cleared by the 5th Infantry Division on 29 March. At this time the 94th Infantry Division was passed to Seventh US Army.

From 28 to 30 March the 6th Armored Division drove rapidly northeast, reaching positions 6 miles from Kassel, about 100 miles north of Frankfurt. This drive which gained 100 miles in 3 days was one of the fastest in the entire history of Third US Army operations. The 65th and 80th Infantry Divisions moved north behind the armor to share in mopping up operations.

At the end of the month the 6th Armored Division was within 3 miles of Kassel while the 65th and 80th Infantry Divisions were mopping up zone in the rear, and the 5th Infantry Division was continuing to police in the vicinity of Frankfurt.

As April started Third US Army was advancing into the German hinterland with its XX Corps on the north and XII Corps on the south, while its VIII Corps after being pinched out was mopping up to the rear on the north flank between XX Corps and First US Army. Enemy resistance was disorganized all along the front, and nowhere was the enemy able to put up even moderate resistance except at Kassel, where XX Corps forces were held up for 3 days.

During the first two days of April, the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions of XII Corps were parallel to each other, attacking to the east, with the 4th Armored Division on the north. The Werra River was reached and crossed by both armored divisions on 2 April, as the 26th Infantry Division. which had been following 11th Armored Division cleared the important manufacturing town of Fulda The 90th Infantry Division made good gains east of Hersfeld as it pushed behind the 4th Armored Division. Then, on 3 April the 4th Armored Division was passed to VIII Corps control in accordance with a change in the corps boundary which gave VIII Corps a central zone between XX Corps on the north and XII Corps in the south. The XII Corps line-up as of 3 April included the 11th Armored Division followed closely by the 26th Infantry Division with the 90th Infantry Division on the north flank and the 71st Infantry Division in the rear.

Orders were issued by the Army Commander to XII Corps on 5 April to consolidate its positions along the line Oberhof - Meiningen, and then attack southeast while Maintaining contact with Seventh US Army. Up to this time the corps attack had been to the east. Meiningen` was cleared by the 26th Infantry Division the same day, and then the 11th Armored Division launched its spearheading attack to the southeast. By 7 April the 71st Infantry Division was on the corps south flank, the 11th Armored Division in the center and the 90th Infantry Division on the north while the 26th Infantry Division was mopping up in the rear. During the next three days the Corps advanced an average of 5 miles per day throughout its zone. On 9 April the 11th Armored Division moved to the Corps south flank, while the 26th Infantry Division took over the central part of zone and the 90th Infantry Division was on the north, while the 71st Infantry Division mopped up in the rear.

Coburg was cleared on 10 April by the 11th Armored Division while Neustadt fell to the same Division the following day. Good gains were made by all units of the Corps during the next three days until 14 April when the important city of Bayreuth was taken by the 11th Armored Division on the Corps south flank. HOF less than 10 miles from Czechoslovakia was captured on 15 April by the 90th Infantry Division at which time the Corps attack was practically halted - although patrols of the 90th Infantry Division crossed the Czechoslovakian border on 16 April. Earlier, on 13 April orders were received from Twelfth US Army Group which ordered the Army to stop its attack after reaching the line Bayreuth - Hof - Plauen - Wilkau - Rocklitz - Zwick-Mulde River.

Now, as XII Corps was lined up along its part of this restraining line, it improved its positions and continued patrolling. Orders were given the Corps on 17 April to pass the 71st Infantry Division to Seventh US Army, to assume command of the 97th Infantry Division, and then to continue its attack to the southeast. A movement south along the Czechoslovakian border was started on 18 April. By 21 April when this campaign came to an end, XII Corps units had driven south as far as Hirschau and Weiden in the drive along the Czechoslovakian border toward Austria.

At the beginning of April, VIII Corps (76th., 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions) was mopping up in a zone where they had been pinched out by the northern drive of XX Corps. On 3 April a new- inter-corps boundary was set up which gave VIII Corps the central part of zone. At this time the 4th Armored Division from XII Corps and the 65th Infantry Division from XX Corps both of which were functioning in the new VIII Corps zone came to VIII Corps control. The 4th Armored Division which had been attacking to the east under XII Corps was driving toward the important city of Gotha, which it cleared on 4 April. Rapid movement to the new zone was made by the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions while the 76th Infantry Division passed to XX Corps control. The 4th Armored Division was constrained from further advance on 5 April to allow other units to catch up in their mopping up operations. At this time 4th Armored Division was well in advance of other units while the 65th Infantry Division was on the north flank, and the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions were mopping up in rear. By 8 April when the 4th Armored Division was passed to XX Corps, other units had closed up to forward positions and were ready to jump off on their continued attack to the east.

VIII Corps was deployed by 9 April with its 89th and 87th Infantry Divisions north and south respectively on the front and its 65th Infantry Division in the rear. Then, on 10 April the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions opened a joint attack to the east, clearing Armstadt. Bad Berka was taken two days later as the two divisions made crossings of the Saale River. Without an armored division to spearhead its attack, VIII Corps was unable to progress as either the XII or XX Corps which flanked it.

Twelfth US Army Group orders of 13 April which gave Third US Army orders to stop its advance called upon VIII Corps to stop at the line Plauen -Zwick-Mulde River. The important city of Zwickau was cleared on 16 April, and by 17 April the Corps had reached its restraining line from Plauen to Zwick-Mulde River in zone. During all of this drive the 65th Infantry Division had been in rear areas, either mopping up or in reserve.

Orders of 17 April provided that VIII Corps would pass the 65th Infantry Division to XX Corps, and would receive the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions from XX Corps; also that it would extend its responsibility to cover the XX Corps zone, and be prepared to pass to control of First US Army. All units patrolled during the following 4 days, until 22 April, at which time the VIII Corps passed to control of First US Army with the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Armored Division, while the 4th Armored Division went into Twelfth US Army Group Reserve. At this time the VIII Corps had the northern zone all the way from Plauen north to a point north of Chemnitz.

At the start of April. XX Corps' 6th Armored Division, followed closely by the 65th and 80th Infantry Divisions was besieging Kassel, an important railroad and manufacturing center at the northernmost part of Army zone. The 80th Infantry Division passed through the armor and entered the city, allowing the 6th Armored Division, followed by the 65th Infantry Division to turn east. Far to the rear the 5th Infantry Division policed in the vicinity of Frankfurt. Perhaps the heaviest fighting during this campaign occurred inside Kassel as the 80th Infantry Division overcame resistance after 3 days of heavy fighting, and took the city on 4 April. By that date the 6th Armored Division had swept 45 miles to the east, and had taken Muhlausen. The 76th Infantry Division passed to Corps control on 4 April from VIII Corps, at which time the 13th Armored Division also came to Corps control, but never reached Corps zone before being passed to First US Army on 7 April.

Like the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions, the 6th Armored Division was restrained on 5 April from further advance to allow the supporting infantry to close up behind the armor. As soon as the 80th Infantry Division could be relieved by First US Army units in the Kassel area, it moved southeast to join, in the Corps attack. No further attack was made for several days while mopping up continued. The 6th Armored Division maintained a reconnaissance screen north and east of captured Muhlausen. On 8 April the 4th Armored Division was passed to Corps control from VIII Corps.

A major corps jump-off occurred on 10 April when the 6th Armored Division passed through the 76th Infantry Division in the northern part of zone, and the 4th Armored Division passed through the 80th Infantry Division in the southern part of zone. Both armored divisions attacked sharply to the east while the corresponding infantry divisions mopped up behind them.

On 11 April the 6th Armored Division captured bridges across the Salle River intact while the 4th Armored Division after by-passing the important cities of Erfurt and Weimar was besieging Jena. Determined resistance inside Erfurt thwarted immediate capture of the city by the 80th Infantry Division, which however captured Weimar, and then cleared Erfurt the following day. The attack of the 6th Armored Division was so rapid that the 76th Infantry Division which followed it, was unable to keep up, but a large number of by-passed enemy were rounded up as the 76th Infantry Division pushed as rapidly as possible behind the smashing armor.

Some elements of the 80th Infantry Division reached Jena on 12 April, following the 4th Armored Division around that city so that the latter Division could renew its attack. On 13 April the 4th Armored Division bypassed Gera, and drove to the Zwick-Mulde River, while some elements of the 80th Infantry Division captured Jena and other elements of the division entered Gera. To the north the Weisse Elster River was crossed by the 6th Armored Division while the 76th Infantry Division accelerated its movement to the east in mop-up operations.

The aforementioned orders from higher headquarters on 13 April prohibited the Corps from further advance as it had reached its part of the Army's restraining line, but in mop-up operations the 76th Infantry Division captured Kayna on 15 April while the 80th Infantry Division cleared Gera on 14 April, and Glauchau and Crimmitschau on 15 April. Positions were maintained until 18 April when the Army ordered XX Corps to pass control of its zone to VIII Corps and also to relinquish control of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, and the 76th Infantry Division. The Corps was further ordered to assume command of the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions and the 13th Armored Division, and with these plus its 80th Infantry Division to take over a new zone far to the south where it could relieve elements of Seventh US Army. By 20 April the 65th Infantry Division had begun to attack after passing through Seventh US Army units while the 71st Infantry Division was driving south from a vicinity south of captured Bayreuth. Neumarkt was cleared on 21 April by the 65th Infantry Division as the 80th Infantry Division closed in Nurnberg and went into SHAEF Reserve. The assigned 13th Armored Division continued its movement to the new corps zone.

On 31 March the 13th Armored Division and the 70th Infantry Division came to Army control for policing of rear areas only. They were used in this capacity west of the Rhine River until 5 April when the 13th Armored Division moved east of the Rhine River to police in an area near Hoxberg. The 5th Infantry Division was relieved from XX Corps and passed to Army control on 4 April, continuing its policing duties, however, in and about Frankfurt. Then on 7 April the 5th Infantry Division (less 11th Infantry) was passed to control of First US Army while the 13th Armored Division also was passed to First US Army control. Control of the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) was passed to First US Army on 9 April.

While policing west of the Rhine River was continued by the 70th Infantry Division, the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) was assigned to Army control with the mission of protecting Army Headquarters in the Hersfeld area. The area of the 70th Infantry Division was increased to include a considerable area west of the Rhine River.

On 17 April the 16th Armored Division was assigned to Third US Army, Then, on 20 April the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) was ordered to move to Erlangen to protect Army Headquarters in its new area. When this campaign ended on 21 April, the 70th Infantry Division was policing east and west of the Rhine, while the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) was protecting Army Headquarters in the vicinity of Erlangen, and the 16th Armored Division was continuing its movement to Army area.

The entire campaign was a period of aggressive movement, it was featured originally by successful assault crossings of the Rhine River as shown below:

Crossing siteDateDivision & Corps
Oppenheim 23 March   5th Infantry Division, XII Corps    
Boppard 24 March 87th Infantry Division, VIII Corps
St Goar 25 March 89th Infantry Division, VIII Corps
Mainz 27 March 80th Infantry Division, XX Corps

At first the corps were lined up with XII Corps on the south, XX Corps in the center and VIII Corps on the north, but as XX Corps swung north in the last few days of March, the VIII Corps was pinched out. It was assigned a new zone several days later in the central area so that XX Corps was on the north and XII Corps on the south. Armored elements of all three corps raced forward so fast during the early days of April that they had to be restrained to allow following infantry divisions to catch up with them in mop-up operations.

By order of the Supreme Commander on 13 April the Army was required to stop its advance at a line Bayreuth - Hof - Plauen - Zwick- Mulde River. No further advance to the east was made following attainment of this line through-out zone. Other orders from higher headquarters on 17 April provided that Third US Army would switch its zone of action to the south in order to drive south toward the Czechoslovakian border into Austria with the object of meeting the Russian forces near Linz, Austria. Under the provisions of this order Third US Army was to receive both the III and XVIII Airborne Corps, but later orders revoked the assignment of the XVIII Airborne Corps before it had began movement to Third US Army.

Toward the end of the campaign a rapid shift to the south, reminiscent of the movements at the early part of the Ardennes Campaign, took place. XX Corps surrendered its zone to VIII Corps which passed to control of First US Army, XII Corps attacked from its positions in the Hof - Bayreuth area to the south, and III Corps came to Army zone, assuming positions on the Army right (west) flank. The latter corps was still moving into positions as the campaign ended.

During this highly successful campaign Third US Army drove from the Rhine River to central Germany, south to the Czechoslovakian border, captured  12,400 square miles of territory and liberated the following important cities shown with their pre-war populations:

Frankfurt   553,464
Kassel 175,000
Wiesbaden 170,000
Erfurt 140,000
Darmstadt 115,196
Plauen 113,000
Zwickau 87,000
Offenbach 85,000
Gera 83,000
Jena 57,000
Weimar 49,000
Gotha 48,000
Eisenach 45,000
Hof 43,000
Muhlhausen    39,000

At the end of the campaign there was no doubt in the minds of any that War in Europe was about to end. Other Allied Armies made sweeping gains throughout the period, and, although none penetrated to such a depth as did Third US Army, all took record tolls of prisoners and swept the disorganized enemy everywhere in front of them. As evidence of the disorganization of the enemy the following losses of Third US Army are contrasted to enemy losses during the period.

CategoryArmy lossesEnemy losses
Killed 1,757 14,300
Wounded 5,885 31,200
Missing 782 unknown
Prisoners of War   unknown 240,661

That the enemy losses are over 30 times as large as those of Third US Army is evidence of the complete mastery of Third US Army during this stage of operations right in Germany's heart. One interesting example of the disorganization of the enemy during this campaign can be shown by his inability to remove priceless art objects, over 100 tons of gold bullion and currency of many nations from an unguarded salt mine near Gotha. This treasure was found on 7 April by soldiers of the 90th Infantry Division.

Activities of XIX Tactical Air Command were featured by mighty blows against the once great Luftwaffe. Against losses of 59 planes, the Command destroyed 185 planes in the air and 601 on the ground. As the area held by the enemy shrank, his planes were forced to use a few concentrated air-fields where they presented excellent targets for fighter bombers. During the 31 days of this campaign, XIX Tactical Air Command was able to fly in strength on 30 days, being grounded by inclement weather only one day. In 1260 missions, 12,304 sorties were flown and 1392 tons of bombs were dropped. Among other claims 10,774 motor vehicles, 633 armored vehicles and tanks, 1446 locomotives, and 11,685 railway cars were destroyed or damaged while 340 railroads and highways were cut and 199 marshaling yards were attacked.


Chapter 14
VIII Corps

Lineage – Organized 26-29 November 1918 in the Regular Army at Montignysur-Aube (Cote D'Or), France, as Headquarters, VIII Army Corps. Demobilized 20 April 1919 in France. Reconstituted 29 July 1921 in Organized Reserves as Headquarters, VIII Corps. Withdrawn 1 October 1933 from the Organized Reserves and allotted to the Regular Army. Activated 14 October 1940 at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Redesignated 1 January 1941 as Headquarters, VIII Army Corps. Redesignated 19 August 1942 as Headquarters, VIII Corps. Inactivated 15 December 1945 at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma. Redesignated 30 October 1957 as Headquarters, VIII United States Army Corps. Activated 20 November 1957 at Austin, Texas. Inactivated 1 April 1968 at Austin, Texas.

The 93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion joined the VIII Corps in action at Emmelshausen on 29 March 1945.

On the first of April, the VIII Corps had reached a pinch-out boundary west of the Frankfurt - Giesen autobahn and was awaiting further orders. Contact had been established with the V Corps of the First Army on the left flank in the vicinity of Giessen(M6621), and the boundary between the XX and VIII Corps of the Third Army ran northeast from the Wiesbaden area to the vicinity of Usingen(M5693) and on north to Giessen. Disposed along the limiting line from left to right flank were the 87th, 76th, and the 89th Infantry Divisions. The 6th Calvary Group was patrolling to the front of and in the areas of the 76th and 87th Divisions.

VIII Corps troops continued to clear towns in the forward areas and to mop up scattered remnants of enemy, some of whom were attempting to infiltrate back to German lines. The only aggressive enemy action was an ambush of one of our patrols near M6395. Enemy in contact were remnants of the 6th SS Mtn and the 276th Infantry Divisions with miscellaneous GHQ, AA, and Engineer outfits. The 76th Division cleared Usingen (M5693) during the night of 31 March - 1 April, thus eliminating a group of determined SS troops which had held out in this wooded area after being bypassed by the V Corps. At 0630, Anspach (M5588) and Westerfeld (M5690) were reported clear; Pfaffenwiesbach (M6293), Friedrichstahl (M6294) and Wehrheim (M5989) were being occupied. Elements of the 304th Infantry continued to protect Rhine River bridges at Boppard and St Goar.

Task Force Fickett - which was composed of elements of the 6th Calvary Group, a battalion of artillery and two companies of TDs, and one company of engineers and two companies of infantry from the 76th Division, and which had crossed the Rhine and advanced east in the zones of the 76th and 87th Divisions to cut the Bad Neuheim-Giessen highway - was dissolved and elements returned to their parent organizations. With the exception of Troops A and B, which were acting as prison guards, the 6th Calvary Group closed in assembly areas. The 6th Calvary Squadron was patrolling the autobahn from 6519 to 6507.

On 2 April, all units continued patrolling and combing the rear areas. Elements of the 304th Infantry were released from the mission of guarding Rhine River bridges and were enroute to join the 76th Division. Field Order Number 18 eliminated the Corps pinch-out boundary in the vicinity of Giessen. It was planned to bring the VIII Corps up and give it a zone between the XX and XII Corps which were operating to the northeast, east, and southeast. After relieving elements of the XX Corps on the left and the XII Corps on the right, VIII Corps was to continue the advance east, where the 4th Armored Division was on the loose near Gotha and Ohrdruf.

The 89th Division was to pass through elements of the XX and XII Corps and establish and maintain contact with the 65th Infantry Division on the left and with XII Corps on the right; protect the Corps right flank and continue the advance. The 65th Infantry Division was to pass from the XX Corps to control of the VIII Corps and continue the advance. It was also to establish and maintain contact with the XX Corps on the left and protect the left flank of the VIII Corps. The 76th Division was to move to the vicinity of Homberg (H1772) and to pass to control of the XX Corps upon arrival. The 87th Division was to await orders in its present location. The 6th Calvary Group was to move immediately to the vicinity of Alsfeld (H0840) and pass to temporary control of XX control upon arrival.

On the 3rd of April, Corps troops continued their movement in preparation for a resumption of the offensive in a new area. The 6th Calvary Group closed in a new assembly area near Muhlbach (M2860) and at 0200 assumed responsibility for the sector previously occupied by the 3rd Calvary Group. This sector extended from Rotenburg (H3954) to Hersfeld (H3954) and was under control of the XX Corps. Elements of the 347th Infantry, 87th Division, departed for the XII Corps area at 0300 to engage enemy troops behind the XII Corps CP. The 76th Division began moving to the XX Corps zone and was to pass to control of that Corps upon arrival. The VIII Corps CP moved from Diez and opened at Alsfeld (H0840) at 1600.

VIII Corps Operations Memorandum Number 40, which was issued on the 3rd, established another limiting line at Mulhausen (H90993) - Langensalza (J0382) - Gotha (J0865). This general line was to be held by armor and infantry alike and only patrols were to operate east of it. The 4th Armored Division and the 6th Calvary Group were to pass to VIII Corps control at 2400. Upon relief by infantry at the limiting line, the 4th Armored, which was to come to the VIII Corps from the XII Corps, was to await further orders. The 6th Calvary Group was to operate in rear of division zones and reduce any enemy pockets in the Corps zone. The boundary between the 89th and 65th Divisions was changed to include Bebra (H4465) in the 89th sector.

On the 4th of April, scattered enemy forces continued to oppose the Corps advance. Ambush activity and small enemy groups were reported in rear areas, and enemy aircraft again harassed our forward elements and traffic on the autobahn. Gotha (J0965) was captured against moderate resistance, Ohrdruf (J1152) was occupied later in the day, and resistance continued in the Eisenach (H8267) area.

The 4th Armored Division, which came under Corps control at 032400, continued its drive to the east in two columns. CCB in the north encountered practically no opposition until reaching Gotha. Here fighting by CCB and elements of RCT 355, 89th Division, continued until surrender at 1115. CCA in the south advanced against scattered small arms and anti-tank fire, blown bridges, and demolitions, and captured Ohrdruf. The location of one of the smaller but famous German concentration camps, Ohrdruf began, in the Corps area, a mass liberation of political and war prisoners which continued until the end of the war. CCA consolidated its positions and occupied the high ground to the east, and CCR, which had assisted CCA, occupied high ground to the east of Gotha.

In the 89th Division during the morning, elements of the 353rd Regiment motorized moved up to attack Eisenach (H8267) and relieve elements of the 90th Division. The 89th Reconnaissance Troop screened the left sector of the zone near H4964 for the 354th Infantry.

The 65th Infantry Division, which had passed to VIII Corps control at 1030, reported short fire fights with small, disorganized enemy groups. Elements of the 259th Infantry moved to the high ground at 7976 and 6380 and the RCT 261 was assembled near H6290. The 260th, assembled in the vicinity of H6282, prepared to move forward by motor and shuttling.

The 87th Division moved by motor to an assembly area near Friedwale (H4955) in the zone of the 89th Division. At 1230, the 1st Bn, 347th Infantry reverted to VIII control from XII Corps where it had been temporarily committed. The 6th Calvary Group mopped up by-passed pockets of resistance west of the Fulda River behind the infantry divisions.

On the 5th of April, the enemy offered light to moderate resistance which consisted of small arms, automatic weapons, and some light caliber artillery fire. Two enemy ambushes were reported and an estimated 78 enemy aircraft participated in raids on Hersfeld(H3954). VIII Corps CP closed at Alsfeld and opened at Hersfeld at 1400.

The 65th Division encountered light opposition and cleared Langensalza (J0382) late in the period. Resistance in the south of the Corps sector was more determined. The 89th Division cleared a pocket seven kilometers southwest of Langensalza quickly, but 300 stragglers organized under SS officers held out at Fortha (H7563) until 1715. Enemy continued to hold Eisenach (H8067), after negotiations for surrender with the bourgomeister and a Wehrmacht major were rejected by SS officers. The 6th Calvary Group reported no resistance from stragglers in rear areas.

Operations Memorandum Number 41 changed the Corps boundaries so that the old south boundary became, generally, the north boundary and the Corps zone became the former zone of the XII Corps. With the 89th Division on the left and the 87th Division on the right, the Corps was to clear enemy from its zone to the J12 vertical grid line, patrol only in the area beyond this limiting line, and be prepared to advance east. The 87th Division was to relieve elements of the 90th Division, and the 89th Division was to screen the Langensalza - Gotha line with not less than one battalion until relieved by XX Corps. The 65th Division, to remain in position until relieved by the XX Corps and the 89th Division, was to be prepared to move to an assembly area near H6363. The 4th Armored Division was to remain in position until relieved by elements of the XX Corps. The 6th Calvary Group was to assemble near Berneburg (H5073) early on 6 April and be prepared to move to Corps zone on short notice.

On 6 April, patrols from the 65th Division drew small arms and bazooka fire from infantry occupying hastily prepared positions five kilometers east and northeast of Langensalza (J0382). The 4th Armored Division reported the same kind of opposition near Fredricksroda (H9955), received sporadic medium and light caliber artillery fire near Ohrdruf (J1152) during the afternoon, and found enemy constructing road blocks near Crawinkel (J1547).

Enemy forces in Eisenach (H8067) resisted the 89th Division until 1300, after negotiations for surrender during the morning were again opposed by SS troops. At 1730, the 89th reported clashes with enemy troops near the road junction at H858664, and around 2030 strong small arms and bazooka resistance was met near Ruhla (H8558), Thal (H8760) and Wothel (H8665). The 87th Division, out of contact with the enemy, picked up several stragglers who offered no resistance.

During the day, Corps troops were engaged in moving to areas specified by Operations Memorandum Number 41, issued on 5 April. Because of continued pressure, the 65th was not relieved and the XX Corps alerted the 6th Armored Division to be ready to assist the division. The 90th Division of the XII Corps was completely relieved by the 87th in the southern part of the VIII Corps sector. The 89th Division began pulling into its new zone. The 354th Infantry moved to the vicinity of Waltershausen (H9859), the 355th to the vicinity of Ohrdruf, and the 353rd near Eisenach(h8067). The 4th Armored Division was to assemble in its present location as SHAEF Reserve.

Field Order 19, dated 7 April 1945

Under Field Order Number 19, VIII Corps was to consolidate along the general line Gotha (J-0965) - Oberhof (J-1138) and, on Army order, continue to advance to the East and Southeast in Z.

89 Inf Div with attached units, 550 AAA AW Bn, 602 TD Bn (SP), 707 Tk Bn and Co B, 93 Cml Bn, was to continue attack, clear enemy in Z (overlay), and consolidate along general line Schwabhausen, (J-1058) - Stutzhaus (J-1047). Relieve elements of the 4th Armd Div in Z. Maintain contact with enemy by patrols and establishing outposts in contact with enemy to front. Resume attack H-hour D-day, advance east and defeat enemy encountered in Z. Maintain contact with XX Corps on left (north) flank; protect Corps left (north) flank.

87 Inf Div with attached units, 549 AAA AW Bn, 735 Tk Bn, 607 TD Bn (SP) and Co C, 93 Cml Bn, was to continue attack, clear enemy in Z (overlay) and consolidate along the general line Stuzhaus (J-1047) - Oberhof (J-1138). Maintain contact with enemy by patrols and establish outposts in contact with enemy in front. Resume attack H-hour D-day, advance east and southeast and defeat enemy encountered in Z. Maintain contact with 89th Inf Div on left (north) flank and with XII Corps on right (south) flank; protect Corps right (south) flank.

65 Inf Div with attached units, 546AAA AW Bn, 808 TD Bn (SP), 748 Tk Bn and Co A, 93 Cml Bn, was to assemble vicinity of Berka (H-6362) and await orders in Corps reserve. One battalion, motorized, will be held for movement on short notice. Use sufficient force, but not to exceed one regiment, to follow the assault divisions and comb the Corps area for enemy who may be bypassed, hiding out, and stragglers. This operation to begin from division assembly area and work east. Be prepared to stage forward in Corps Z of advance and to protect Corps line of communications. On Corps order, pass through leading elements 89 and 87 Inf Divs in Z (overlay), attack east and defeat enemy encountered.

On the 7th of April at daybreak, 800-1000 enemy with 14-18 tanks launched a strong counterattack near Struth (H7994) and at 0930 re-occupied the town. Heavy fighting continued until noon, at which time the 65th Division, with the assistance of the 6th Armored Division of the XX Corps and friendly aircraft, repulsed the enemy. Half of his force was either killed or captured, nine of his tanks were destroyed, and the remainder of the force retired in disorder to the north and northwest. Sniper fire continued active at scattered points throughout the 65th Division area.

The 89th Division continued to move into the new zone in the northern part of the Corps sector. An enemy pocket developed in this area when the 4th Armored, advancing in the northern part of the Corps sector, and the 11th Armored, operating in the XII Corps to the right of the VIII Corps, reached the Gotha - Ohrdruf and the Oberdof (J1138) - Zella Mehlis (J0635) areas but did not establish contact. Enemy defending the general line H8764 - H8459 - H8665 with heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and panzerfaust fire offered stubbon resistance throughout the day. The 353rd Infantry cleared resistance at Wutha (H8665) and Ruhla (H8558) in this area, and the 354th, which had moved around the 353rd from the left, cleared Waltershausen (H9959) and Rodichen (J0058) during the period. At 1700, the 354th was heavily engaged by enemy defending a road block near H988561. The 355th motorized moved from the Gotha area, to which it had advanced with the 4th Armored, to positions north of Ohrdruf.

In the southern part of the Corps zone, the 87th Division advanced against light small arms and bazooka fire until late in the afternoon, when the enemy increased their determination to defend the vicinity of Tambach (J0143). Elements of the 347th Infantry passed the 345th on the right and established contact with the 11th Armored, with the XII Corps at Oberhof (J1138). At midnight, enemy attacked Oberhof unsuccessfully, but strong resistance was maintained against the 345th in the Tambach area.

In the 4th Armored Division area, sporadic light caliber artillery fire from Crawinkel (J1547) fell in the vicinity of Ohrdruf (J1152) during the afternoon and evening. Otherwise little enemy activity was reported as the 4th Armored maintained its positions, awaiting relief by the 80th Division of the XX Corps. The 6th Calvary Group was assembling near Berneburg (H5075).

During the 8th of April, the 87th and 89th Divisions continued their advance to the restraining line J12. Opposition still emanated from enemy pockets in the 89th sector and from enemy groups holding key defensive positions in the 87th sector. The 65th Division, which was being relieved by the 76th Division, was assembling near H6363. Considerable abandoned equipment was found by the 65th near Struth after the unsuccessful enemy counterattack of the previous day. Kella (H6395) and Volksroda (H6938) were occupied unopposed. The 4th Armored was partially relieved by the 80th and 89th Divisions, and the 6th Calvary Group assembled in the general vicinity of H8661.

In the 89th Division sector, enemy pockets offered stubbon resistance throughout the day as our forces closed in on and drove them from towns and villages. In the area including Friedrichroda (H9955), Cabarz (H9457) and Tabarz (H9556) very determined small arms and automatic weapons resistance was encountered at road blocks and entrances to towns. Friedrichroda was cleared during the afternoon; Cabarz and Tabarz were cleared near the end of the period. Another area of resistance was along the general line H8764 - H8599. Opposition was particularly heavy against our drive east in the vicinity of Seebach(H8960) and Schmerbach (H9157), but both towns were occupied during the afternoon. Schonau, Kalbersfeld, Langeharn, Catterfelm, Katterfeld, and Dapolarz were also occupied against strong rsisitance during the night of 8-9 April. In the forward zone near Ohrdruf (J1151), troops reported sporadic artillery fire.

In the 87th Division zone at Oberhof (J1138), the counterattack launched at 072345 by enemy employing automatic weapons and panzerfaust was repulsed at 0130. At 0630, the enemy raiding party in the vicinity of Tambach (J0238) was dispersed and after stiff fighting until noon the town was captured. Elements of the 345th Infantry cleared Dietharz (J0348) and advanced to J041175. Several small enemy groups armed with panzerfaust and small arms were engaged elsewhere in the zone.

On 9 April, the 87th and the 89th Divisions continued toward the Corps restraining line, clearing and consolidating their areas as they advanced. Against fairly heavy resistance, the 89th ejected enemy from several towns. A determined group held Finsterbergen (J0052) from 082100 to 0991000, and at Georgenthal (J0652) stiff resistance was maintained until 0900. Crawinkel (J1547) remained a source of strong resistance, Wolfis (J1450) received SP fire during the morning and late afternoon, and reports of single and small groups of tanks were frequent during the period. At the end of the day, the 89th held a general line J140535 - 115520 - 110500 - 145505 - 055495.

In the 87th sector, enemy offered moderate resistance in the form of road blocks defended with small arms, machine gun and bazooka fire. Scattered artillery fire was ineffective and stragglers caused no trouble on apprehension, but one tank near Schwarzwald (J1045) delayed our troops some. At the close of the period, the 87th had advanced elements to J080460 and J007475.

The 261st Infantry of the 65th was enroute to the division area in the vicinity of H840269. At 1300, the VIII Corps CP opened at Eisenach. The 4th Armored Division passed to the control of the XX Corps at 1800.

On the 10th of April, the 87th and 89th Divisions launched a limited objective attack generally from the limiting line set by VIII Corps Operations Memorandum Number 40, issued on 5 April. Particularly heavy resistance from both light and heavy arms was reported throughout the period. In the northern part of the Corps sector, Arnstadt (J2653) was reached by the 89th and a bridge over the Gera River was captured intact. Artillery fire increased noticeably during the day and fire received in Holzhausen (J2155) was estimated to be 105mm and 170mm. In the southern sector, the enemy offered moderate to heavy resistance to road blocks and key terrain features with light weapons.

The 89th Division attacked at 0800. The 255th Infantry on the left captured Muhlburg (J1756), Bittstadt (J2253) and Arnstadt, advanced to high ground 1 kilometer east of Arnstadt, and reached the limiting line on capturing Ridisleben (J2756). Elements of the 354th advance east from Wolfis(J1450), captured Espenfeld(J2250) and reached the high ground on the limiting line at J2251, while other elements advanced west through Wolfis and entered Gossel(J19949). Heavy small arms and automatic weapons resistance from enemy entrenched in cliffs from J2549 to J2651 was encountered at 2130. The 1st Bn, 354th moved north from the wooded area on the division right boundary near J1248 to an area 1 kilometer south of Ohrdruf (J1151). In the extreme southern part of the division zone, dug-in infantry with tanks near the woods at J1248 resisted very heavily with small arms and automatic weapons fire supported by artillery fire from the vicinity of Crawinkel (J1547) and Leibenstein (J1945). The 353rd was assembling near Ohrdruf.

The 87th Division attacked at 0630 against small arms, automatic weapons and some tank fire. In spite of woods and extremely rugged terrain, the 345th Infantry reached areas one kilometer west of Crawinkel, one kilometer east of Stutzhaus (J1047), and 1½ kilometers southeast of Schwarzwald (J1045). The 1st and 3rd Bns, 347th remained along the Oberhof - Schwarzwald highway (J1038 - 1045) until late afternoon. From there, the 3rd Battalion advanced seven kilometers east and the 1st Battalion advanced 6 kilometers. The 2nd Battalion moved forward on the left flank of the regimental zone to three kilometers east of the highway. The 346th assembled in the vicinity of Tambach (J0247).

The remaining elements of the 65th Division closed in the division assembly areanear H8062 at 1500. The 260th Infantry advanced and cleared the sector from the assembly area near Markshul (H7359) to a line three kilometers northeast of Steinbach (H8551) - Bratterode (H9050) - Schmakalden (H9247) - Reichenbach(H9343). Plans were made by the division to move one RCT to the vicinity of Friedrichroda (H9954).

Enemy resistance on 11 April was moderate in most of the Corps zone with scattered artillery fire. Wizleben (9J3762) in the 89th Division sector was heavily defended with intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. Crawinkel (J1547) in the south was captured against moderate resistance, but as the period ended the 87th Division encountered heavy fire near Stadtilm (J3647).

Task Force Sundt (composed of the 607th TD Bn Hq; B Co, 607th TD Bn; 735th TD Bn; K Co, 346th Inf, 87th Div; 87th Recon Troop; 2nd Plat, B Co, 312th Engr Bn) of the 87th Division moved through the 89th Division zone at 0630 to attack east from Arnstadt (J2554). After passing through the town at 0830, however, the Force was ordered west to reduce resistance in front of the 345th and 347th Regiments in position near J2038 and J1641. When Task Force Sundt reached J2944 the order was changed and the Force then advanced east to the vicinity of Stadtilm (J3599469). Elements of the 346th Infantry moved out of the regimental area at J0247 to follow Task Force Sundt, passed through the 345th, and advanced to J2946 and J3344. The 345th entered Crawinkel (J1547) at 0830 and elements began clearing the town and neighering woods, while other elements advanced to J135440. By the end of the day the 345th had advanced to Plaue (J2347) and J2144. The 347th attacked at 0645 and advanced to J2940 and J3242. During the day the 87th cleared ten towns, but at 1845 it encountered heavy resistance along the line Stadtilm, Griesheim (J3344), Cottondorf (J3242) and Grafinau (J3138). Enemy in this area was supported by direct tank and artillery fire.

The 89th Division attacked at 0630 from the vicinity of Arnstadt against moderate to heavy resistance and reached the general line Gutendorf (J4463) - Meckfeld (J4263) - Tonndorf (J4360) - Kranichfeld (J4356) - Wizleben (J3752). The towns of Gorbitzhausen (J3149), Marlishausen (J3152), Alkersleben (J3255), Elxleben (J3357), Reicheim (J3858), and Hohenfelden (J4058) were all cleared. Heavy fire was received by our forces advancing on Wizleben, and between 1800 and 2000 mixed 170mm and 88mm fire fell in all forward areas. At 2100 strong resistance developed in the eastern edge of Wizleben, and the enemy machine guns, 88s, and mortars were active in Kranichfeld. Task Force Crater (composed of 707th Tank Bn less B and C Co); 1st Bn, 353rd Inf (less B Co); A Co, 602nd TD Bn; 89th Recon Troop; 340th FA Bn; 1 platoon, 314th Engr Bn), which had been formed at 1700, began movement to an assembly area in the vicinity of Reicheim.

In the 65th Division an RCT composed of the 259th Infantry and the 867th and 868th FA Battalions, assembled near Friedrichroda (H9955); the 260th Infantry assembled near Catterfeld (J0452); and the 261th assembled near Oberellen. The 6th Calvary Reconnaissance Squadron of the 6th Calvary Group was concentrated near J1550 and the 28th Reconnaissance Squadron (less A and B Troops) was in the vicinity of J2253. The 28th had one reconnaissance platoon with each combat regiment of the 89th Division; one with the 318th Infantry, 80th Division; and one with the 4th Armored Division.

Enemy resistance which built up at the end of the 11th withdrew during the night and on the 12th of April light resistance was encountered as our forces advanced rapidly to the vicinity of Rothenstein (J7257) in the north and Rudolstadt (J5441) in the south. Both towns are on the Saal River. Forces in the rear areas, particularly elements of the 6th Calvary Group, met increaed sniper activity.

The 89th Division continued its attack at 0740 with the 355th Infantry on the left and the 354th on the right. Task Force Crater, spearheading the attack which advanced 20 kilometers, captured a Class 70 bridge intact over the Llm River in Bad Berka (J4961).

The northern column reached the Saal River after taking Saalborn, Grosslohma (J5860), Kleinlohma, Sollnitz, Tromlitz, Milda (J6257), Zimmritz and Schirnwitz. The southern column was to by-pass Blankenhain (J5357), but because of resistance it reduced the town and then attacke