Addendum to the history of the
98th Chemical Mortar Battalion
and its predecessor unit, the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion


These accounts of seven different battles in the Luzon campaign are taken from an apparently official record, author(s) unknown.
They provide considerable detail that is not included in the history by Bennett Saunders
Contents
1 - Cabaruan Hills
2 - Hill 355
3 - Lupao
4 - Malasin
5 - Munoz
6 - San Manuel
7 - Thirty-Minute Creek
Return to the history of the 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion.


Battle of the Cabaruan Hills
Companies A & D
12 to 25 January 1945

The 6th Infantry Division landed on S-Day, 9 January 1945, two regiments abreast, the 1st Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of San Fabian, and the 20th Infantry Regiment near Dagupan, thus forming a solid front between the two towns. When no enemy opposition was encountered upon the landing, the two regiments immediately moved southward, the 1st Bn, 20th Infantry Regiment, along the road from Dagupan to Malaniqui and from there east to the plains in the vicinity of Lunec where it went into position and commenced extensive patrol activity; while the 2nd battalion moved through Santa Barbara and patrolled the area south from there, eventually falling in behind the 1st battalion in a push toward the Agno River. Meanwhile, the 1st Infantry Regiment was moving south from San Fabian to Mangaldan, from where the 2nd Battalion continued south to Santa Barbara and then cut east along the road to Urdenetta; and the 1st Battalion cut southeast to Mapandan-Manapag-Urdentta.

Companies A and D of the 98th CMB were attached to the 20th and the 1st Infantry Regiments respectively; the 1st platoon of Company A to the 1st Battalion, and the 2nd platoon to the 2nd Battalion; while the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company D were likewise attached to the respective infantry battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment.

It was obvious from the first that the enemy was fighting a delaying withdrawal and only occasional patrol clashes occurred the first few days. Information from Filipino civilians and guerillas indicated the enemy was in considerable number, in various scattered groups, some poorly equipped but others possessing field pieces and tanks. A Filipino collaborator captured by Company B of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, talked freely, stating that the Japs intended to withdraw to the Cabaruan Hills on the other side of the Agno River, where they had dug-in heavy weapons and emplacements with strong points on the flanking hills near Unzad, Palna and Cabaruan.

While the 20th Infantry was meeting scarcely any opposition, the 1st Infantry, moving along roads with adjacent groups of small hills, was occasionally held up by road blocks and enemy artillery and machine gun fire which were covering various points along the roads. Part of a Jap armored division was withdrawing along the Santa Barbara-Minien-Urdenetta road and left rear guard elements to delay the advance of the 1st Infantry Regiment. Occasional sharp, fierce clashes took place with these rear-guards, most of whom were killed. Farther north the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, encountered similar obstacles along the road from Mangaldan to Mapandan and Manaog and thence south to Urdenetta.

At Mapandan, on 12 January, the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company D, in support of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, fired on a concentration of the enemy in the hills nearby, and next day the infantry battalion commander reported that four truckloads of enemy dead were collected in that area.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 1st Infantry Regiment, then converged on Urdenetta, catching the Jap armored column before it could withdraw and nearly annihilated it. Both mortar platoons fired rolling barrages on the town, destroying many buildings which contained enemy ammunition and supplies in large quantities. Nine enemy tanks were destroyed during the encounter, some of them by M-4s, but it was impossible to determine whether the remainder had been knocked out by either mortar or artillery fire.

The 1st Infantry then sped south from Urdenetta to Villasis, thus outflanking and surrounding the Cabaruan Hills, with the 20th Infantry on one side and the 1st Infantry on the other.

To secure the army beachhead which extended as far south as the Agno River, the Cabaruan pocket had to be mopped up. It was therefore decided that the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, would move into the Cabaruan Hills and make a reconnaissance in force, while the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, would follow a day later after the enemy strength had been determined, and help clear the hills.

The CO of the 1st Battalion therefore decided to move from Lunec and make a night march across an unharmed bridge at the Agno near Talaspatong and from there to proceed cautiously into the Cabaruan Hills and dig in before day-break. Every precaution was taken to make the march as secretly as possible, for it was realized that a substantial enemy force could easily cut off the battalion at Talaspatong. To safeguard against this eventuality, the 2nd Battalion was to follow along the same route the following day.

As the night march got under way, a terrific downpour commenced, making marching extremely difficult and bogging down vehicles in the mud. Day was breaking when the troops, wet, muddy and weary, entered the hills from the south and immediately dug in. A few vehicles were still scattered along the road the infantry came over, bogged down in mud or unable to climb slippery hills. It was after sunrise when the 1st platoon supporting the 1st Infantry Battalion, arrived at the infantry perimeter, the men pushing and helping the vehicles through the mud.

Shortly after the battalion had gone into position, a short sharp encounter took place with an enemy patrol located on a height overlooking the 1st Battalion's perimeter about four hundred yards in front of friendly positions. A number of infantry casualties were sustained from enemy knee mortar, machine gun, and especially sniper fire. An undetermined number of enemy casualties were likewise caused and the enemy patrol finally withdrew, taking it's casualties with it, and friendly troops secured the height. However, sporadic enemy sniper fire continued to harass friendly troops and to cause casualties; it was obvious that enemy eyes were watching from the surrounding hills.

An infantry reconnaissance troop on a reconnaissance that morning had gone all the way across the hills as far as Cabaruan before enemy fire drove them back. They returned without having sustained any casualties. It now appeared to be quite certain that the enemy was dug in around Cabaruan at the northern extremity of the hills and perhaps at Unzad and Palna on the right flank. Therefore, heavy concentrations of the artillery fire were laid on Cabaruan and the 1st platoon of Company A fired WP and HE barrages on Unzad.

The next morning, 19 January, the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry pushed northeast across the hills in the direction of Unzad and then swung north along the hills on the right flank to Palna, where light enemy opposition temporarily halted the advance. The opposition consisted of only twelve of the enemy who were killed in short order, and the infantry moved on through Palna and went into San Jose, north of the Cabaruan Hills, which had already been secured by the 1st Infantry Regiment.

On the same morning, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, came across the Amo River through Talas Patang and attempted to cut across the center of the Cabaruan Hills on the left flank of the 1st Battalion and go into the town of Cabaruan.

The 2nd Battalion had scarcely proceeded beyond the area where the 1st Battalion perimeter had been located that morning, when the enemy opened up from concealed positions and threw the 2nd Battalion back with heavy losses. The infantry then withdrew to a safe area behind hills and went into position.

The 3rd platoon of Company A was now attached to the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, and the 2nd platoon relieved the 1st platoon with the 1st Battalion, so the 1st platoon could go to the rear to repair broken down vehicles.

That night and the following day the 3rd platoon fired approximately 450 rounds of ammunition, getting a direct hit on a Jap 77mm gun and a 31 caliber heavy machine gun, and thereby also assisting in neutralizing enemy positions on a high hill immediately in front of the infantry position. The forward NCO observer for the 3rd platoon attempted pin point firing with one gun at the time, under the direction of the 1st Battalion CO, 20th Infantry, on enemy strong points and performed so well that the battalion CO recommended him for a commission.

The 2nd Battalion then succeeded in dislodging the enemy from the high hill, thereby acquiring good observation; but the enemy again managed to stop the infantry from a hill position 900 yards east of this high ground. The 2nd Battalion was then compelled to withdraw to the high ground overlooking the enemy position and set up perimeter.

On 23 January, the 1st and 2nd platoons of Company A were also brought up to support the 2nd Battalion, and both platoons went into position to the left of the 3rd platoon, each platoon being approximately 200 yards distant from the other and also about 200 yards to the front or rear of the other platoons. The company commander desired this dispersed position for greater safety by forming less of a target for enemy artillery. This was the first time all three firing platoons of Company A operated together on a single mission. The mission of Company A was to lay a barrage of ten artillery squares to neutralize enemy positions located in the area surrounding the town of Cabaruan.

Each mortar platoon maintained its own OP and communications network, even though all three OP parties were located on the same hill. It was felt that the establishment of an independent OP for each platoon, rather than a common OP for all three, would avoid any possible confusion of orders among the platoons and would also facilitate speedier adjustment and greater fire power. The OP was located on what was perhaps the highest hill in the Cabaruan group and overlooked enemy positions, which were only about six hundred yards to the front. The battalion commander, 2nd Infantry Battalion, designated the target area each platoon was to cover in great detail; even pointing out the area each gun was to be registered on and shifted, during the firing, to cover every spot in the area. The observer then adjusted accordingly and commenced firing.

Throughout the night of 23-24 January, the platoons fired neutralization and harassing barrages, throwing out occasional rounds of WP with the HE. Fires started by the WP burned off the target area including a few huts in the enemy positions. The firing had been so scheduled and coordinated that approximately one and sometimes two rounds would go off every five minutes, but never on a set time in order that the enemy would not be able to determine when or where the fire was due.

Friendly artillery, both 105's and 155's, firing from the opposite direction were covering the north side of the enemy hill masses, while the infantry 81mm and 60mm mortars were covering the slopes on the flanks of the enemy positions. Everyone witnessing the amazing spectacle of bursting WP and the perpetual pounding of mortar and artillery shells throughout the night was convinced that no live enemy, dug in no matter how deep, could escape the effects of that veritable hell. However, later developments revealed that the bulk of the enemy had withdrawn from the central hill masses into the low terrain, far to the right and left flanks of the main hill positions and about three hundred yards closer to friendly positions.

Around 0700 hours on the morning of 24 January, all firing ceased and complete silence reigned. The battalion commander, 1st Infantry Battalion, then assembled all the officers and gave his field order. At 0800 hours there was to be a terrific barrage, including all artillery and mortar weapons available, which was to last for 20 minutes. At 0900 hours the mortar platoons would mark the corners of the enemy area for an air strike. After the air strike, the three mortar platoons would lay down a heavy smoke screen, covering the entire enemy area. Companies E and F, now in position on opposite sides of a ridge adjoining the enemy hill positions on the right flank, were to advance along this ridge into the enemy position; while Company G, now situated in front of the enemy hill masses, was to swing around the hills under cover of the smoke screen and come in from the left flank. All OP parties and the infantry battalion commander were to join Company G and move along with it, while two M-4 tanks were to move with the OP parties. Only radios were to be carried along, while wire was to be brought along behind company G, and were therefore the only means of communication while the battalion was on the move. A battalion rear CP was to remain in position and the regimental commander of the 20th Infantry Regiment was to remain at this OP and keep contact with the forward moving elements. All vehicles were to be loaded and ready to move behind Company G, except the 3rd platoon which was to remain in position in case any fire was needed, and follow later.

At 0800 hours, therefore, the artillery and mortar barrage commenced. The enemy hill positions became a cauldron in a mass of fire, flying debris and dirt that boiled over for 20 minutes and then suddenly ceased.

The mortar platoons then immediately registered smoke on the four corners of the enemy area under the direction of the battalion commander, and threw out an occasional round of WP to keep the target area marked for the air strike. The planes, however, did not arrive until 1100 hours, thus perhaps allowing the enemy an opportunity to redeploy. When the planes finally arrived they circled over the target area once and then started to strafe and bomb on the next time around. After the air strike, the three mortar platoons proceeded to cover the enemy area with a heavy smoke screen and the Infantry started to move forward according to plan.

Either while the infantry had been waiting for the planes or during the firing of the smoke screens, some of the enemy had apparently moved through the smoke and gone into position on a little knoll on the northeast extremity of the enemy positions that had been neutralized.

When Company G swung around the enemy positions through a ravine, the bulk of the enemy, dug in on the northwest flank in terrain that was covered with brush and grass and thought to be too flat and too far removed from the main enemy positions to worry about, allowed the infantry to pass by their positions unmolested. Company G then turned and moved on the hill from the left flank, as had been planned, and proceeded cautiously and slowly without seeing a sign of a live enemy. The hill was strewn with approximately 160 enemy dead, about 80% of whom wore no shirts and had suffered severe burns from WP. Much enemy equipment and ammunition was strewn all around and a number of emplaced heavy weapons – 90mm mortars, heavy and light machine guns, and 47mm – were destroyed. It was also observed that many of the enemy who had been dug into caves connected by tunnels had either committed suicide or had been killed by concussion.

While Company G was moving on the hill positions, some of the enemy, with machine guns, rifles and knee mortars apparently moved around behind them into grass and brush-covered terrain below the hill. Suddenly the enemy opened fire from the right and left flanks and the rear of Company G with machine guns, 90mm mortars, knee mortars and rifles. In the meantime, companies E and F were pinned down on the right slope of the hill by enemy fire from the knoll on the northeast corner.

When the enemy fire began, the infantrymen at first hit the ground, some seeking protection behind the M-4 tanks and others in holes containing enemy dead and debris. Immediately, when the enemy opened fire, and almost simultaneously, the company commander of Company G, and four or five other officers, were hit by snipers, and at about the same time one of the M-4 tanks was hit and burst into flame. No enemy was visible anywhere but fire rained from all directions. As enemy mortar shells continued to burst all over the area, the Company G men were suddenly seized with panic and a mass disorganized flight commenced, with wounded men crying for help and dead men falling here and there over the area. Men fled, leaving all heavy equipment – packs, radios and even rifles on the field.

It was during this confusion that the company commander of Company A, 98th CMB, who had accompanied his OP parties with Company G, took over. The enemy fire did not seem to perturb him and his calm, cool behavior seemed to have an instant effect on the infantrymen. The battalion commander, 1st Infantry Battalion, had returned to the rear CP, when the firing first commenced, and attempted to establish contact by radio with his companies to order a withdrawal. The CO of Company A then succeeded in halting the retreat and in reorganizing the men of Company G. It was then found that the only communications available was the Company A's radio, which the operator had kept with him throughout the confusion which resulted from enemy fire. He then contacted the rear battalion CP with his radio and was ordered by the battalion commander to take command of Company G for the emergency. The CO of company A then immediately sent his OP parties back on the old OP and ordered them to fire smoke on the enemy positions as quickly as possible. While the OP parties were going back, he contacted the 1st and 2nd platoons, who had already started to move forward, and ordered them back to their old positions.

The 3rd platoon, which had remained in position, commenced firing smoke almost immediately, completely covering the enemy positions and setting fire to the brush and grass where some of the enemy was hidden. The enemy fire ceased almost instantly when the WP shells started bursting in enemy area.

The CO of Company A then proceeded to assemble the remainder of the scattered infantrymen in a gully directly below the hill he had been on when the firing started. By this time, the 1st and 2nd platoons of his own mortar company were back in position and joined in firing smoke on the enemy. The company commander then organized patrols to go back on the hill and evacuate the wounded. When all the wounded were safely evacuated, the company commander drew the company back into their old positions under cover of the smoke screen.

On this single mission, the three platoons of Company A had fired a total of 1,117 rounds HE and 737 rounds WP. Of the enemy dead counted, at least 80% were due to WP burns, nearly all of which had been fired by the 4.2 mortars. The mortar platoons had likewise used WP effectively to burn off enemy camouflage and to reduce the effectiveness of enemy fire as well as to screen friendly troops.

The regimental commander, 20th Infantry, made a written commendation, praising the 4.2 mortar platoons of Company A for their fine support and especially commending the company commander and the OP parties of Company A for their coolness under fire. The company commander later received the Silver Star for his actions on this particular mission, and the radio operator received the Bronze Star.

The 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, was badly depleted in strength and worn out; therefore, on the evening of 24 January, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry regiment, moved in from the northwest, thereby tightening the net around the enemy, and the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry was relieved. The 1st platoon, Company A, 98th CMB, was then attached to the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment while the 2nd and 3rd platoons went back in reserve with the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry.

For this mission the 1st platoon was compelled to go into position on a very exposed knoll which was subject to constant enemy sniper and artillery fire. The mortars and ammunition were dug in and the men likewise dug deep holes for individual protection. Whenever the platoon fired, it was necessary for the platoon personnel to leave their dug in positions, bring ammunition up to the mortars, and then remain during the fire mission. While the platoon was engaged in a fire mission, a 90mm enemy mortar shell landed right in the middle of the platoon perimeter but fortunately it turned out to be a dud.

When the platoon registered on the enemy area, the first night with the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, the first round hit an enemy ammunition dump. Flames and smoke shot hundreds of feet into the air and enemy ammunition continued to explode from two to three hours after the hit.

By 26 January the 1st platoon had fired 276 rounds HE and 160 rounds WP, getting credit for destroying an enemy field piece, machine gun and ammunition dump. On the evening of 26 January, the 2nd platoon relieved the first platoon, which then returned to the Company CP at Villasis.

The platoon commander of the 2nd platoon immediately requested permission to move his platoon back farther, behind the knoll, in defilade; but the permission was not granted because the battalion commander felt it would take too much time and he needed fire immediately. The 2nd platoon then fired concentrations of WP on the enemy positions in order to shield the evacuation of wounded men. The wounded were evacuated successfully.

The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, had suffered severe casualties and before nightfall of 26 January, the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry moved in to lead the assault on the enemy positions while the 2nd Battalion was to remain where it was and merely hold the position. The 1st Battalion came in and moved around to the left flank of the 2nd Battalion in order to assault the enemy position from the south. The 2nd platoon, Company A, was then attached to the 1st Battalion and moved to a new position, behind the 1st Battalion, in defilade. The platoon then registered on an enemy hill position and fired harassing and neutralization fire in conjunction with artillery and Infantry mortars for the remainder of the night.

The enemy had by this time been squeezed onto a hill, with an adjoining ridge, approximately 400 yards long and 200 wide. After heavy night firing, the 1st platoon assisted in laying down a heavy preparatory barrage, preceding the assault in the morning. Approximately three minutes before the assault commenced, the platoon laid down a heavy smoke screen on the enemy position, and at 0700 the infantry attacked.

The forward observer party for the 2nd platoon went forward with the assault platoon of Company A, which was the assault company. Fierce enemy sniper and machine gun fire was encountered and the assault platoon was compelled to crawl forward on their stomachs. The assault platoon managed to reach the base of the enemy hill where it was pinned down, most of the men seeking protection in shell holes and behind logs and other obstacles. By the time the rest of the infantry company came up to this position, the assault platoon had nearly all become casualties. The 2nd platoon, Company A, forward observer and his radio operator set up the radio in a shell hole. An infantryman in the same shell hole was shot by a sniper; but even though sniper bullets struck the dirt all around, neither the observer nor the radio operator was hurt. The forward observer then directed more WP on the enemy position, while the remainder of the infantry company moved up and while casualties were being evacuated.

The infantry commenced to crawl up the hill under cover of the smoke screen and finally reached the top ridge. Everyone then dug in below the ridge and on the slope of the hill.

That night, part of Company A, 1st Infantry, withdrew below the hill into a clump of trees where the company CP was located. Company C, 1st Infantry, moved up near the same clump of trees and some Company C men assisted in perimeter defense setup on top of the hill.

The enemy area was now so concentrated that the 4.2 forward observer felt it was too small and narrow for the platoon to attempt to fire on. However, against the forward observer's judgment, the CO, 1st Infantry Battalion, ordered him to fire on the hill at all cost, to try his best; and he himself, the battalion commander, would take the responsibility. The forward observer then registered on the hill. The rounds landed so close that many of the infantrymen were afraid and requested that fire on the hill be discontinued. However, the infantry battalion commander would not grant this permission, as he feared an enemy counterattack that might drive his troops off the hill again. The 4.2 forward observer then moved up on the hill and dug his hole immediately in front of the front line infantrymen. He continued to fire heavy concentrations throughout the night. Some rounds landed as close as ten or fifteen feet in front of him and the infantrymen, and shrapnel and dirt flew back over their heads nearly every time rounds exploded. One infantryman became shell shocked and had to be evacuated during the night, but no one was hurt. The 4.2 platoon fired approximately 108 rounds on this position during that night.

The next morning, 25 January, an enemy soldier came in and voluntarily surrendered. He stated that the mortar rounds had been hitting directly on top of the enemy battalion CP throughout the night, and the one officer remaining to the enemy, had taken the guns and knives away from the enemy personnel during the night in the CP in order to prevent suicides. He explained that the enemy had large caves and tunnels under the hill and that no shells could penetrate that deep, but that most of the enemy personnel had already committed suicide. One enemy dug-in position was found only about ten feet from where the 4.2 observer had been dug in for that night.

Infantrymen threw a large bundle of high explosives into this hole after it was discovered that morning, and blew it out. A leg and other parts of enemy anatomy flew up into the air with the explosion. An infantry officer then threw a white phosphorus grenade into this same hole a few minutes after the explosion, and a living enemy suddenly threw his rifle out and then followed it himself. Surrounding infantrymen neutralized him. The infantry then went up on the hill and there was no further sign of opposition. Many holes and pill boxes were discovered and the infantrymen blew them all with high explosives. Most of those holes and pill boxes were tunneled in too deep to be able to determine whether any enemy, alive or dead, was in them. However, approximately 800 enemy dead were counted on the hill, the adjoining ridge and surrounding territory; but it was estimated that at least 1,500 of the enemy must have been killed in this battle, many of them in holes and tunnels where they could not be seen or counted.

By noon of 25 January, the Battle of Cabaruan was officially declared over. The infantry pulled out in the afternoon to go into reserve but left one company, Company D, there in case any more of the enemy might be around. According to later reports a number of the enemy still came out of holes that had been blown out with high explosives, the following day.


Battle of Hill 355
Company C, 3rd platoon
13 to 24 January 1945

Hill 355 was a long "L" shaped, steep, sparsely-covered hill. For defensive set-up, it was ideally located and, because of the steep approaches, easy to defend. The Japs made the most of such natural advantages and turned the hill into a veritable fortress. Cannon positions were well built and camouflaged, pillboxes were so located as to support each other, and the entire hill held a maze of connected entrenchments designed on World War I plans. On D plus 4, the 3rd platoon was attached to the 169th Infantry Regiment of the 43rd Infantry Division. The platoon commander reported to Colonel Mullin, regimental commander for orders and was told to have the platoon dig in and move into position early the next morning. Elements of the 169th Infantry were to assault Hill 355 and the 4.2 mortars were to support the attack.

Early the next morning a reconnaissance was made for a suitable gun position. A defiladed position was found, and the platoon displaced forward at once and set up its mortars. The defiladed position afforded the platoon protection from direct fire weapons.

Three different times, the 169th Infantry sent small forces forward to test the enemy strength. Each force was met by heavy mortar fire from emplacements on the reverse slope of the hill.

Northwest of Hill 355 was Mount Alva. The Japs controlled Mount Alva and it made possible direct observation of any approach of American infantry from that direction.

The 4.2's were called on to place fire on the reverse slope of Hill 355. Between 1130 hours and 1830 hours, six missions were fired. Four missions were harassing fire on the reverse crest and forward slope of the hill. The fifth mission was to lay a vertical smoke screen between Mount Alva and the river at the base of Hill 355. The screen effectively blinded enemy observation from Mount Alva but, as the attacking troops tried to cross the river, a Jap mountain gun fired on them from the forward slope of Hill 355. The 4.2 forward observer spotted the location of the gun and re-laid the mortars to deliver fire. Thirty-seven rounds of HE were fired as rapidly as possible. The forward observer reported direct hits on the gun, and later the S-3 reported seeing pieces of the gun and the crew blown into the air.

The infantry now held the river crossing but was being harassed by enemy fire from pillboxes located at the base of Mount Alva. The mortar platoon was ordered to fire on the pillboxes at 2000 hours. After ten minutes of rapid fire, two hundred and sixty-eight rounds were expended and the "Cease fire" order was given. Results of this barrage were unknown, but considerably less fire came from that area the following day. The 4.2's had received counter battery and sniper fire all day but had sustained no casualties.

On D plus six, the infantry made attempts to enlarge the river crossing. The supply lines were under continuous enemy fire and the difficulty of bringing in the badly needed ammunition and evacuating wounded became critical. The 4.2's fired three harassing missions on Hill 355 and knocked out one Jap mortar. A smoke screen was requested to cover the river crossing to aid the evacuation of the wounded. The screening mission was fired and proved very successful.

Late that afternoon, plans for further attack were changed. The 4.2 mortars were to prepare three hundred rounds of HE for continuous night fire on Hill 355. This barrage was to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. The plan was to sweep around the right flank of the enemy and attack Hill 355 from the rear. The withdrawal was effected by 2100 hours and the mortars were given "Cease fire" and ordered to follow the infantry.

The strength of the enemy on Hill 355 was now determined and became a regimental instead of a battalion objective. From D plus 7 until D plus 13, the mortars were not called on to fire, as the 169th was securing a supply line and moving into position for the new assault.

On D plus 14 the platoon was ordered to support the Second Battalion of the 169th. At 1300 hours the platoon displaced forward to a position south of Mount Alva. Sniper fire was continuous but no casualties were sustained. The platoon commander reported to the battalion CP and was asked for immediate support. The 4.2 forward observation party went forward with the assault company. One fire mission was called for to rake a draw where enemy troops were believed concentrated. Sixty four rounds were fired into the area. Observation was very difficult as enemy and sniper fire was heavy and accurate. In spite of the fact that both the forward observer's helmet and the aerial from the radio drew constant fire, observation and communications did not falter. That night the platoon moved forward to the battalion CP to tie in with the infantry perimeter.

On the morning of D plus 15, the forward observation party again moved forward with the assault company. The assault of Hill 355 was to begin at 0700 hours. For fifteen minutes preceding the attack, the 4.2's laid a barrage on the open trenches on the right flank of the Jap line. All mortars had been previously registered on the enemy position. As the attack began, the forward observer noticed the Japs moving a mountain gun into position on the left flank. He requested, and was immediately given, permission to swing one mortar on the new target. After firing three rounds, the mortar crew fired for effect and several direct hits were observed among the crew of the enemy gun. The mortar was left laid on the new target so that the gun would not have to be relaid later.

As the infantry moved forward in the assault, no enemy fire was received from the right flank. When the hill was finally taken and the open trenches examined, the 4.2's were credited with killing one hundred and eighty Japs on the right flank alone. In the trenches a great number of machine guns and light mortars were found. Had not that flank been cleared, the assault might not have been as successful as it was.


Battle of Lupao
Company C
2 to 7 February 1945

The 1st and 2nd platoons received orders on D plus 24 to report immediately to the commander of the 35th Infantry Regiment. The regimental CP was then located at San Roque, a small town astraddle the main highway, about one and one half miles west of Lupao.

The 1st platoon was ordered to support the 1st Battalion of the 35th, and moved forward and went into position. The only position available left much to be desired. The guns were set up, with benefit of natural cover, in a rice paddy, three hundred yards to the rear of the assault companies.

The platoon registered on several points on the south side of Lupao. Soon after registering, a white phosphorous mission was called for to burn a group of house from which sniper and machine gun fire was being received. As the houses began to burn, an ammunition dump blew up. Movement was observed among the buildings and fifty rounds of HE were immediately fired. While the rounds were in the air, twelve Japs started to run from one house to another and the HE landed directly among them. When the smoke lifted no further movement of the twelve was observed. At dusk, registration for defensive fire was conducted on probable avenues of enemy approach and the platoon tied its perimeter in with the infantry for the night. Several times during the night, Japs made attempts at infiltration but were unable to break through.

At 1730 hours, the 2nd platoon was ordered to report to the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion had circumvented the enemy defenses and established a road block on the east side of Lupao. To join the battalion it was necessary for the platoon to circle to the north, through Jap held territory, and come in from the northeast. The platoon was under small arms and machine gun fire during the entire move but only the vehicles were hit and non badly enough to delay the column. Upon arrival at the new position the men found the ground too rocky to dig fox holes. Soon after dark it began to rain. The Japs staged an attack from east to west on the 1st Battalion some thirty-five hundred yards away. As a result considerable American small arms fire came through the 2nd platoon area. While the attack was in progress Jap tanks started firing 47mm cannon into the platoon position and succeeded in destroying a bamboo grove directly to the platoon's rear. The majority of the rounds fired by the tanks were armor piercing instead of HE. This alone saved the platoon from serious casualties.

Early the following morning, the 1st platoon fired a rolling barrage as the infantry moved forward. The enemy opposition was very strong and machine gun fire so intense that only seventy-five yards was gained by the attack. At about 1100 hours, the Japs counter-attacked and had to cross an area covered by 4.2 fire. The mortars prevented a concentrated attack and the enemy retreated leaving many dead. The platoon was given credit for breaking up the attack but no count of the enemy dead could be made as the area in which they were killed had not yet been taken by friendly troops. Several missions were fired on targets of opportunity during the afternoon and several enemy machine guns and ammunition dumps were destroyed. That night the platoon again tied in with the infantry perimeter. As usual the Japs tried to infiltrate but were unsuccessful.

Early on the morning of D plus 25, the 2nd platoon registered on the northern section of Lupao. The forward observer moved ahead with the assault company and at 0900 reported that the entire advance was pinned down by enemy tank fire. The firing was so intense and accurate that even a withdrawal meant suicide. The 4.2's immediately fired a barrage of approximately one hundred and fifty rounds of HE into the area from which most of the fire was coming. As soon as the barrage was completed the infantry was able to move forward again. As the platoon started firing the barrage, two enemy tanks broke through the defenses and headed for the platoon position. One was quickly knocked out by 37mm fire but the other managed to come within fifty feet of the gun positions before one of the section chiefs stopped it and set it afire with two rounds from his bazooka.

During the morning of D plus 26, the infantry advanced on Lupao from both the west and east making it unsafe for the 1st platoon to fire. The platoon "march-ordered" and moved around Lupao, going into position directly to the rear of second platoon. Supporting fire was not needed by the infantry, so the mortars were registered for defensive fire.

Friendly artillery had been registered on Lupao and was engaged in firing a series of barrages. The mortars of the 2nd platoon were used to fire on targets of opportunity only. The intensity of enemy fire was increasing and at 1600 hours it became necessary to cease firing the 4.2's or suffer heavy casualties from enemy fire. A general regrouping of infantry troops was in progress for the main attack on the town the following morning.

The enemy, due to infantry advances from three sides, had been forced into a long narrow area. The 35th regimental commander decided it would be very hazardous to have the artillery continue firing as a long or short round would fall on friendly troops. It was decided to use 4.2's to deliver whatever fire was deemed necessary. For the remaining three days of the battle for Lupao, the 4.2's fired almost continually and much of the fire was drawn in to within 25 to 50 yards of friendly troops. During the entire battle not one round of 4.2 landed among friendly troops.

The 1st and 2nd platoons divided the enemy-held territory between them and the forward observation parties moved forward with the assault companies. The attacks began at 0630 on D plus 27. Both platoons of the 4.2's laid down a rolling barrage in front of the forward moving infantry. As strong points were approached and the advance halted, the mortars swung to the new target and fired until the opposition was literally blasted out of existence. Enemy tanks, gun positions, machine guns, mortars, pill boxes, and dug-in troops were subjected to overpowering barrages.

Constant firing for so long a period became very fatiguing to both the observer and gun crews. The men were at the mortars continually for seventy-two hours, eating and sleeping only when lulls in firing permitted. Accuracy became paramount as the area between the attacking forces had dwindled to a space two hundred yards in depth and five hundred yards in width. Into this small area alone, twenty seven hundred rounds were fired.

On D plus 28, at about 2100 hours, the battle was at its highest pitch. The forward observer, being unable to see on account of darkness, fired the platoon by sound only. Over the normal noise of battle he heard excited chatter of Jap troops. He immediately called for a "Battery-twenty-five rounds" in the direction from which the sounds came. A few seconds before the first of the rounds landed, the Japs began a Banzai attack. Several tanks and other vehicles were hit and began to burn. As the remainder of the rounds landed, the light given off from the burning vehicles illuminated the damage being done. Enemy bodies were being blown into the air and the attack was breaking up. The barrage had landed in the center of the largest concentration of the enemy.

On D plus 29 the infantry went through Lupao and cleared out the small pockets of resistance left there. By 1200 hours the town was secured.

The 4.2 platoons were credited with destroying two tanks, three armored vehicles, one command car, one 47mm cannon, several machine guns and mortars, in addition to killing seventy-five Japs by the previous night firing. The regimental commander of the 35th Infantry commended the mortar platoons on their invaluable support and stated that the battle would have lasted days longer if the 4.2's had not been available.


Battle of Malasin
Company C, 1st platoon
14 January 1945

The 1st platoon of Company C was attached to the 1st Battalion, 103rd Infantry Regiment, and was firing supporting barrages as the infantry moved toward enemy positions in the vicinity of Pozorrubio.

On the morning of 14 January, the 1st platoon was to accompany and support Company A of the 1st Battalion, reinforced with a platoon from an anti-tank company and a section of heavy machine guns from Company D of the 1st Battalion. The mission of this reinforced company was to set up and maintain a road block in the vicinity of Malasin.

Upon arriving at their objective at Malasin, Pangasinan, the 4.2" mortar forward observer went forward and registered the mortars in on several check points. Registration was completed at about 1530 hours and the observer returned to the infantry perimeter and established his OP. At about 1830 hours, an enemy reconnaissance patrol of about 10 men approached the position but, before effective fire could be placed on them, they dispersed and disappeared. A radio warning came down from battalion at about 1900 hours, stating that an enemy armored column was moving from the north through Pozorrubio toward the road block. The exact strength of this column was unknown.

At approximately 2230 hours, another armored column was reported south of the road block in the vicinity of Lipit and was reported moving north toward the road block. The estimated strength of this unit was from 500 to 600 men. On the evening of 14 January, elements of these two columns attempted to break through our road block.

At 2240 hours, the 4.2" mortar platoon observer called for a fire mission but he had difficulty getting proper observation because of darkness and constant shelling by enemy direct-fire weapons. At one time he endeavored to climb a tree at the edge of the perimeter but was driven out by snipers and fire from an enemy 77mm gun. Finally the observer located himself in the CP of the anti-tank platoon and registered his mortars by sound, using as base points the registrations he had made earlier in the day. Excellent results were obtained by this method. The first enemy attack was beaten off and at about 0300 hours a lull came in the fighting. The mortars had been firing steadily since 2240 hours.

Again at 0155 hours, the enemy was assembling for another attack and the mortar platoon was called on for another mission. The forward observer shifted the guns slightly from his last concentration and fired a barrage. The enemy was scattered and the attack never materialized. At 0330 hours, the enemy attempted to break through from the north and again he was pushed back and beaten by the concerted efforts of the 4.2" mortars and the anti-tank guns. At 0400 hours they were at it again, this time from the north side of the perimeter, only to be driven off again by the mortars.

At day-break the 4.2 platoon knocked out an enemy 77mm gun as it was going into position and fired on enemy tracked vehicles. The mortars were then shifted over and flushed out enemy troops that were assembling in a nearby ravine. A smoke screen was laid down by the mortar platoon to enable the battalion aid men to remove the dead and wounded from the nights fighting. The fighting had been fierce and our troops had received many casualties, among them the CO of Company A. At 1300 hours, the mortars again laid a smoke screen, this time to conceal the movements of fresh troops into the perimeter.

During the firing on the night of 14 January, the 4.2 mortar platoon was credited with 94 confirmed enemy dead and many enemy wounded. They also received confirmed credit of destroying an enemy 77mm gun. The new CO of Company A thanked the personnel of the mortar platoon for the job they accomplished that night


Battle of Munoz
Company A, 1st & 3rd platoons
31 January to 6 February 1945

From all reports from Filipinos, guerillas and infantry reconnaissance, it appeared that a Jap armored division was operating somewhere east of Guimba and was entrenched either at Munoz or San Jose or both places. The whole 6th Infantry Division therefore went into position in the vicinity of Guimba and carried on extensive patrol and reconnaissance activity. Filipinos reported that the enemy was dug in at Munoz with many tanks and armored vehicles, but some of the enemy units had already pulled out and gone to San Jose and the remainder of the enemy was likewise preparing to leave Munoz.

On 30 January, therefore, the 20th Infantry Regiment sent a strong reconnaissance patrol to Munoz. The patrol went through Munoz, finding no sign of the enemy but many abandoned dug-in positions. It was then assumed that the enemy had withdrawn to San Jose, which was at the base of hills that offered good defenses; and according to some reports, part of the enemy armored force was entrenched at Rizal.

The 1st Infantry Regiment cut across the fields from Guimba in a night march and went into position south of San Jose within artillery and mortar range of the town. The primary objective was to cut the road between San Jose and Rizal and trap the enemy which was thought to be in San Jose. To close the trap the 20th Infantry Regiment was to move along the highway from Guimba through Munoz and attack San Jose from the West. The 63rd Infantry Regiment was to remain in reserve and move up later to support either of the other regiments as the situation might require.

The 1st and 3rd platoons, Company A, 98th CMB, were attached to the 20th Infantry Regiment, the 3rd platoon to the 3rd Battalion, which was to lead the assault, and the 1st platoon to the 1st Battalion, which was moving up behind the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd platoon was attached to the 1st Infantry Regiment which was moving on San Jose.

Around 0900 hours on 31 January, the 3rd Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, reached the road running parallel with the town in front of Munoz, when suddenly the enemy opened up and threw the 3rd Battalion back with heavy losses. The 3rd Battalion then withdrew under heavy enemy fire and went into position. Many of the infantry were pinned down so close to the enemy positions that it was considered inadvisable to fire 4.2 mortars or artillery on the enemy until after those troops had withdrawn.

It was obvious now that the enemy had pulled a clever ruse by withdrawing from Munoz the day before and pulling back in and going into prepared positions during the night. It had also seemed highly improbable that Munoz rather than San Jose would be defended by any strong force, since the latter town was in a much better strategic location for eventual withdrawal into the hills. But as it turned out, San Jose was undefended except for harassing elements on the hills nearby who were firing artillery at the 1st Infantry Regiment as it entered the town while about 2/3 of a Jap armored division were dug in at Munoz, a position now cut off from retreat to the hills. This apparently illogical enemy move caught the infantry by almost complete surprise at Munoz.

By the afternoon of 31 January, the 3rd Battalion had withdrawn from Munoz and dug in on the opposite side of the road running parallel to the town. Two enemy tanks then came out of the town along this road and fired their 47mm guns into friendly troop positions. The 4.2 observer for the 3rd platoon then directed fire from one gun and secured a direct hit on one of the enemy tanks which burst into flames. The other tank then came off the road and was approaching the observer's position firing the 47mm in his direction as it came. He continued to use this one gun and gave a sensing to direct the fire in front of his position. When the enemy tank was within fifty yards of his position the rounds landed, six in rapid succession, and one round lit close enough to the tank to tear up the treads and halt it. Infantrymen covered the tank turret with rifle fire and the 4.2 observer sneaked up to the tank, jumped on it and threw a grenade inside. The tank then burst into flames from exploding ammunition inside of it. The observer escaped without injury.

On 1 February, the 3rd Battalion again attempted an assault upon the town and was pinned down about seventy-five yards in front of enemy dug-in tanks. Enemy emplacements were so well camouflaged it was almost impossible to locate them until the enemy opened fire from these positions. The 4.2 observer then registered his guns and brought the fire in close to within 75 yards in front of the infantry. He then fired a number of heavy barrages, destroying the two dug-in tanks and thus enabling the infantry to cross the road and dig in on the other side in front of the town.

On the same day, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 20th Infantry Regiment, had come up and gone into position alongside the 3rd Battalion.

The CO of Company A, 98th CMB, had learned, while at the 20th Infantry Regiment CP, that a number of enemy dug-in tanks had been spotted in the town of Munoz, and he determined to accompany the observation party for the 1st platoon, which was supporting the 1st Infantry Battalion, and try to help locate the tanks and knock them out.

At about fifty yards in front of the front line infantrymen, who were dug in around Munoz, stood a rice mill. A small group of infantry were cautiously proceeding in the direction of the mill, using if for concealment and cover as they advanced, when the Company A CO and his OP party came up. He decided to take his OP party up to this mill. They then entered and found a window facing the town which offered good observation. Not fifty yards away from the mill and directly facing it, was an enemy pill box. In the area surrounding the pill box were a number of holes where some of the enemy was undoubtedly dug-in. The OP party then realized that the 4.2 platoon was too close to those enemy positions to be able to fire on them at minimum range. The CO immediately sent instructions by radio to move the platoon back about 300 yards.

As the platoon was moving back, the CO was getting very impatient and he secured a BAR from a nearby infantryman and commenced to fire on the enemy pill box and raked the enemy positions around it. Suddenly an enemy 47mm opened fire from the pill box, hitting the corner of the rice mill three times and shearing it completely off. The CO and his OP party hurriedly ran out of the front room into a rear room in the rice mill. By this time the 1st platoon was in position and reported ready for firing. The platoon then sent a round on the way and the CO and his OP officer ran back into the front room to watch for the round to land. The OP officer gave a sensing and immediately withdrew from the room again, but the CO decided to remain and fire on the enemy position with his M-1 rifle. He fired a number of rounds when suddenly an enemy machine gun and 47mm gun opened up. Two machine gun bullets struck the CO, one through the head and another through the chest. Two of the infantrymen came running out of the front room wounded by shrapnel. An aid man then reported that the CO was dead. The OP party and the infantry immediately decided to evacuate the rice mill and draw back into safer area. Enemy machine gun and rifle fire by this time was intense and the parties who were withdrawing from the rice mill were compelled to crawl back on their stomachs to safer positions. During the course of the withdrawal, the radio operator's aerial was shot off by a sniper bullet and the OP party was cut off from communications with the platoon.

When the news of the CO's death was brought back to the 4.2 mortar platoon, four men of the 1st platoon immediately volunteered to go up and bring back his body. The platoon then fired WP in front of the rice mill, laying a smoke screen that covered the enemy position and the hill. Under cover of this screen, the four volunteers went up and retrieved the body without further mishap.

On 2 February the OP parties of the 4.2 mortar platoons went on a cinder hill near enemy positions around Munoz and registered on the town. Terrific barrages were fired into the town by the 4.2 mortars, the field artillery and the infantry 81mm and 60mm mortars. While the OP party of the 1st platoon was directing fire from this cinder hill, an enemy sniper shot the radio operator through the right side of the chest. He was evacuated and a new radio operator was immediately sent up to replace him. During and after the firing, infantry patrols probed and felt out enemy defenses but no organized attack was attempted that day.

In the meantime the 3rd platoon, on the same day, had knocked out four more enemy tanks, all of which had been dug in and were destroyed by the 4.2 barrages fired on them.

By this time arrangements had been made for the two mortar platoons to support all three of the infantry battalions. Each platoon was to support its respective infantry battalion and also the 2nd Infantry Battalion whenever the situation required it.

On 3 February the 3rd platoon destroyed another four enemy tanks, two that were dug-in and two that were out in the open. The observer for the 3rd platoon had registered a concentration the previous day on a certain point in the vicinity of where these tanks were located now. He left three guns on this concentration and requested that the platoon prepare plenty of rounds of ammunition to fire on this concentration. He then used one gun to fire at the tanks, driving them into the area where his concentration was registered on. When the tanks got near the concentration he called for a barrage which landed about the same time the enemy tanks entered the concentration area. Two of the enemy tanks were knocked out in this manner; one escaped but probably was damaged.

On 4 February the forward observer of the 3rd platoon spotted two enemy tanks that were boldly coming along the road in the direction of the OP. The tanks came head on with considerable speed firing their 47mm in the direction of the OP as they came. The observer already had two guns registered on this road and had been firing harassing fire on it throughout the previous night, since it was a possible route of enemy approach. However, the tanks, approximately two hundred yards one behind the other, were approaching so rapidly that the observer gave a sensing which he estimated would be very close in front of his position on the road. He was pinned down by the fire from the 47mm and did not dare to raise his head to observe the fire. He immediately called for "Fire for Effect" as the front tank was rapidly advancing in his direction. The tank was within fifty yards of his position when the first round landed and by coincidence or luck, scored a direct hit on the tank, which burst into flame and caused ammunition in the tank to go off and explode the tank. In the meantime, the second enemy tank had come up to within about fifty yards of the front tank, and as more 4.2 rounds continued to explode in the vicinity of the first tank, the second tank suddenly turned and started running back in the other direction. The observer then raised the fire from one gun far out ahead of the tank and when the rounds landed, the tank turned and came back again, firing it's 47mm in the direction of the infantrymen dug-in on one side of the road.

He then fired the gun registered in front of his position and the tank again turned around and started running back in the other direction. While the tank was running back and forth the observer kept raising the fire of the #1 gun and bringing in the fire of the #2 gun, while he was keeping up a continuous fire from both guns. Finally, two rounds landed, one on each side of the tank, and even though the rounds were from 15 to 20 yards away from the tank, the explosion or shrapnel broke the treads and the tank was stalled. Another round then landed about three yards to the rear of the tank, setting it on fire. At the same time four of the enemy came out of the burning tank but were shot by the forward observer and infantry riflemen, but two other enemy managed to get into the ditch alongside the road about 15 yards to the left of the burning tank and set up a machine gun. The forward observer then shifted his fire to the left and demolished both the enemy and the machine gun.

On the same day the 1st platoon observer pinpointed a dug-in tank with one gun and destroyed it. He spotted two other tanks in camouflaged dug-in positions and fired barrages on them but the artillery happened to be firing on the same targets at the same time and it could not be determined whether the 4.2 mortar shells or the artillery shells hit the tanks first. The observer then fired a number of barrages into some trees and brush and it turned out that two half-tracks had been camouflaged in the brush, both of which were destroyed by the mortar fire.

On 5 February the 1st platoon forward observer located two more enemy tanks dug in about 100 yards in front of the river running on the outskirts of the opposite end of the town. He fired heavy barrages on the tanks, knocking both of them out in the same barrage. Immediately after the mortar fire started hitting into the brush area where those tanks were dug in, a large number of the enemy ran out of the brush and out of holes and attempted to escape across the river. The 4.2 observer fired a number of barrages squarely on those enemy troops. The explosions threw many of them into the air, whole and in pieces, and there was much howling and screaming and frantic running in all directions. Approximately one hundred of the enemy were killed in the course of this mission and very few escaped. The observer then located a pill box in the same vicinity, and got a direct hit on it while registering with one gun. He then closed the sheaf and fired a barrage of six rounds on it. Later, after the infantry had taken the town, it was found that between forty and fifty Japs had been killed in this pill box from concussion, and a field piece emplaced in the entrance had been completely demolished.

Terrific artillery and mortar barrages were fired on the town of Munoz on 5 February. Not a single building in the town was left standing, all the trees had become bare broken stumps, and the grass and brush which the enemy had used so effectively for camouflage was burned or broken into black tentacles sticking up here and there. As camouflaged positions had become exposed in the course of the six day battle, mortars or artillery or both were immediately concentrated on them and the positions were neutralized. It became apparent that the enemy might attempt to pull out of the town.

Since San Jose, where the 1st Infantry Regiment was entrenched, was approximately eight miles away, there was a possibility that the enemy might pull out and swing north around San Jose and escape into the hills. But, on the evening of 5 February, the 63rd Infantry Regiment cut in on the road between Munoz and San Jose and established road blocks all along the road leading out of Munoz. The 63rd had come within sight of Munoz after dark and the enemy apparently did not know about it.

Around midnight an enemy force counterattacked the 20th Infantry on the south and west side of the town, while the remainder of the enemy with tanks, armored vehicles and trucks loaded with supplies and ammunition and some with field pieces strung along behind, attempted to evacuate the town along the Munoz-San Jose road. The 20th Infantry broke up the counterattack, both 4.2 mortar platoons getting credit for many enemy dead. In the meantime, the enemy armored units ran smack into the 63rd Infantry which was dug in and waiting for them. The battle lasted nearly throughout the night. Enemy tanks, half tracks, trucks and field pieces were scattered and burning all along the road from Munoz to San Jose. The entire enemy armored force was completely wiped out. The next morning the 20th Infantry entered Munoz unopposed.

In this battle the 4.2 mortar platoons had received credit for destroying fifteen enemy tanks plus two probables, two half tracks, two field pieces and one large pill box, plus a large number of enemy dead amounting to at least 200. In addition, the platoons shared credit with artillery and with infantry mortars for the destruction of much enemy equipment and many enemy personnel for which credit could not be given to any one unit because all were firing on common areas at the same time. The platoons also played a large part in the general neutralization of the enemy defenses and camouflage and the general disintegrations of the enemy as an organized fighting force.


Battle of San Manuel
Company D
19 to 26 January 1945

On D plus ten days, the second platoon was ordered to support the 161st Infantry Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division. At that time, the 161st had progressed to about one and one half miles west of San Manuel, Pangasinan Province.

All roads leading to San Manuel were under enemy fire. The Third Battalion, to which the platoon was attached, had set up its command post very near the farthest point of advance and was under Japanese artillery fire. As the platoon approached the Battalion CP, it came under heavy Jap machine gun fire. The platoon commander dispersed the platoon and proceeded on foot to report to the battalion commander. The immediate problem was the Jap artillery, and the battalion CO requested fire be brought on a hill to the northeast to blind Jap observation.

The platoon set up the guns and the forward observer found a point to observe fire from the top of a tree about a hundred yards in front of the guns. Within fifteen minutes of the receipt of the order for a smoke screen, the first of the rounds were on the way. Two guns only were used to fire the smoke mission and they maintained a very effective screen for three and a half hours before the order to cease fire was given. The other two guns were used to cover the highway leading out of town to prevent its use by the enemy. The two guns were covering the road as a precautionary measure only and they were not used at that time. As darkness fell, a group of infantrymen were assigned to the platoon to assist in setting up a strong perimeter to prevent enemy infiltration after dark. Except for the sporadic firing of small arms, the night was reasonably quiet.

Soon after dawn the Jap artillery again began to shell our troops; so again the platoon laid down a smoke screen and the enemy guns ceased firing. One company of infantry approaching San Manuel from the southwest was being held up by a Jap strong-point located in a cemetery on the outskirts of town.

The forward observer reported inter-connecting pillboxes and trenches and called for a mixed barrage of white phosphorous and high explosive. To fire this mission, WP was used first; twenty rounds sweeping fire with fifty yard range increases. When the extreme limits of the cemetery had been reached, HE was fired through the same area at twenty five yard decreases in range. By this method of fire, very little if any, of the area escaped pounding. Because of the speed of the advance, it was impossible to determine the extent of casualties inflicted on the enemy at that time. Several days later the platoon was informed that at least fifty Japs had been killed by WP alone and an undetermined number of casualties had been caused by the HE.

Several hours later, the same method of fire was again used to clear one section of the town and silence a number of enemy machine guns. In this second instance the enemy had established gun positions and ammunition dumps under Filipino grass huts. The effect of the mixed barrage was devastating. The WP burnt everything flammable, and in doing so destroyed two large ammunition dumps in addition to silencing the machine guns that were harassing the infantry. Whatever snipers were hiding in the huts were killed or driven out from cover.

While the platoon was engaged in blasting and burning out snipers and machine guns, an artillery observation plane spotted three Jap tanks approaching San Manuel from the north. The observer in the plane waited until they were in range of the 4.2 mortars and, as soon as the current mission was over, called for fire. The artillery observer conducted the sensing and, after a short interval of firing, reported one direct hit on one tank and close near misses on the other two. All three tanks were considered knocked out as one was clearly burning and the other two had stopped and were smoking. Shortly before dark, the platoon was again called on to fire into the town where several more tanks were observed. When the mission was completed the platoon was credited with two probables on tanks, two positives on machine guns and two more ammunition dumps.

At 1630 hours, the 1st platoon moved into position beside the 2nd platoon and set up its mortars. The observation party moved forward but soon reported that they were pinned down by enemy small arms fire and would be unable to conduct fire. At dusk the party returned unharmed and planned to go out again the following morning.

The situation at San Manuel was becoming increasingly difficult to control. Either the enemy had reinforced the troops in the town or the G-2 information had originally been incorrect. The number of enemy tanks in the town was surprisingly large and many of them had been dug in with only the turret above ground level. A single battalion of infantry supported by one platoon of 4.2 mortars had been initially committed as the enemy force defending the town had been estimated at six hundred men and sixteen tanks. After the first day's fighting, the number of enemy troops was estimated to be approximately four thousand and the number of tanks close to sixty.

A general withdrawal was ordered to Binalonan, about seven miles to the southwest. By this time small enemy patrols had worked through the infantry lines and were placing small arms fire on the roads. As the mortar platoons moved out, they were constantly fired on but only a few vehicles were damaged and no casualties were sustained. The men were given twenty-four hours in which to rest and clean their equipment while at Binalonan. New plans were formulated for the assault of San Manuel. The new plan was to use two battalions of infantry, supported by two platoons of 4.2 mortars, with one battalion of infantry in reserve.

On D plus fourteen, both platoons of mortars moved out of Binalonan and proceeded to the outskirts of San Manuel. After going into position, the platoons registered and fired several harassing missions. As darkness fell the guns were registered for perimeter defense. During the night the Japs again used infiltration tactics but were unable to break through the infantry perimeters. In the morning quite a number of enemy dead were found around the perimeters.

The second platoon received orders to fire into one section of the town where a large number of enemy troops were concentrated. The platoon fired a barrage of HE which lasted for one and a half hours. After seven hundred rounds of HE has been fired, a barrage of WP was called for to burn the area. No definite count of enemy personnel was given but the platoon received confirmation for the destruction of three tanks, two anti tank guns, a machine gun and two ammunition dumps. Approximately thirty houses and buildings, giving cover to the enemy, were completely destroyed.

The first platoon was ordered to lay down a barrage in preparation for the infantry advance on the north side of town. In this area, the enemy had placed a large number of snipers and they were seriously hampering the advance. In order to clear the area of the enemy it was necessary to blast and burn every structure. After the barrage lifted, the infantry was able to advance with a minimum of opposition. During the firing of these missions both platoons were under sporadic enemy fired but received no casualties.

The following morning, D plus sixteen, the first platoon fired several hundred rounds as a preparatory barrage preceding an infantry advance. The barrage started at 0700 hours and was laid on the northwest corner of the town. The infantry followed the rolling barrage and managed to secure the corner and hold it in spite of constant counter-attacks. The 4.2 mortars greatly aided the infantry in breaking up the attacks and maintained a defensive fire for a full eight-hour period. About 1730 hours, the forward observer registered three mortars on the main intersection of town. The fourth gun was used to fire on tanks moving about town. With this one mortar the observer would force a tank to cross the intersection where the majority of fire power was concentrated. By this method several tanks were knocked out before dark.

The second platoon displaced forward to the northern edge of town, approximately seven hundred yards behind the assault company, and went into position. At 1800 hours the enemy launched a furious counter-attack and the platoon fired three hundred and fifty rounds of HE in front of the area where the Japs were trying to break through. At one time the enemy had advanced so far that the forward observer brought fire within thirty five feet of his own position. The attack lasted all night and both 4.2 mortar platoons received intense fire from enemy tanks and small arms. The enemy did not succeed in breaking through the infantry lines in any noticeable strength, and by 0700 hours the following morning the Jap hold on San Manuel had been broken. Approximately twenty-one hundred enemy dead were counted; forty eight tanks, many field pieces, machine guns and mortars were destroyed during the battle. The 4.2 inch mortars did not suffer a serious casualty and the total number of rounds fired in support of the infantry neared the thirty-five hundred mark.


Battle of Thirty-Minute Creek
Company C, 3rd platoon
26 to 27 April 1945

On 26 April 1945, the third platoon, Company B, was in position on the Kennon road. It had been in support of the 136th Infantry for the past few weeks. The terrain was difficult mountains and deep draws. It was good country for the Japs who were fighting a delaying action, withdrawing toward their main defenses in the Baguio area.

The 136th Infantry was sending out a strong reinforced patrol to reconnoiter and clean out the area around "Half-way" and "Thirty-Minute" Creeks, where it was believed the enemy had a strong point. The third platoon's mortars were to be used in support of this patrol and fire supporting fires if the patrol ran into trouble. The platoon's forward observer moved up, registered in his mortars, and established his OP.

At about 1000 hours a request for a fire mission came down. The patrol had encountered strong enemy machine gun and mortar fire in the vicinity of Thirty-Minute Creek and was pinned down. The mortars were already registered and they laid in 425 rounds of HE and WP. At 1600 hours all the ammunition at the platoon position, with the exception of approximately 30 rounds of WP, had been expended. Two guns were then firing, each on a different azimuth and range. The number four gun section was firing continuous fire at five second intervals, when a "flash back" from a round ignited powder charges on eight rounds of WP that were on the "Ready" rack. The resultant ‘flare up" ignited dry brush and grass just adjacent to gun positions, and a medium strong wind carried the fire quickly around the south perimeter of the platoon area. The fire at the platoon positions was reported to the forward observer who ceased fire momentarily. This was a previous enemy position and there were numerous stacks of enemy ammunition concealed in the brush and Kunai grass near the platoon positions. When the grass fire reached this ammunition, it began to explode, throwing shrapnel and burning ammunition over the platoon position.

The platoon commander ordered the men at the gun positions to seek cover below a steep bank close to the position until the fire burned itself out; however, at this time a combat patrol requested an immediate smoke mission to cover its movements while it was going forward to remove some badly wounded men. The platoon commander requested volunteers to go back to the position with him and fire the concentration from the number four gun, which was still laid on this position. Four men immediately came forward and moved back to their gun positions and started firing the screen for the infantry. The number one gun section then returned to its position and started preparing and passing ammunition to the crew firing the mission. The number two section also voluntarily went up and carried the ammunition supply at their gun position over to the mortar firing the smoke screen. All these actions were voluntary, and while they were being carried out, the area in which the men were working was blanketed with shrapnel and burning ammunition. Disregarding the personal danger, these men continued firing the mortar until all ammunition remaining at the position had been expended. After completion of the fire mission, the men started removal of the platoon's equipment from the area. Due to the intensity of the fire and the exploding ammunition, only the important organizational equipment was removed.

At 1715 hours the fire and explosions still had not abated. The platoon moved to the company CP for the night and returned at 0715 hours on 27 April 1945 to the position. At 0735 hours the battalion commander, 3rd Battalion, 136th Infantry Regiment, was advised that this platoon was able to fire on call anytime with three mortars. Two hundred and ten rounds of HE ammunition were brought to the position by the platoon on its return.

This platoon was commended by the CO, 3rd Battalion, 136th Infantry Regiment, both for its work during the day and also for the last smoke mission fired during the fire at the platoon position. It was stated that the work of this platoon was chiefly responsible for the successful accomplishment of the mission of the patrol and for the successful removal of the wounded men from the forward area. A later reconnaissance of the target area revealed fifty-five dead Japs had resulted from 4.2" mortar fire.


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